How U.S. Navy SEAHAWK Helicopters DESTROYED Houthis' Pirates

Well, it’s safe to say that 2023 did not  end well for a small contingent of Houthi rebels operating in the Red Sea. According  to representatives from U.S. Central Command, on the morning of December 31st, four small  vessels being operated by members of the Iranian-backed militant group were decimated by  a group of U.S. Navy Seahawk helicopters that’d responded to the urgent distress call of a  Singapore-flagged civilian shipping vessel. Armed with crew-served and small arms weapons, the Hout

his approached and began firing  at the 353-meter-long container ship, the Maersk Hangzhou. During the attack, the  four small boats got dangerously close to the much larger vessel — within 20 meters — and even  attempted to board it. And when it looked like the Maersk Hangzhou’s on-board security team might  be outmatched, the call went out to the Navy. But this wasn’t the first time that  Maersk Hangzhou called the Navy for help. In fact, it was the second time in less than 24  hours that they

’d been attacked by Houthi forces, as they were traversing the increasingly  dangerous waters of the Southern Red Sea. Just the day before, the ship was reportedly hit  by a Houthi-fired anti-ship ballistic missile. And after the incident was reported to  the Navy, the USS Gravely — an Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyer  deployed to the region earlier in the year — would end up shooting down two other  missiles intended for the Maersk Hangzhou. Perhaps realizing they weren’t going to g

et  lucky with a long shot, the Houthis decided to move in for a closer attack. But this strategy  would ultimately not work out well for them. Once that second call came in, around 0630 local  time, a small formation of Navy Seahawks lifted off from the deck of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower  — one of the Navy’s 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. Arriving on target a short while  later, the Seahawks issued a series of verbal warnings to the Houthis, who responded by  opening fire on the hoveri

ng helicopters. Big mistake. In an effort to defend themselves, the helicopters  swiftly sank three of the four Houthi small boats, while the remaining boat fled the area.  Once the smoke cleared, so to speak, there was no reported damage to either U.S.  personnel or equipment, nor were there any casualties among the crew of the Maersk  Hangzhou. The Houthis, on the other hand, lost 10 fighters in the confrontation,  according to a Houthi military spokesman, who also strongly warned against any

further  escalation by their “American enemy.” To annihilate the attacking Houthis, the Seahawk  guns crews likely relied upon a combination of their two primary weapon systems — the  versatile and reliable 7.62mm M240 machine gun, which can be mounted in a side door or window,  or the .50 caliber GAU-21, also known as the M3M. These are both formidable weapons that can provide  essential offensive and defensive capabilities. The tried-and-tested M240 has been renowned  for its accuracy and sust

ained firepower since the late 1970s — and its versatility allowed the  Seahawk’s crew to engage their targets with deadly precision. But in situations where increased  firepower and penetration might be needed, the M3M is going to be your best bet. Whether it’s  used for suppressive fire or precision targeting, this heavy weapon delivers devastating  firepower, making it ideal for engaging armored targets or larger threats  encountered in a maritime environment... Like a handful of power boats

loaded  down with rebel fighters packing AK-47s. The Navy Seahawk helicopter, formally  known as the Sikorsky MH-60 Seahawk, is a versatile and highly capable aircraft —  truly the modern-day workhorse of the Navy’s current arsenal of aircrafts. The Seahawk  was adapted from the Army’s UH60 Blackhawk and the Sikorsky S-70 family of helicopters  but ended up with a few highly unique design features — including foldable main rotor blades  and a hinged tail. These modifications were specifically in

cluded with naval operations  in mind, so that the Seahawk could be used for a wide range of maritime-related  missions, including anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, search and rescue, and  various forms of naval logistics support. Two of the most notable variants of the  Seahawk are the SH-60B and the MH-60R. Similar in design and capabilities, both  the SH-60B and the MH-60R are currently being used by the Navy for a variety of combat,  surveillance, and support missions. The MH-60H

, though, is the more widely used and more modern  variant, entering into service in the early 2000s, compared to the SH-60B which was introduced in  the 1980s. The MH-60R comes equipped with advanced sensors, including an airborne low-frequency  sonar system, air-launched sonobuoys, and a sophisticated APS-124 search radar system. This  allows it to detect, track, and engage submarines and surface vessels with precision-guided weapons  such as Hellfire missiles and Mark 54 torpedoes. Another va

riant, the MH-60S, is primarily used for  logistics support, personnel transport, and search and rescue, or SAR, operations. It features a  large cabin space capable of accommodating cargo, passengers, or medevac patients. The MH-60S  can also be equipped with machine guns and other defensive systems so that it can carry out  these missions in a hostile environment. In fact, all Seahawk variants come with a variety  of defensive capabilities designed to enhance survivability in combat situations

