In the annals of Sahih Muslim hadiths, one particular saying has resonated
with the Islamic resistance movement and found its place in the charter of Hamas. Hamas, officially known
as the Islamic Resistance Movement, is a Sunni Islamist organization
with a dual political and military role. This group currently exercises governance over the Gaza Strip
within the Palestinian territories. Its inception can be traced back to the early days
of the first Palestinian Intifada, a period marked by a sust
ained series
of protests and violent uprisings initiated by Palestinians in response
to the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip. The spark that ignited
the first Intifada was an incident that occurred on December 9th, 1987,
in the Jabalia refugee camp. An Israeli Defense Forces
truck was involved in a collision with a civilian car, resulting
in the death of four Palestinian laborers, three of whom hailed from
the Jabalia refugee camp. Palestinians allege that this acc
ident
was a deliberate retaliation for the earlier
killing of an Israeli in Gaza. Israel, on the other hand,
vehemently denied any intentionality or coordination
behind the crash. The Palestinian response to this incident
was characterized by a wave of protests, civil disobedience and sporadic violence. The landscape was marked
by graffiti, barricades and a proliferation of stone
throwing and Molotov cocktails directed at the IDF and its installations across the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These c
onfrontations
contrasted with civil efforts, including general strikes,
boycotts of Israeli civil administration institutions
in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and an economic boycott encompassing
a refusal to work in Israeli settlements. Abstention from purchasing Israeli products, nonpayment of taxes
and a boycott of Palestinian vehicles with Israeli licenses. In response to this unrest, Israel
deployed an extensive force of around 80,000 soldiers,
while its countermeasures, which initially
included the use of live
rounds, attracted criticism for their perceived disproportionality. Amidst these tumultuous times, three influential figures,
namely Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and Salah Shehadeh,
among others, exhorted the populace to rise against Israeli forces,
particularly after mosque services. In the wake of these protests
against Israel. Hamas was founded by al-Rantisi
and Yassin with roots going back to Amheds Mujama al-Islamiya, a religious charity
affiliated wi
th the Egypt based Muslim Brotherhood, which had been established
in Gaza in 1973. Before the first intifada the Israeli administration
had looked favorably on the work of Sheikh Yassin and his Islamist
group, Mujama al-Islamiya. Israel recognized the group as a charity and in 1979 as an association,
while also endorsing their establishment of the Islamic University of Gaza,
which later became a hotbed of militancy. Israel may have wanted to nurture a counterforce to the
then enemy Yasser Arafat
's Fatah party and the Palestinian Liberation
Organization, or PLO. Whatever the motives, Hamas was to soon turn on Israel. Ahmed Yassin was born in al-Jura, a small village near the city of Ashkelon
within the British mandate of Palestine. Forced to flee along with his family,
they settled in al-Shati camp after their village was subjected
to ethnic cleansing by the Israel Defense Forces during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. The other co-founder of Hamas,
Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, was born in Yibna ne
ar Jaffa in 1947,
and his family were forced to flee to the Gaza Strip during the 1948
Arab-Israeli War. In 1956, at the age of nine, Israeli soldiers killed his uncle in Khan Younis. Rantisi pursued his studies
in pediatric medicine and genetics at Egypt's Alexandria University,
graduating at the top of his class. He became a certified physician
and during his time in Egypt, became an ardent member
of the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1976,
he returned to Gaza to teach parasitology and genetics at the
Islamic University. Hamas's initial foray against Israel occurred in the spring of 1989, when the organization abducted
and killed two Israeli soldiers, Avi Sasportas and Ilan Saadon. During this period, figures
such as Shehade and Sinwar were imprisoned in Israeli
facilities. Hamas subsequently established
a new entity called Unit 101, led by Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, with the explicit mission
of abducting soldiers, the discovery of Sasportas'
body prompted an intense Israeli response characterized
by the arrest
of numerous Hamas leaders and activists, including Yassin,
who was sentenced to life in prison. This marked the outlawing of Hamas. Mass detentions, along with a subsequent
wave of arrests in 1990, effectively dismantled the organization
to adapt and evade detection. Hamas decentralized its command structure,
