15 Events that Defined the War in Ukraine - Modern DOCUMENTARY

Russia started its aggression against  Ukraine in 2014 despite promising to respect its sovereignty in many treaties,  including the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. In February 2022, Russian president Putin hoped to  win an easy victory and end Ukrainian sovereignty and freedom, but his foolhardy full-scale  invasion backfired. More than a year later, the war is still raging on, with tens of  thousands of soldiers and civilians dead and millions displaced. But how did  we reach this point? Here is

a video with 15 key events that defined Russia’s  unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine. We had to make sure we chose events that really  happened, and that we got the full picture, which is where our researchers come in. But for  the average news reader that isn’t a practical option, which is why we’re glad to say that we’re  sponsored today by Ground News. It’s the news service that tells you what all the big players in  news are saying, which helps you get a handle on the kinds of narrat

ives being produced, and what  kinds of people are getting access to what kinds of information about the world. For example, I’m  here on this story alleging serious war crimes against the Wagner Group. On the right we see how  many news outlets have talked about this so far, and the left-right political affiliations of  those sources. Then you get a list of all the stories in question, which you can go read if  you like, but most interesting is that Ground News assesses not only the sources’ pa

rtisan  position, but the balance of fact vs fiction, and who controls the source, which gives you a  head start seeing conflicts of interest, bias, and the possible origins and motivation of  misinformation. Similarly, they give you the news that some publications don’t with their  Blindspots analysis - you can see lists of stories that are only shown to certain political  affiliations, helping you avoid falling victim to polarization, and seeing why people tend to  view certain stories the way

they do. In short, you’ll be armed to face the modern news  industry and get a better view of what’s actually happening. To get started, go  to ground dot news slash kings generals, or you can get the same services on your phone  with the Ground News app. See the world from outside the news industry bubble and you’ll  never want to go back in, try Ground News today. 1. BATTLE OF KYIV When Russia launched its full-scale invasion  in February 2022, Kyiv was the key target. Capturing Kyiv would ha

ve expedited the fall of  the Ukrainian government and potentially inflicted a decisive blow on the resolve of the Ukrainian  army and its people to defend their country. Kyiv was arguably the crown jewel of the new  Russian imperial project aiming to restore the old borders of the Soviet Union. A lot was at  stake for Ukraine. All allies of Ukraine expected a quick capture of Kyiv and, in general, had  low confidence in the ability of the Ukrainian army and government to withstand the Russian 

pressure. Remember that in February 2022, the Russian army was still considered the second  strongest army in the world, its elite units and its enormous stockpile of tanks and armored  vehicles were still intact. On 24 February 2022, the Russian army moved from the city of Chornobyl,  along with the Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts, Ukraine was considered doomed. Footage of  ambushed and destroyed Russian tanks during its advance seemed nothing more than a consolation  prize for the valiantly defendi

ng Ukrainian army. Very soon, Russian operatives started their  diversions inside Kyiv, while the elite airborne units of the Russian army were fighting to take  over key airfields in Hostomel and Vasylkiv in the outskirts of Kyiv to create a foothold near  the capital. Within a few days, the Russian army reached Irpin, Bucha and several other towns near  Kyiv. But Russian losses kept mounting as the 72nd Mechanized Brigade, territorial defense units,  volunteers, National Guard units and newly

arrived international volunteers proved themselves  a tough nut to crack for the Russian army. Through the combination of successful  ambushes, the destruction of key bridges, which delayed the Russian units, and a fierce  defense of Ukrainians, Russians were stopped. Even the infamous 40-mile-long Russian tank  and armored column could not make a difference. Several times they were on the brink of breaking  through into Kyiv, such as during the battle of Moshchun in mid-March, but were eventual

ly  repelled with severe losses. Russian advance in the Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts was significant  but still fell short of threatening Kyiv. The Russian advance halted, and with it, their  momentum disappeared. It became clear that the Russian force dedicated to capturing Kyiv  was way smaller than they would have needed. They decided to switch their focus to Donbas,  where they still stand a chance of success. Thus, in early April, the Russian army withdrew  from the Kyiv, Sumy and Chernihiv o

blasts under the pretext of the Gesture of Good Will. To  this day, the Russian propaganda claims that the Russian army could have captured Kyiv had it  wanted to do so, or that Kyiv was actually never a target, but whatever they are trying to sell,  and however they are trying to portray this, it does not matter. Ukraine won the battle of  Kyiv and achieved arguably the biggest upset of modern military history and took a huge step  towards, at the very least, not losing this war. 2. INITIAL RUS

