Eastern Front Tank Warfare 1944 - WW2 Documentary Special

It was in 1943 and 1944 when Tank Warfare reached its peak. Not just in this war but in military history as whole. Never before and never again would armored fighting vehicles engage each other on such a large scale, with such ferocious energy. On the Eastern Front, both the German and Soviet tank leaders prepare their arsenals, for better or worse, for the final ride to determine the outcome of this war. I’m Indy Neidell; this is a WW2 in Real Time Special about the state of tank warfare on the

Eastern Front here near the end of 1944. I’ll look at the German side first. The Wehrmacht of 1944 finds itself in a critical position, with only 15 combat ready Panzer Divisions operating on the Eastern Front. And even those 15 have been drastically reduced in strength, both in personnel and equipment, which has led to a significant decrease in overall effectiveness. Efficiency… sorry. The heavy fighting in 1943 at Kursk, Rzhev, and in Ukraine has sabotaged their ability for any kind of real o

ffensive operations. Many Panzer Divisions are down to 40 or 50% of their authorized strength, and some are as low as 25%. On paper, a Panzer division is to be outfitted with 170 tanks, but the average is only 60, so the overall goal to revitalize the German Heer with tanks has failed miserably. The appointment of Heinz Guderian as the inspector of the Panzers in order to restore combat efficiency across the board, kinda went down in flames, as inter service rivalries, bureaucratic infighting, a

nd a complete lack of backing by Hitler’s inner circle made it impossible. And the long awaited, much anticipated strategic reserve - which every General worth his salt lobbied for - never materialized. To prevent the disaster that looms on the horizon, two steps have been taken to keep the Panzers alive. The first revolves around upgrading the extant medium tanks with long-barreled guns, better sights and electronics, and other technical improvements. The Panzer III is ancient by now, yet still

in service with its L and M versions now outfitted with 5cm guns. The current Panzer IV version G fares not so much better, although its 7.5cm gun is more than capable of taking on its equivalent in the field at typical battlefield range, but it is really the inner workings that show their age. Additional armor-plates can be bolted on, sure, but the already underpowered Maybach HL 120 gasoline engine is at its limits in terms of mobility. The engine only gives 300hp, whereas the Soviet V-2 dies

el engine inside the T-34 easily goes up to 500. Same goes for the suspension. Both the Panzer III’s torsion bar, as well as the Panzer IV’s leaf-spring suspension are outclassed by the T-34’s Christie suspension, especially over the terrain conditions of eastern Europe. These technical issues have led to the German panzers losing their edge in speed and mobility. Remember, the German mobile doctrines of “Blitzkrieg” rely on superior mobility, not armor or firepower. The second step is innovatio

n. The new generation of medium tanks begins with the launch of the Panzer V Panther. Although entering mass-production in early 1943, the Panther is rushed out with many technical flaws and problems. Most have been ironed out by 1944 with the Panther Version A, yet faulty components such as fuel pump malfunctions still happen. Overall, the Panther is excellent when it comes down to sophisticated sights, fire control elements, and gun stability, yet the numbers of them are just not there to make

the desired impact. Then there are the new heavy tank regiments with the Tiger I, for controlling the battlefield or breaking through enemy positions with shock and unstoppable force. The Tiger is objectively the best tank in this theater in 1943. Its frontal armor is basically impenetrable and the 88mm gun makes short work of enemy opposition. However, major drawbacks comes with the immense production cost, maintenance problems, and an overall technical unreliability. Sure, superior gunnery an

d armor are excellent features, but this naturally leads to an excess in weight. Being over 44 tons means that crossing wooden bridges or getting salvaged from a ditch are almost impossible tasks at times. Even worse, the Tiger- and the Panther- are both fuel hogs, consuming double the fuel of the Panzer III for the same range. The Panzers have been driving hand to mouth already as it is, as consumption of fuel exceeds its production in seven out of twelve months. Tiger and Panther also further

complicate the distribution of spare parts. They do not share the same engines, transmissions, or armaments like the Panzer III or IV, so they have to build up a whole new stock of their own. They do not even use the same road wheels and tracks so German factories are again pretty divided on what they produce because of a lack of standardization. And by 1944, the Reich’s industries universally lack steel, copper, rubber, and other war materials. So what good is it that German scientists develop

a deadly high velocity armor piercing round with a tungsten carbide core, if tungsten carbide is barely available? Adding to the supply problems are the Allied bombing runs on the plants of MAN, Henschel, and Krupp, as well as disrupting the sub-component manufacturers in the Ruhr, and this only decreases the output. Tanks with damage beyond local level maintenance must send back to Germany for parts and repairs, so they are often months away from their units in the field. This leads to- by many

accounts- cannibalization and an overall degradation in quality, eating away at the combat power of the Panzer Divisions. Same goes for the crews, by the way, which are now mostly composed of exhausted veterans or inexperienced newcomers. So it is not surprising that an increased focus has been put on cheaper alternatives, like the turretless Assault Guns and Panzerjäger. The self propelled Panzerjäger Marder III with a 7.5 cm Pak 40 is a cheap version of a tank destroyer, yet is heavily relied

on by the infantry. Also the Assault Guns, the Stug III and IV. Although technically not a tank, the Stug III is the predominant armored vehicle of the Wehrmacht in 1944. Armed with the same 7.5cm gun as the Panzer IV, it is often called the “infantry tank”. The upgraded Sturm-howitzer with a 10.5cm gun is also more and more in use to counter Soviet tanks. All this means that the Panzer Divisions of the Army do not get a chance to revitalize. More and more their ability to hold a continuous lin