making its operations more diffuse. These actions were undertaken in response
to the anger that followed the Al-Aqsa massacre of October
1990, during which Israeli security f
orces employed live ammunition against Palestinians
in the Al-Aqsa compound, killing 17 Palestinians
as they tried to prevent Jewish Orthodox extremists from placing
a foundation stone for the Third Temple on the Temple Mount. In the shadow of what became
known as Black Monday, Hamas declared every Israeli soldier
a legitimate target and called for a “Jihad against the Zionist enemy
everywhere in all fronts and every means”. Consequently, Hamas restructured itself, merging the units al-Majd and
al-Mujahidun al-Filastiniun to form a military wing
known as the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. This military wing was led by Yahya
Ayyash. The name "Izz ad-Din al-Qassam" is a homage to the Palestinian nationalist leader,
Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, who fought against the British
and whose death in 1935 played a significant role in sparking the 1936 1939 Arab revolt in Palestine. Yahya Ayyash, an engineering graduate
from Birzeit University was known for his expertise in bomb making, signifi
cantly enhancing Hamas offensive capabilities. This proficiency earned him the nickname "al-Muhandis" or "the Engineer”. He played a pivotal role in Hamas's
adoption of suicide bombings, arguing Until his assassination in 1996, nearly all bombs used in suicide
missions were constructed by him. In December 1992, Israel responded to the killing
of a border police officer by deporting 415 members of Hamas
and Islamic Jihad to southern Lebanon, which was under Israeli occupation
at the time. In Leba
non, Hamas established connections with Hezbollah and Palestinian residents
of refugee camps, learning how to construct suicide and car bombs. The Israeli deportations were accompanied by a two week
curfew imposed on the Gaza Strip, resulting in a daily economic loss
of approximately $1,810,000. The deportees were allowed to return
nine months later. This action by Israel
sparked international condemnation, and the United Nations Security Council
passed a unanimous resolution condemning the depo
rtations. In response,
Hamas ordered two car bombings. Hamas conducted its first suicide bombing at Mahola Junction
in the West Bank in April 1993. The attack involved a car
parked between two busses carrying soldiers. Besides the suicide bomber, the blast resulted in the death
of a Palestinian. The device had design flaws,
but Hamas would soon improve its bomb making techniques,
creating increasingly lethal explosives. This level of violence was not typical
during the initial years of the Intif
ada. Early Hamas violence
was primarily directed at Palestinians, particularly those perceived as Israeli collaborators. Hamas’s actions during the first Intifada played a role in expanding its popularity. However, by 1989, less than 3% of Palestinians
in Gaza supported Hamas, with Fatah
remaining the dominant political faction. Over the following four years, Hamas
popularity did rise to 13%. In February 1994, during Ramadan, Barak Goldstein,
a Jewish settler in military attire perpetrated a hei
nous act
by massacring 29 Muslims who were in prayer at the Ibrahimi mosque
in Hebron, located in the West Bank. Following the massacre,
an additional 19 Palestinians lost their lives in clashes
with Israeli forces. While Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
condemned the massacre. He refrained from withdrawing
the settler community for fear of a confrontation
with the settlers. In response to the massacre, Hamas vowed
to seek retribution for the lives lost. Hamas declared that if Israel failed
to distinguish between fighters and civilians, they would be compelled to treat
the Zionist community in a similar manner. In the aftermath of the shooting, Palestinian protests and riots
quickly erupted. During the subsequent week,
the Israel Defense Forces was responsible
for the deaths of 25 Palestinians. While five Israelis also lost their lives. The Israeli government imposed a two week
curfew on the 120,000 Palestinian residents of Hebron,
confining their movements. Although the 400 Jewis
h settlers in the area had no such imposition. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin reached out to Palestine Liberation
Organization leader Yasser Arafat, characterizing the attack
as a loathsome criminal act of murder. In an address to the Knesset. Rabin not only condemned Baruch Goldstein
and his legacy, but also Rabin declared murderous settlers to be outcasts,
alien to Israel and to Judaism. In response to the incident,
the Israeli government initiated measures such as the arrest of follower
s
of Meir Kahane, restricted entry of certain settlers
into Arab towns, and demanded that these settlers surrender
their army issued rifles. However, they rejected a PLO demand