SIAN ADVANCE, CAPTURE OF KHERSON While the end-game of the Russian invasion of  Ukraine still puzzles analysts, simultaneous attacks on several axes indicated the intention  of Putin. There was an assault on Kyiv through Chornobyl, Chernihiv oblast and Sumy oblast;  on Kharkiv from Belgorod; on North Luhansk from Russia and the occupied portion of Donbas; on  Kherson and the Zaporizhia oblasts from Crimea. Had all of these offensives succeeded, Russia  would have undoubtedly moved to occupy, at

the very least, the left bank of the river  Dnipro and the key city of Odesa. Perhaps more. This overly ambitious and optimistic plan fell  well short of being executed as Ukraine offered a level of resistance which virtually nobody  expected from them. Russia suffered heavy losses and was defeated in the Battle of Kyiv and had  to leave all of northern Ukraine by April 2022. Russia failed to capture Kharkiv. Since the  expectation from the Russian army was a quick victory everywhere all at once

, setbacks in Kyiv  and Kharkiv overshadowed a significant advance of the Russian army in the south and the east of  Ukraine. On March 2, Russia captured Kherson, the only regional center they had managed  to occupy since the start of the war. They advanced from there to the right bank of  the river Dnipro, along with capturing large swathes of the Zaporizhia oblast. By May,  they had completed the capture of Mariupol. A significant portion of the Kharkiv oblast  was taken under Russian control.

The initial Russian advance culminated in the summer when  Russia finally captured Sieverodonetsk and Lysychansk after months of fighting. This put all  of the Luhansk oblast under Russian occupation. Russia achieved several strategic  goals in the war's first 3-4 months. They created a land bridge between Russia and  Crimea. They created a bridgehead on the right bank of Dnipro to threaten strategic Odesa.  They ensured the blockade of key Ukrainian ports instrumental for Ukrainian exports. Bu

t time  showed us that the Russian occupation force was too small to protect its initial success. 3. WESTERN SANCTIONS As we have already pointed out on numerous  occasions, virtually everyone predicted a quick victory for Russia at the start of the  war. Western pundits argued that the United States and the European Union would add a  few more irritating sanctions on Russia, which would fall well short of having a  decisive impact on the Russian economy, similar to what happened after the ann

exation  of Crimea in 2014. The common theme of analysts was that very soon after Russia won the war,  everything would return to business as usual. But the overachievement of the Ukrainian army  on the first days of the war, the refusal of president Zelensky and the Ukrainian government  to give up without fighting changed the script and the narrative. Even though this seemed  very unlikely, just a few days into the war, western countries decided to disconnect major  Russian banks from the SWIF

T international payment system, which was seen as the most  painful sanction to be imposed upon Russia. Russian assets in western countries worth  some 1 trillion dollars were frozen. Almost all major western corporations  have stopped doing business in Russia. Import of several Russian commodities was banned,  along with the export of western technologies and spare parts necessary for maintaining Russian  industry. The European Union even agreed to ban sea oil imports and impose a price  cap fo

r Russian oil and gas. Considering Europe’s long-term dependence on Russian  energy exports, this was a remarkable step. Have the Western sanctions worked? If the  goal was to force the Kremlin to withdraw from Ukraine immediately, this has certainly not  worked. But arguably, the more realistic goal is to gradually degrade the Russian economy to the  point when waging war would become unsustainable. As the EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell  told the European Parliament, “the sanctions are a

slow-action poison. It takes time”. In  2022 the Russian economy shrank only by 2.2%, according to the IMF, or 4.5%, according to the  World Bank. The Russian Central Bank has been using available resources to stabilize the ruble  and the Russian economy in general. Additionally, energy prices soared last year due to the  unpredictability of the war, which has ironically allowed Russia to make huge profits from energy.  Russia has been diverting its economy from Western markets to mostly China

and India, and although  this is a long process, these two countries have already been purchasing much of the Russian energy  commodities. For instance, India has had a 16-fold increase in oil imports from Russia since the  start of the war. However, both of these countries buy Russian energy at a considerable discount,  lower than even the price cap imposed by the West. As a result, the Russian economy has been running  considerable deficits in January and February, with the budgetary revenues

down by almost 30%. The Russian economy is standing for now, but as energy prices have had a downward  trend and the Western countries are trying harder to eliminate loopholes in sanction  regimes, it may start suffering more. It is too early to make a definitive judgment  on the effectiveness of western sanctions, but in the short-term the Russian economy has  surely not crumbled under the sanctions regime. 4. BATTLE OF MARIUPOL Before the invasion, Mariupol was an important industrial center o