e of defense shrinks, and break-ins are not just common but became expected. Each sector of the front uses its armored divisions more and more as “fire brigades”- mobile counterstrike units that the infantry calls upon to deal with enemy break-ins. This ad-hoc “Kampfgruppen”ability is still a real strength in the German tactical arsenal, but it means that it is impossible to concentrate armor into large forces like before, and this defensive strategy only further dilutes strength. As for the Sov

iets, their Tank armies suffered badly during the first years of the war and even in 1943 had some serious defeats handed to them. Nonetheless, the Wehrmacht was unable to finish them off and instead allowed the Soviets to not only reestablish their tank armies, but increase their strength to levels never before seen. And the old approach of diverting most of their armor into smaller units to support the infantry has been finally abandoned. Instead, the Red Army concentrates their strength into

Tank Corps and Brigades. The medium T-34/76 has secured its place as the main workhorse of the Red Army throughout 1943. Its superior diesel engine, decent gun, and sloped armor plates give it enough versatility on the battlefield to be reliably useful in both offensive and defensive operations. Yet with the appearance of the German Tigers and Panthers, the T-34 needs some well-deserved upgrades. Next to a new command cupola and an extended three-man turret, the main step forward is the 85mm D-5

t gun. Sure, the T-34 is still not a looker, nor is it the kind of quality you would find in German or Western workshops, but Soviet industry has by now perfected the production cycle. In the time and energy it takes German manufacturers to build one Panzer 4, there are six T-34’s rolling out of the Soviet factory gates. Paint-jobs and polishing are not necessary, what counts is industrial output. So overall, the Soviets are now able to outproduce the Germans more than 10x in tanks and assault g

uns, leading to an all-time advantage of 7-1 in armor on all fronts. Sure, Soviet tank training is still lackluster. A couple kilometers of driving, a few rounds on the range, testing of the machine-gun, and the tank is ready for frontline service. Ok, the Red Army does its best to modernize and overhaul its tank force. The heavy KV-1 and 2 tanks are finally phased out. Despite some new concepts, the KV series as a whole prove ultimately a dead end in a larger operational context. Same goes for

the thin-skinned T-70 light tanks, whose main benefit in 1943 is the sheer numbers that can be put into the field as infantry support. In their stead come the heavy IS-tanks and the SU-self propelled artillery guns. The IS-122 or IS-2- that is the new heavy tank and an indirect response to the German Tiger I and II. The 122mm gun fires massive 25kg high-explosive shells. These are six times heavier than a Panther round and three times heavier than a Tiger one. With armor 100mm thick, the IS-2 is

sent to all Guards Heavy Tank Regiments over 1944 as a breakthrough tank. For the infantry, the Soviets introduces the SU-self propelled guns. The SU-76 is basically a 76.2mm ZIS-3 anti-tank gun put onto the chassis of a T-34. This frees up the actual battle tanks, while also providing the infantry with more firepower against enemy armor. Unlike the shaky Nazi hierarchy, Stalin holds a firm grip on production and standardization. Inner squabbles like the Germans have between Porsche and Hensche

l about a new prototype are impossible, as everything has to be just practical and “good enough”. Also, unlike the Germans, the Soviet factories do not suffer from heavy bombing anymore, nor do they worry about building for a navy at the same time. And of course having to worry just about one front makes an overall much more concentrated approach much easier. It is also fair to say that without the immense amount of lend-lease armor steadily coming in through the Persian corridor, the Soviet tan

k force would have a much harder time going on the offensive. The amount of Matildas, Valentines, Stuarts, Lees, Grants and Shermans that bolster the Soviet lines over the years… well, it’s a lot. But all that superiority in numbers meant little as long as the Soviet Generals did not know how to use them in the field. The Germans always had tactical superiority through their excellent use of combined warfare, even with a much smaller and technically inferior tank force, but while the German Army

is losing its edge, the Red Army’s capabilities for massive armored operations only grow. Over the course of 1943 and 1944, the Soviets slowly but surely close the gap. The Deep Battle doctrine is in direct response to the tactical superiority of the German training and experience. For too long the Soviets simply tried to copy the German approach by sending their best units into the first wave of attack in order to force a breakthrough. The Wehrmacht was still more than capable of not only blun

ting such a spearhead, but just breaking it apart despite being outnumbered. But by relying on different echelons of armor and motorized infantry that are also adequately supported by artillery and air-attacks, they are able to exhaust their enemy’s defensive capabilities. Instead of punching through like the Germans, they gradually use their numbers to bend and eventually break the enemy’s lines. Overall, it is clear to see that the tables have turned. Where the German Panzer Divisions are grad

ually bleeding strength and suffering from degraded or damaged armor, the Red Army is on the rise. Not just numerically but tactically as well. To put it bluntly, Soviet High Command has gotten its act together and learned how to use their tank force according to the doctrines of combined arms operations. Outproducing the Germans at every step, the Red Tank Armies prepare for the final push into the Reich itself. If you want to see a special we did on the eve of Operation Barbarossa about the st

ate of German and Soviet armor at the time, click here to check that out, and join the TimeGhost Army at TimeGhost.tv or patreon.com so we can make ever more awesome specials like these ones.