for the disarmament of settlers and the creation of an international force
to protect Palestinians. The Hebron massacre had a profound impact
on the nature of Hamas's militancy. During its initial seven years, Hamas primarily targeted what it deemed legitimate military targets, such as Israeli soldiers and military insta
llations. However, in the wake of the Hebron massacre, Hamas abandoned its distinction
between military and civilian targets. Sheikh Ahmed Haj Ali,
the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank, contended that... The massacre at the mosque
released them from any taboo about indiscriminate violence
and introduced a dimension of ‘measure for measure’
based on citations from the Koran. On April six, 1994, a suicide bombing
occurred at a crowded bus stop in Afula, killing 8 Israelis and inju
ries to 34 others. A week later, a Palestinian
detonated himself on a bus in Hadera, claiming the lives of 5 Israelis
and injuring 30 more. Hamas claimed responsibility
for both attacks. Another bombing on a bus in downtown
Tel Aviv in October resulted in the loss of 22 lives
and injuries to 45 individuals. Then, in late December 1995,
Hamas made a promise to the Palestinian Authority
to halt military operations. However, this commitment was short lived as the Israel Security Agency assassinate
d
Yahya Ayyash, the 29-year-old leader of the al-Qassam Brigades, on January 5th, 1996. A massive crowd, nearly 100,000 Gazans participated in Ayyash's funeral. In retaliation for his assassination, Hamas resumed its campaign of suicide bombings, which had been relatively dormant
for much of 1995. In September 1997, Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the assassination of Hamas leader
Khaled Mashal, who was residing in Jordan. Two Mossad agents entered Jordan
using false Canadian p
assports and sprayed Mashal with a nerve
agent on a street in Amman. However, they were apprehended and King
Hussein threatened to put the agents on trial
unless Israel provided an antidote for Mashal and released
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Israel complied with the demand, and the antidote
saved Khaled Marshal's life. Yassin was returned
to Gaza, where he received a hero's welcome with banners
hailing him as the “sheikh of the Intifada”. Yassin's release temporarily
boosted Hamas's popularity, and dur
ing a press conference,
he declared, While Palestinians were accustomed
to the idea that their youth were willing to sacrifice their lives
for the struggle, the concept of suicide bombings was a new
and not widely supported development. A poll conducted in 1996
after a wave of suicide bombings by Hamas in retaliation
for Israel's assassination of Ayyash, showed that a majority, around 70%,
opposed the tactic, and 59% called for Arafat
to take action to prevent further attacks. The second Intifad
a in September 2000
began violently with mass demonstrations and lethal Israeli
counterinsurgency tactics. By July of the following year,
after almost a year of savage conflict, polling indicated that 86% of Palestinians
endorsed violence against Israelis and support for Hamas
had risen to 17%. The unrest emerged from the failure
of the 2000 Camp David summit, which was expected
to reach a final agreement on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process
in July 2000. In September 2000, Ariel Sharon,
the
Israeli opposition leader, made a provocative visit to the Al-Aqsa
compound on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. This visit sparked protests and riots, and the Israeli police responded
with rubber bullets and tear gas. In the turbulent period of the conflict, a high toll of casualties was inflicted
on both civilians and combatants. Israeli forces resorted to gunfire, targeted assassinations,
as well as tank and aerial strikes, while Palestinians employed
tactics ranging from suicide bombings and g
unfire to stone
throwing and rocket attacks. The violence is estimated
to have killed 3000 Palestinians, 1000 Israelis and 64 foreign nationals. Among the many militant groups involved in military style
attacks and suicide bombings against Israeli civilian
and military targets during this period, the al-Qassam Brigades were prominent. Over the ensuing years the conflict claimed the lives of almost
5000 Palestinians and over 1100 Israelis. While Palestinian attacks
against Israelis were numerous,
the most devastating form of violence
came in the form of suicide attacks in the first five years of the intifada,
slightly over half of all Israeli casualties were victims of suicide
bombings, with Hamas being responsible for approximately 40% of the 135 attacks
during this period. On June 8th, 2003, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi directed a Hamas
led attack at the Erez checkpoint in the Gaza Strip, killing
four Israeli soldiers. Two days later, Rantisi narrowly survived
an Israeli helicopter attack on