f Ukraine and  one of the key ports for Ukraine’s global trade. It became the target of Russian aggression in  2014, when their proxies first took control of the city before being expelled by Ukrainian forces.  But when the Russian invasion was launched, Mariupol again became the focus of the Russian  army’s attention. It started being shelled on the very first day of the war. Very soon, the Russians  advanced on the city, and by March, Mariupol was surrounded. The city's siege had begun, and it

  was under uninterrupted shelling and airstrikes. Several attempts to evacuate civilians failed as  a humanitarian disaster unfolded in front of the world. On March 9, a Russian airstrike destroyed  a maternity ward and a children’s hospital. On March 16, hundreds were killed in an airstrike  on the Dram Theater of Mariupol, where civilians had taken shelter. By mid-March, Russians  were already making gains inside the city, with chances of the Ukrainian defenders breaking  the encirclement dim

inishing to non-existent. Russians gradually advanced deep into the  city by methodically destroying all pockets of resistance. The Ukrainian air force conducted  several helicopter missions to provide military and medical supplies to besieged defenders of  Mariupol, which surely boosted their morale, but in the grand scheme of things, was not nearly  enough to change the situation. Ultimately, the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works, a huge facility  with a vast network of buildings and underground t

unnels, became the sole pocket of resistance,  where the Azov regiment and remaining Ukrainian defenders continued fighting. Their defiant  resistance continued until May 20, when Ukrainian soldiers had no other option but to surrender.  The Azovstal resistance was not only a symbolic act of courage by the Ukrainian defenders, which  won the sympathy of many worldwide. It also fixed a significant portion of the Russian occupation  force in Mariupol, which could have been used in the Zaporizhia o

blast or Donbas, enabling the  Russian army to capture more Ukrainian territories at the time Russians were still advancing.  Still, Russia captured Mariupol after months of fierce fighting, completing the important task of  creating a land bridge between Russia and Crimea. 5. MOSKVA CRUISER SINKING Despite the fact that Ukraine had almost no navy and no one expected this, the Black Sea  became one of the theatres of the war in Ukraine. Russia has historically strived to make the  Black Sea its

internal lake and enjoyed a strong presence in the Black Sea at the start of  the war in Ukraine with the Soviet-made Moskva cruiser as the flagship of the Russian Black Sea  fleet. The Black Sea Fleet has been used for the naval blockade of Ukraine, for support of ground  operations of the Russian army and for the capture of the Zmiinyi Island at the beginning of the war.  As the Ukrainian navy was significantly weakened by the capture of its vessels and defections to  Russia during the illegal

annexation of Crimea in 2014, along with losing some of its vessels  at the beginning of the Russian invasion, it has not posed a major problem for the Russian  navy. But the 1936 Montreux Convention allowed Turkey to close the Straits in wartime, which  caused a far greater problem for the Russian presence in the Black Sea during this war, as  it couldn’t bring new ships to the Black sea. On 14 April 2022, the Moskva cruiser was sunk  a day after being struck by Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship cru

ise missiles. Russia did not mention  Ukraine in its official statement regarding the incident stating that it occurred due to an  explosion of ammunition on board. The number of casualties of the Moskva sinking is still unclear  as claims range from 40 to 600. To this point, Russia has not been able to replace the Moskva  with two other missile cruisers of a similar class it possesses due to the Montreux Convention. After  the sinking, Russia was forced to move its Black Sea Fleet further away

to about 80 nautical  miles from the Ukraine-controlled territory, effectively making any landing operation against  Odesa or Mykolaiv impossible. Moskva was the Russian ship with the most advanced  anti-missile and anti-air capabilities and had to defend smaller ships, so its sinking  complicated the naval operations considerably. Russia also suffered reputational  damage caused by the Moskva sinking. The Russian Black Sea Fleet was perceived  to be safe from any threats from Ukraine, but the U

kraine-made Neptune missiles begged to  differ. The Moskva cruiser had a symbolic meaning for Putin personally, as he had sailed on it on  several occasions, and this incident was a huge morale boost and propaganda win for Ukraine during  the toughest first several months of the war. 6. BATTLE OF SEVERODONETSK When Russia withdrew from Kyiv and North Ukraine in early April,  it refocused its efforts on Donbas. By then, most of Luhansk oblast was already  under the Russian occupation, but Ukraine

still controlled Lysychansk, Severodonetsk and several  other towns nearby. It was a Ukrainian-controlled salient which stuck like a sore thumb for Russia,  and in April, they gathered some 12.5k troops and a massive artillery force to capture it. In May,  Russia captured the towns of Popasna and Rubizhne, crucial for the control of Severodonetsk. But the  Russian advance was not coming easy. For instance, on May 10, the Ukrainian army destroyed at least 1  Russian Battalion Tactical Group when

it tried to cross the pontoon bridge across the Siverskyi  Donets river near Bilohorivka, with dozens of tanks and IFVs destroyed. Still, despite heavy  losses, Russians continued making steady gains. In late May, they took the battle into  Severodonetsk. Despite some successful counter-attacks of the Ukrainian army  inside the city, the Russian firepower advantage was immense and decisive. On June 9,  the Ukrainian governor of Luhansk oblast Serhiy Haidai reported that Russia had captured 90%

of  Severodonetsk. The Ukrainian commander-in-Chief Zaluzhny blamed the Russian advance in this  section on a “tenfold advantage” in artillery. On June 24, the Ukrainian forces withdrew from  the city, as their defensive positions were becoming untenable and the risk of encirclement  growing. A few days later, Lysychansk fell too. The capture of Severodonetsk was the culmination  of the Russian offensive in the second phase of the war. With this victory, the Russian army  took all of the Luhansk

oblast under its control, which was an important propaganda win. But they  also took heavy losses in the process, something the Ukrainian army would take advantage of in  just two months. Moreover, the Russian artillery advantage in the battle of Severodonetsk prompted  the United States to finally agree to Ukrainian requests to supply them with HIMARS MLRS, which  helped Ukraine to turn the tide in this war. 7. HIMARS O’CLOCK; TANKS FOR UKRAINE! The Russian aggression against Ukraine began in

2014, but the west only started supplying  weapons in 2018. Even as the United States and Europe were ringing alarm bells about the imminent  Russian invasion, their military assistance to Kyiv remained limited. Initially, weapons provided  to Ukraine were mostly defensive, such as Javelin and NLAW portable anti-tank weapons and  Stinger portable anti-aircraft weapons. The goal of these supplies was to limit the impact  of the massive superiority of Russia in tanks, armoured vehicles and militar

y aircraft. These  weapons are also suitable for guerilla warfare, which is what many military commentators  expected the war to evolve into. Instead, these weapons played a key role in  stalling the initial Russian advance. Ukrainians destroyed scores of Russian tanks and armored  vehicles in ambushes with Javelin and NLAW, often targeting the first and the last vehicles  in long Russian columns, making it very difficult for all the vehicles in between to move. Stingers  destroyed several Russi

an military aircraft, which was the first step towards denying air superiority  to Russians. But as the Russian Blietzkrig-Z failed, they switched to their usual tactic of  massing artillery in their targeted sections, and shelling them into obliteration. This tactic  enabled the Russian army to progress in Donbas, notably capturing Sieverodonetsk and Lysychansk in  the summer of 2022, which remains the last major success of the Kremlin in Ukraine as of 31st of  March. This prompted the United S

tates to supply HIMARS MLRS with a precision-guided munition of  80 km range around the same time. HIMARS became a game-changer for the Ukrainian army. News  of the destruction of Russian military bases, ammunition depots, oil depots and other military  assets started flowing almost daily. Russia could not afford to use the same tactic anymore and  eventually was forced to withdraw its military assets deeper into the occupied area outside  HIMARS's range. This halted the Russian offensive and en

abled the Ukrainian army to finally catch  the momentum and liberate large swaths of land in several months. As Russia retaliated with drone  and missile attacks on the critical Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, the West started  supplying air defence systems to Ukraine. But by late 2022, the Ukrainian advance stalled  too. It became evident that Ukraine would need to improve the tank and armored vehicle capacity  of its army to launch another counter-offensive. After months of negotiations, We

stern allies  finally agreed to cross the self-imposed red line of not providing western-made tanks to  Ukraine, as the United States pledged Abrams, the UK pledged Challenger 2, while Germany and the  EU members promised Leopard 2 main battle tanks, along with dozens of other significant military  deliveries. According to different estimates, Ukraine’s allies have provided military assistance  worth 40-50 billion dollars within a year since the start of the full-scale invasion, the lion's  shar

e of which belongs to the United States at around 30 billion dollars. It is impossible  to understate the significance of this aid, as Western military support has enabled the  Ukrainian army first to stop the Russian army and then launch its own offensives. It has  given Ukraine a chance actually to win this war. Ukraine is currently discussing the delivery  of fighter jets and long-range precision weapons with its western allies, who are so far  reluctant to cross another self-imposed red line