his car, which claimed the life
of one of his bodyguards, a civilian, and left
at least 25 others injured. Yassin was a vocal critic of the outcome of the 2003 Aqaba summit. Though his group initially declared
a temporary truce with Israel, it failed dramatically on June 11th, 2003,
when a Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem claimed
the lives of 17 and injured over 100. Israeli forces retaliated by killing
two senior Hamas members and four others. On September 6, 2003,
an Israeli Air Force F-16
launched several missiles at a building in Gaza
City with Yassin inside. He miraculously survived the attack
and Israeli officials subsequently confirmed
that he had been the intended target. In response to the media, Yassin declared that On 22nd March 2004, Ahmed Yassin, at the age of 67,
was assassinated in Gaza City. While returning from early morning prayers
by an Israeli helicopter gunship, his bodyguards were also killed instantly,
along with nine bystanders. Hamas accused
Israeli Prime Mi
nister Ariel Sharon that he “opened the gates of hell”. Shortly after the attack, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi
took over the leadership of the movement in the Gaza Strip. There was a growing discontent among the Palestinian population
during the Oslo peace process. The realities on the ground
did not align with the expectations created by the peace agreements. Hamas would capitalize
on this mounting discontent in the 2006 Palestinian Authority
legislative elections. The landslide victory with 76 seats,
excluding an additional four seats, won by independent candidates
who supported Hamas. Fatah, in contrast,
only managed to secure 43 seats. International observers
tasked with evaluating the electoral process deemed it
competitive and genuinely democratic. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar
and the United Arab Emirates urged the United States
to consider engaging with Hamas and argued that it would be unwise to penalize
Palestinians for their democratic choice, a view endorsed by the
Arab League a mont
h later. Upon winning the elections, Hamas assumed administrative control of Gaza
and introduced sweeping changes. It inherited a region mired in chaos
and lawlessness, primarily due to the economic sanctions
imposed by Israel. The United Nations, the United States,
the European Union and Russia, which had severely depleted the administrative resources
of the Palestinian Authority. Numerous mafia-style
gangs and terror cells inspired by al Qaeda had proliferated. Hamas took Significant steps to
restructure the police and security forces,
crack down on crime and gangs, ensuring that no groups openly carried weapons
or committed crimes with impunity. People began paying their taxes
and electricity bills while authorities took on tasks such as garbage collection
and incarceration of criminals. Then in early February 2006, shortly
after winning the election, Hamas extended an olive branch to Israel
by offering a ten year truce. They proposed this in exchange
for a complete Israeli withdraw
al from the occupied Palestinian territories,
including the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Hamas also sought recognition
of Palestinian rights, such as the right of return. However, this truce did not imply
a permanent cessation of armed operations against Israel, nor would they prevent
other Palestinian groups from conducting such operations. The United States, Russia, the European Union
and the United Nations laid out conditions for continuing
assistance to the Palestinian Authority
, including the renouncing of violence,
recognizing Israel and accepting
previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements. Hamas refused to meet these demands. Consequently, all international aid
to the Palestinian territories was frozen. But it was not just international pressure
weighing upon the new leadership. Tensions escalated between Fatah
and Hamas militants as Fatah commanders refused to comply
with the government's orders. The Palestinian Authority
initiated a campaign of demonstrations, assas
sinations and abductions against Hamas. Predictably, Hamas responded in kind. Israeli intelligence reportedly warned
Mahmoud Abbas that Hamas had planned to assassinate him in his Gaza
office, viewing him as an obstacle to its complete control
over the Palestinian Authority. Hamas leader Mohammed Nazzal
accused Abbas of complicity in besieging and isolating the Hamas
led government. The situation remained volatile,
with both Fatah and Hamas vying for power and control. On June 9th, 2006, during
an Israeli artillery operation, there was an explosion
on a bustling Gaza beach leading to the loss of eight Palestinian
civilian lives. While it was widely assumed that Israeli
shelling was responsible for the casualties, Israeli government
officials denied this claim. The situation escalated
when on June 10th, Hamas formally withdrew from its 16-month