. But if the first year of the war has taught us  anything, it is that while the West may be slow in reacting to Ukrainian needs and is proceeding  with the utmost caution, it eventually delivers. 8. KHERSON COUNTER-OFFENSIVE After the capture of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk by July 2022, the frontline  stabilized in Ukraine for a bit. It seemed like the Russian assault capabilities had been  diminished after months of costly battles, while Ukraine was waiting for more Western military  support

and an opportune moment to strike. The Ukrainian political and military leadership  started telegraphing their intent to launch a counter-attack on the occupied portion of the  Kherson oblast on the right bank of Dnipro. Obviously, deception is a key component of the  art of war, and it was strange that Ukraine had been so open about its intentions. But  their statements about Kherson prompted the Russian command to transfer some of its  forces in Kharkiv oblast and Donbas to their bridgehead on

the right bank of Dnipro, which  may have been the Ukrainian intention all along. In July, Ukraine started using HIMARS against  Russian bases, logistical lines, ammunition and fuel depots and other components of its military  infrastructure on the right bank of Dnipro. But the key target of HIMARS strikes were bridges  across Dnipro, including the Antonivka bridge, which enabled Russians to transfer  troops and equipment to the right bank. These HIMARS strikes severely crippled the Russian  mi

litary infrastructure on the right bank putting their troops in the region in a precarious  position. They also forced the Russian army to relocate some of its military infrastructure  to the left bank out of range of HIMARS. The strikes continued throughout July and August,  gradually weakening the Russian military strength in the area. While both Ukraine and Russia  attempted several minor assaults on the right bank of Dnipro in this period, it  led only to minor changes on the ground. On Augu

st 29, a large-scale counter-offensive  was finally launched by Ukraine on the right bank of Dnipro. The Ukrainian army immediately broke  through the first line of defence and liberated several villages and towns. But the Ukrainian  advance was initially slow and the government officials called for patience and not to expect a  quick victory. Heavy fighting with slow Ukrainian progress continued in September, when Russia  announced the annexation of the Kherson oblast. In early October, Ukraine

achieved an important  breakthrough, rapidly advancing along the bank of Dnipro for up to 30 kilometres. Ukrainian  assaults were accompanied by regular HIMARS strikes on the Russian military infrastructure and  logistical lines in the area, further crippling their capacity to defend the occupied areas. On  October 18, the new Russian commander in Ukraine, Sergei Surovikin, admitted that defending Kherson  would be difficult. Steady, but slow Ukrainian advance continued. The Ukrainian command w

ould  have preferred the liberation of the right bank of Dnipro to be accompanied by the surrender of  the formidable Russian contingent in the area but chose to progress slowly to prevent any  surprises, which allowed the Russian troops to start leaving this area in early November.  Finally, on November 11, the Ukrainian army entered the city of Kherson putting an end to the  Russian occupation on the right bank of Dnipro. The Kherson counter-offensive is one of the most  important victories of

Ukraine in this war. The anticipation of the counter-offensive forced  the Russian command to relocate troops from the Kharkiv oblast, enabling the Ukrainian army to  launch another counter-offensive there as well. Both of these resounding victories  demonstrated to the world that Ukraine is capable of both valiantly defending  itself and conducting successful offensives. This was an important morale boost for  the Ukrainian army and society while demonstrating to Ukraine’s western allies that 

further military support would not be in vain. 9. KHARKIV COUNTER-OFFENSIVE Although Russia failed to capture Kharkiv, it occupied a significant portion of the Kharkiv  oblast in the initial offensive at the start of the war. By the time the Ukrainian army  stabilized the situation, important logistical hubs of the Kharkiv oblast, like Izium, Balakliya  and Kupiansk, were under Russian control. Kharkiv was regularly shelled, and battles continued  for months without much to show for either side

. It increasingly seemed like both sides had  deprioritized this front. And the Ukrainian army took advantage of this masterfully. For months the  Ukrainian government and army officials, including president Zelensky, told the world about their  intention to counter-attack in the Kherson oblast. Evidently, Russia took the bait and redeployed  some of its troops from the Kharkiv oblast to the right bank of Dnipro. On the eve of the  Kharkiv counter-offensive, several Russian Telegram channels war

ned about the increased  Ukrainian deployment activity on this front, but for some reason, the Russian command chose  not to react and prepare in any way. Moreover, Ukrainians launched several notable HIMARS strikes  on Russian military infrastructure in the occupied Kharkiv oblast in preparation for their assault. On September 6, the Ukrainian army launched its counter-offensive, which surprised the  Russian army. Unlike in Kherson, this time, they managed a quick advance by bypassing  Russian

positions and attacking their rear, forcing the Russian troops suffering from poor  morale and being undermanned to panic and flee. On September 8, Ukrainians liberated Balakliya.  Two days later, they took Izium without much fighting. Russians were being routed and  leaving large amounts of military equipment. By September 13, Ukrainians liberated all  the territory west of the river Oskil. Russians intended to create their new defensive  line there, but Ukrainian progress continued. On the sam

e day, they established a bridgehead  on the East bank of Oskil near Borova. 3 days later, the strategic town of Kupiansk  was liberated. Almost every day, the news of the liberation of numerous towns and villages would  flow. Russians struggled to establish a solid front, and the Ukrainian advance continued until  October 1, when the Ukrainian army retook Lyman. The new front emerged along the Svatove-Kreminna  line, which is still the case as of late March. The Kharkiv counter-offensive was a

huge success  for the Ukrainian army. They liberated over 500 settlements and 12k square kilometres of Ukrainian  land. This devastating success forced the Kremlin to conduct an unpopular mobilization and speed  up its sham referenda on occupied territories. More importantly, just like it was  in the Kherson counter-offensive, the Ukrainian army proved that  it is capable of attacking too. 10. ATTACK ON THE CRIMEAN BRIDGE The morning of 8 October 2022 brought astonishing  news to everyone follow

ing the war in Ukraine. Despite apocalyptic warnings by the former  president of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev and other Russian officials, Ukraine heavily damaged  the Kerch Bridge through a still unclear method. Let’s give a little context about the  importance of the Kerch Bridge. This bridge connects the Taman Peninsula of Russia  with the illegally annexed Crimea. It consists of a highway and railroad, which became the  key supply line connecting Russia to Crimea. Putin opened the bridge personal

ly in 2018 to  highlight its symbolic and strategic importance to Russia. It was supposed to demonstrate that  Crimea is now home to Mother Russia forever. Only Ukraine had other ideas about this. The incident footage shows that a truck carrying explosives exploded on the highway  bridge, simultaneously causing the explosion of 7 fuel tanks on the railway bridge. Other  reputable sources claim that the blast may have been caused by maritime drones or missile strikes.  Whatever the source of the

explosion on the Kerch Bridge has been, it has caused significant damage  to both bridges. This has delayed the delivery of supplies to Crimea, and one has to remember  that while there are other supply routes to Crimea through the occupied Donbas and Zaporizhia  oblast, the Kerch Bridge is a crucial alternative, and Russia cannot afford to lose it, if it  intends to keep Crimea under its control. Russia is currently conducting very active  repair works on the bridge, intending to restore its fu

ll operability in July 2023. It is also worth noting that the retaliation of the Kremlin to this embarrassing and  painful attack demonstrated that the only remaining tool of escalation for Russia is  the nuclear weapon, the probability of use of which is extremely unlikely. Yes, Russia struck  several Ukrainian cities with cruise missiles, which was tragic to all victims of these attacks  in retaliation. But Russia has been attacking Ukrainian cities throughout the war anyway, and  the retaliat

ion demonstrated that Medvedev’s regular warnings about the nuclear apocalypse  should be taken with a huge grain of salt. 11. RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION In hindsight, it is now absolutely clear that the  size of the Russian occupation force at the start of the war was small and inadequate to its grand  ambitions of capturing almost all of Ukraine. Evidently, the initial Russian strategy  relied upon a false premise of the weakness of the Ukrainian statehood and its army, which  was supposedly going t

o crumble in the face of the elite Russian VDV (airborne troops) and a  never-ending stream of Russian tanks. The size of the Russian army sent to take over Ukraine in  February was estimated to be between 150 and 200k troops. As Russia sought to capture all of Kyiv,  Kharkiv, Donbas, and Odesa, while employing very poor tactics such as continuous frontal assaults  and facing powerful Ukrainian resistance, they started taking heavy losses. Crypto-mobilization  efforts, such as the recruitment of

inmates by the Wagner PMC and the creation of volunteer  battalions by republics of the Russian Federation, have not been sufficient to change this situation  radically. And as the Russian offensive momentum stalled in the summer of 2022, it became evident  that Russian lines had been stretched extremely thin, with the number of soldiers nowhere near  enough to hold huge swathes of occupied territory. One of the key reasons behind the Russian  disaster in the Kharkiv counter-offensive was that

the Russian army simply did not have  enough men to defend, hence they were routed. There was news of lost territories  almost every day in September 2022, and the Russian public was increasingly unhappy.  This prompted Putin to use one of the last remaining cards up his sleeves to escalate  and turn the tide of the war - mobilization. He ordered a partial mobilization on 21  September 2022, despite promising not to do that on numerous occasions before that. The exact number of people to be mobi

lized was not reported and is still debated. The defense  minister Shoigu stated that 300k reservists would be mobilized, while some claimed the number  to be much higher at 1.2 million people. Russian military conscription offices conducted  a chaotic execution of the mobilization order, evidenced by numerous tragicomic videos  demonstrating poor accommodation and supply of the Russian mobiks. Some mobilized were  sent to the battlefield almost immediately, while others went through the trainin