ceasefire and claimed responsibility for subsequent Qassam rocket attacks
launched from Gaza into Israel. Tension continued to increase when on
June
25th two Israeli soldiers were killed and another Gilad Shalit was captured during an incursion by the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Popular Resistance Committees and Army of Islam. In response, the Israeli military
initiated Operation Summer Rains, three days later,
with the aim of securing Shalit's release. This operation
led to the arrest of 64 Hamas officials, including eight Palestinian Authority
cabinet ministers and approximately 20 members
of the Palestinian Legislative Council. T
hese arrests and other events
effectively paralyzed the Hamas dominated legislature
for much of its term. Gilad Shalit remained in captivity
until 2011, when he was finally released in exchange
for 1027 Palestinian prisoners. In February 2007, Saudi sponsored
negotiations led to the signing of the Hamas and Fatah Mecca agreement,
aiming to establish a unity government. The agreement was signed
by Mahmoud Abbas on behalf of Fatah
and Khaled Mashal on behalf of Hamas. By March, the Palestinian Leg
islative Council
had established a national unity government, with 83 representatives
voting in favor and only three against. Unfortunately, in June of the same year, renewed fighting erupted
between Hamas and Fatah. During this period, Major General Yadlin
emphasized the benefits for Israeli interests in the event
of a Fatah withdrawal from Gaza. As Hamas continued to gain influence. The subsequent June 27 ‘Battle of Gaza’
saw Hamas seize control of the region, effectively ousting Fatah offici
als
and causing President Mahmoud Abbas to dismiss the Hamas-led
Palestinian Authority government. As a response, Abbas
also outlawed the Hamas militia. The intense fighting between Hamas
and Fatah resulted in the loss of at least 600 Palestinian lives and many maimed and tortured on both sides. On June 17th, 2008, Egyptian mediators announced that an informal truce had been agreed
upon between Hamas and Israel. In this truce, Hamas committed
to ceasing rocket attacks on Israel, while Israel agr
eed to allow limited commercial
shipping across its border with Gaza. This agreement remained in place unless there was a breakdown
of the tentative peace deal. Hamas also hinted
at discussing the release of Gilad Shalit. Even before the truce was agreed upon, some on the Israeli side
were not optimistic about it, with Israeli Security Agency Chief Yuval
Diskin stating in May 2008 that a ground incursion
into Gaza was unavoidable and would be more effective in quelling
arms smuggling and pressur
ing Hamas to relinquish power. While Hamas was careful to maintain
the ceasefire, the lull was sporadically violated
by other groups, sometimes in defiance of Hamas. For example, on June 24th, Islamic Jihad launched rockets
at the Israeli town of Sderot. Israel considered this attack
a grave violation of the informal truce and closed its border crossings with Gaza. On November 4th, 2008, Israeli forces killed six Hamas gunmen
in a raid inside the Gaza Strip while attempting
to stop the construct
ion of a tunnel. In response, Hamas resumed rocket attacks. When the truce officially expired
on December 19th, Hamas launched a barrage of rockets
and mortars into Israel over the next three days,
although no Israelis were injured. On December 21st, Hamas announced its readiness
to stop the attacks and renew the truce if Israel ceased its aggression in Gaza
and opened its border crossings. On December 27 and 28, Israel implemented Operation Cast Lead against Hamas. Egyptian President Hosni Muba
rak said, “We warned Hamas repeatedly
that rejecting the truce would push Israel to aggression against Gaza”. According to Palestinian officials, over 280 people were killed and 600 were injured
in the first two days of air strikes. Most of the casualties were Hamas
police and security officers, although many civilians also died. According to Israel, the targeted sites
included militant training camps, rocket manufacturing facilities and weapons
warehouses which had been pre-identified. Later, t
hey also attacked
rocket and mortar squads that fired around 180 rockets
and mortars at Israeli communities. Despite Israel sending out thousands of cell phone messages urging residents of Gaza to leave houses where weapons may be stored
to minimize civilian casualties, some residents complained
that there was nowhere to go because many neighborhoods
had received the same message. There were allegations that Israeli bombs
landed near civilian structures such as schools,
and some claim that Israe
l was deliberately targeting Palestinian civilians. On January 17, 2009, Israel declared
a unilateral ceasefire. In response, Hamas announced a one week
ceasefire the following day, providing Israel with time to withdraw
its forces from the Gaza Strip. In July, Khaled Mashal, Hamas's