g process,  the effectiveness of which is difficult to assess. Although the execution of mobilization has  been heavily criticized even in Russia, the sheer number of people brought to  fight in Ukraine, trained or untrained, well-equipped or poorly equipped, made a  difference. They bolstered Russian lines, and enabled them to create reserves, which  prevented the Ukrainian army from liberating any further territory after the Kharkiv and  Kherson counter-offensives. Some argue that the Kremlin

will order another mobilization very soon,  but there has been no confirmation of this yet. 12. RUSSIAN ATTACKS ON UKRAINIAN INFRASTRUCTURE When Ukraine managed to catch the offensive momentum in this war in the fall of 2022, Russia  made two important decisions to regain the initiative. First, they conducted mobilization to  bolster the ranks of the occupation force. Second, the Kremlin decided to launch a campaign of  mass strikes against the Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. Make no mistake,

Russia had  been striking Ukrainian cities, their civilian infrastructure, residential buildings, bridges  and other objects since the start of the war. But since October 2022, Russian strikes have  started being more systematic and regular. One of the main targets was the Ukrainian  energy infrastructure, which aimed to cripple the Ukrainian power supply to industries and  households. The idea was to hit the Ukrainian energy infrastructure hard throughout cold months  and leave ordinary Ukrain

ians without heating and power, which was going to supposedly make them  force their government to acquiesce to Russian demands. Russians have been using Iranian-made  Shahed kamikaze drones , cruise missiles, Iskander ballistic missiles, S-300 air defense  missiles and even Kinzhal hypersonic ballistic missiles against Ukrainian cities throughout  this period. These pushed Ukraine’s western allies to finally start supplying western-made  air defence systems such as Patriot, IRIS T, and NASAMS,

which have helped Ukraine to mitigate  this threat. But Ukraine still struggles to shoot down Kinzhal missiles, S-300 missiles, as  it lacks the weapons to do that. Ukraine’s energy infrastructure was under extreme duress for  several months, and at times, households would be without power for several days in a row. It has  caused a few small-scale spontaneous protests. But since February 2023, the Ukrainian government  has seemingly managed to stabilize the situation. The power supply to househ

olds has become much  more stable and regular. This has been possible for several reasons, such as the apparent  inability of Russia to sustain the intensity of strikes on Ukrainian cities it had in October,  November and December and significant support from Ukraine’s allies in supplying the country with  generators, other energy supply facilities and financial help to alleviate this problem. So  far, Ukraine has been able to avoid the worst and seems to have adapted to Russian missile  and dro

ne strikes to minimize their impact. 13. BATTLE OF BAKHMUT Bakhmut is one of many cities in the densely  populated industrial region of Donbas of Ukraine. Back in 2014, some clashes occurred in the  city, but the Ukrainian forces quickly expelled Russian-backed troops from Bakhmut. Following  their defeat in the battle of Kyiv, the Russians switched their primary focus to Donbas. After  the fall of Popasna in May 2022, followed by the capture of Sieverodonetsk and Lysychansk, Bakhmut  became the

main target of Russia in Donbas. It is important to remember the context here.  Since it became clear that the Ukrainian government would not fall and that capturing  Kyiv, Odesa, and other big cities was more of a pipe dream than a realistic goal, the Kremlin  changed its narrative, switching the focus from Ukraine overall to specifically Donbas. Capturing  Donbas and reaching the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts became a more  achievable goal that Russia started to pursue

. Bakhmut is a strategically important logistics  hub of Donbas, so capturing it is a must for the Russian army if they intend to move on Sloviansk  and Kramatorsk, as is expected from them. Fighting in and around Bakhmut started in August,  when Russian forces advanced to the city's outskirts, gaining ground in villages and towns  around Bakhmut. But the back and forth between Russian and Ukrainian armies continued until  November, as sides repeatedly captured and lost the same ground. Even as

Russia suffered setbacks  in the Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts, Wagner and other units continued assaulting Bakhmut, but  until November, the battle of Bakhmut was mostly a slow-paced trench warfare with significant  Russian losses. That is when Wagner and regular Russian units went on an offensive and started  to grind gradually through Ukrainian defenses. The significance of Bakhmut for Ukraine became  further evident when Zelensky visited it in December amidst heavy fighting. The biggest  Russi

an breakthrough occurred after Wagner's occupation of the small town of Soledar in  January. Since then, the Russian army has been expanding its area of control around Bakhmut.  Ukraine now has only one supply line to Bakhmut left, and in March, the Ukrainians withdrew from  the eastern part of Bakhmut to more advantageous defensive positions on the Zabakhmutka river.  Different reports indicate that the United States has advised Ukraine to withdraw from Bakhmut  completely to the next line of d

efense, but so far, the Ukrainian command has decided to stay  put and fight. As of late March, Bakhmut holds. 14. BUCHA MASSACRE Bucha is a small town near Kyiv. Before the war in Ukraine, most people outside of Ukraine  probably did not know about the existence of this inconspicuous town. We first heard about this  town, when Russia assaulted it at the start of the war. Then we read about a humanitarian catastrophe  in Bucha, as sides fought fiercely for control. Ukrainian media started report

ing  about Russian soldiers' indiscriminate killing of civilians in Bucha. On March  9, the Ukrainian government evacuated 20k residents from Bucha amidst heavy fighting. Rumors  and reports of atrocities continued circulating, but the scale of the tragedy inflicted on  Bucha by the Russian army became apparent only as the 64th Separate Motorized Brigade, the  76th Guards Air Assault Brigade, and other units withdrew from the town and the Ukrainian forces  moved in. According to the Ukrainian go

vernment, 458 civilians were killed in Bucha, while the  UN confirmed the killing of 73 civilians and investigated 105 cases. Civilians were killed  indiscriminately. Some of them were killed in their homes during door-to-door raids. Apparently,  others were killed on the streets while they were minding their own business and going on with  their daily routines. There were signs of torture, mutilation, and rape on some bodies. Russians  tried to hide traces of their atrocities by burning bodies

and digging mass graves. Of  course, Russia denied its responsibility and claimed that this was fake news spread by  enemies of Russia and that everything was orchestrated in order to blame the Russian army.  But international human rights organizations, prominent media outlets, and satellite footage all  pointed at the Russian army as the perpetrator. Similar atrocities have been revealed in other  temporarily occupied towns like Izium and Trostyanets too. The Bucha massacre was shocking  in it

self, by being such an unspeakable tragedy, but it was not shocking in terms of the history  of the atrocities committed by the Russian army. 15. GRAIN DEAL Even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, food prices were hitting record highs on the  market due to the pandemic-caused disruption of supply lines and a hike in energy prices. But  the war in Ukraine could have turned it into a full-scale crisis with potentially disastrous  consequences in the poorest parts of the world. At the start of

the war, Ukraine had 10% of  global wheat exports, along with being the world's largest exporter of sunflower oil  and one of the largest exporters of corn. Russia and Ukraine combined had 27% of  global wheat export and 53% of sunflower and seed exports. Many African countries imported a  significant portion of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine, with 15 of those countries having more  than half of their imports from the warring sides. Since Russia blockaded Ukraine's maritime  trade routes,

Ukraine could not export its wheat to global markets. The matter was further  complicated as Ukraine placed naval mines on its shores to prevent Russian assault from  the sea. Along with that, in response to the Western sanctions, Russia decided to stop  exporting fertilizers to global markets. In April 2022, the UN and Turkey started mediating  between sides to avoid a global food crisis. Negotiations continued for almost 3 months when  on July 22, the warring sides finally signed the Grain Dea

l. Russia and Ukraine did not sign any  agreement with each other, instead choosing to sign separate mirror agreements with the UN and  Turkey. The deal envisaged the safe export of wheat and fertilizers from Odesa, Chornomorsk  and Yuzhne through a special corridor in the Black Sea. Turkey assumed the responsibility of  inspecting all vessels carrying relevant produce. The agreement was signed for 4 months, but  since then, it has been renewed several times, most recently on 18 March 2023. At o

ne point on 29  October 2022, Russia suspended its participation in response to Ukraine’s attack on the port of  Sevastopol, occupied by Russia. But Russia’s refusal to participate was basically ignored, as  Ukraine continued exporting its products with the UN's and Turkey's approval. 4 days later, Russia  confirmed the resumption of its participation in the grain deal claiming that Ukraine agreed  not to use the special corridor for military needs. Ukraine refuted this claim stating that  no fu

rther guarantees were provided to Russia, as Ukraine does not intend to use the corridor  for military uses anyway. While the Grain Deal was later criticized by Russia under the pretext that  the majority of the Ukrainian export ended up in Western countries, it was still a major positive  step for stabilizing the global food market. Unfortunately, the war rages on, so we will  continue this series. If you don’t want to miss any episodes, make sure you are subscribed and  have pressed the bell b

utton to see them. Please, consider liking, subscribing, commenting,  and sharing - it helps immensely. Recently we have started releasing weekly patron and youtube  member exclusive content, consider joining their ranks via the link in the description or button  under the video to watch these weekly videos, learn about our schedule, get early access  to our videos, access our private discord, and much more. This is the Kings and Generals  channel, and we will catch you on the next one.