political bureau chief, expressed Hamas's willingness to cooperate with a resolution
to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This cooperation included
the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders,
with t
he condition that Palestinian refugees
be granted the right to return to Israel and East Jerusalem be recognized
as the new states capital. By August, Mashal expressed readiness to engage in dialog with the Obama
administration, noting that their policies were more favorable than those of former
US President George W Bush. Mashal said, In March 2012, Mahmoud Abbas made the remarkable statement that there were no political differences
between Hamas and Fatah, having reached an agreement on a join
t political platform
and a truce with Israel. When commenting on relations with Hamas,
in an interview with Al Jazeera, Abbas revealed,
We agreed that the period of calm would be not only in the Gaza Strip
but also in the West Bank, adding that we also agreed
on a peaceful, popular resistance against Israel,
the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders,
and that the peace talks would continue if Israel halted settlement construction
and accepted our conditions. Two years later
, there was an agreement
to form a compromise unity government. With elections scheduled for late 2014. However, these elections did not
take place, and following a new agreement, the next Palestinian general election
was planned for the end of March 2021, but did not occur either. In 2013, despite several weeks of indirect
three-way diplomacy between representatives of Hamas, Israel
and the Palestinian Authority, no agreement was reached. Inter-Palestinian reconciliation
talks stalled, leading
to a series of five rocket strikes on Israel by Hamas
during President Obama's visit to Israel. On the 8th of July 2014, Israel launched Operation Protective Edge
after the kidnaping and murder of three Israeli teenagers and to counter
increased Hamas rocket fire from Gaza. The bloody conflict concluded
with a permanent cease fire after 7 weeks, resulting in more than 2200 casualties and over 10,000 wounded. Between 2018 and 2019, Hamas participated in the Great March
of Return along the Gaza bo
rder with Israel, resulting in the loss
of at least 183 Palestinian lives. This was a series of demonstrations
held every Friday in the Gaza Strip near the Gaza-Israel border from
March 30th, 2018, to December 27, 2019. During this deadly confrontation, a total of 223 Palestinians
were killed by Israeli forces. The demonstrators called
for the right of Palestinian refugees to return to the lands from which
they were displaced, namely in Israel. They also protested Israel's land,
air and sea blo
ckade of the Gaza Strip and the United States, recognition
of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. In May 2021, tensions escalated in Sheikh Jarrah
and the Al-Aqsa mosque compound in Jerusalem, leading to renewed
clashes between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. After 11 days of intense fighting, the conflict resulted in the loss
of at least 243 lives in Gaza and 12 in Israel. On October 7th, 2023, Hamas
initiated an invasion into Israel. In the months leading up to the attack,
Hamas had conveyed mislead
ing information to Israeli intelligence,
indicating a lack of intent for conflict. The attack commenced in the early morning
with a barrage of over 3000 rockets launched from the Hamas
controlled Gaza Strip into Israel. Simultaneously,
some 2500 Palestinian militants breached the Gaza Israel barrier. Inexplicably, there was little resistance to the invading force
along the usually highly secure border. Attackers overran multiple military
and police facilities quickly, allowing them to reach
14 m
iles in from the border. At least 1400 Israelis lost their lives
to the hands of Hamas militants. 260 civilians were massacred
and a large number injured. At the "Supernova Sukkot Gathering”,
an open air music festival held to celebrate the Jewish holiday
of Sukkot near the Re'im kibbutz. Many were also taken hostage. This attack marked
the most significant act of terrorism
in the history of the state of Israel. The assault was part of what Hamas
referred to as Operation Al-Aqsa flood, which in
cluded massacres of hundreds
of other Israeli and international civilians in nearby communities
such as Netiv HaAsara, Be'eri, Kfar Aza, Nir Oz, and Holit,
on the same day. Unarmed civilians, hostages
and captured Israeli soldiers were transported to the Gaza Strip,
including women and children. Israel responded with retaliatory strikes before officially declaring war on Hamas
a day later. On October 13th, 2023, Israeli
Defense Minister Yoav Gallant urged Palestinians to evacuate
northern Gaza,
including Gaza City. He emphasized the need to distinguish
between civilians and terrorists, stating The war between
Hamas and Israel continues.
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