,  including infrared (IR) countermeasures, chaff and flare dispensers to counter incoming  missiles, and armor-plated seats to protect the crew against small arms fire. But their  primary defense is their ability to operate and engage potential threats at a distance, as we  saw during this recent skirmish with the Houthis. The typical crew for a Seahawk consists of a  pilot, an airborne tactical officer or ATO, and a sensor operator. In most cases, the  ATO or sensor operator is responsible for

employing the helicopter’s weapon systems,  including its machine guns and missiles. They will typically coordinate with the  pilot to engage targets effectively, but in certain situations, the pilot may  also retain the ability to pull the trigger. And in terms of power, the Seahawk’s airframe  is propelled by two 1,900 SHP T700-GE-401C turboshaft engines. Manufactured by General  Electric, these engines are renowned for their reliability, performance, and efficiency  — making them well-suited

for the Navy’s demanding operational tempo. The impressive  power output and advanced technology of the T700 enables the Seahawk to reach a maximum  speed of 233 kilometers per hour (145 mph) at an altitude of 1,500 meters (5,000 ft.).  Operating with standard fuel reserves, the MH-60R typically has a range of around 245  nautical miles, approximately 454 kilometers, while the SH-60B has an average range closer to  450 nautical miles, approximately 833 kilometers. What makes these aircraft trul

y combat  effective, however, is their capability to deploy at a moment’s notice — not just from  shore bases or forward operating locations, but from Navy aircraft carriers, destroyers,  frigates, fast combat support ships, expeditionary transfer docks, and amphibious assault ships. They  can take off from, and return to, essentially any vessel with a flat deck, which allows for  an impressively diverse mission profile. Combined with their imposing level  of firepower, it was the Seahawk’s rapi

d deployment ability that’s made them so  effective against the mounting Houthi threat. According to CENTCOM officials, the Houthis have  launched nearly 40 attacks on the international shipping industry since November 19, 2023 — but  since the recent string of attacks in the Red Sea began, this was the first time a U.S. asset  had actually killed any Houthi combatants. Since Hamas attacked Israel last October,  and Israel promptly invaded the Gaza Strip, the Houthis have continued to use anti-s

hip  missiles and drones to attack vessels they believe are either linked to Israel or heading  to Israeli ports. And as a consequence, a number of shipping companies have diverted  their vessels around this area of the Red Sea, which has resulted in daunting delays and  other global supply chain issues. For example, just two days after the Houthis’  disastrous face off with the Seahawks, the Danish shipping and logistics  company Maersk — the operator of the Maersk Hangzhou — announced a 48-hou

r pause  in its Red Sea and Gulf of Aden operations. But it’s not only the shipping companies  who are responding to the Houthi threat. Back in December, in response to increased  hostility from the Houthis and rising fears within the commercial shipping sector, the  U.S. Department of Defense launched Operation Prosperity Guardian — a security initiative that  would bring together maritime forces from the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy,  Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles, and Spai

n in an attempt to address the navigation and security  challenges in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. According to U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin,  the new initiative’s forces will operate under the umbrella of a previously established  multi-national naval partnership called the Combined Maritime Forces. They will also fall  under the leadership of Task Force 153, a U.S. Navy-led initiative that’s based in Bahrain and  is focused on maritime security in the Red Sea. Austin first introduced O

peration Prosperity  Guardian during a visit to Bahrain, where he stopped during a broader trip to the Middle  East, that also included meetings with leaders in Kuwait, Qatar, and Israel. During those meetings  he emphasized the importance of safeguarding freedom of navigation in international  waterways. Given that approximately 10 to 15 percent of worldwide shipping passes  through the Red Sea, the problem with the Houthis has resulted in billions of dollars  in losses for commercial shipping

companies. And, since the introduction of the initiative, there’s been notable progress. So far over  20 nations have committed to participate, and more are expected to join the coalition  in the future. Individual contributions to the collective effort are expected to range from  military assets such as ships and aircraft, to troops, to advisory personnel, to other forms  of military, financial, and logistical support. However, commitment from allies hasn’t  been as reliable as the U.S. hoping

for. Almost half of the nations who joined  up have chosen to remain unnamed, while some named partners have opted  to contribute only a minimal amount of personnel. The DOD remains optimistic  that the coalition will grow over time, at first glance though, the group seems to be  lacking the participation of several key players, including Turkey, Germany, Egypt, South Korea,  and Japan. Other nations — including Italy, India, and France — prefer to stay out from under the  U.S. initiative’s umbr

ella and are sending ships to the region on their own. But while these  individual deployments may, in the long run, contribute to Prosperity Guardian’s success, they  also send the message that even some of America’s closest allies remain hesitant to publicly align  themselves. Which isn’t fully unexpected given the long-burning firestorm of controversy surrounding  the West’s participation in Middle East affairs. Even though the overall goal of  Prosperity Guardian is to boost the confidence o

f commercial shipping companies, so that they’ll feel safe returning to business  as usual, the unenthusiastic response from some of the U.S.’s most-powerful allies does raise  some concerns for the folks in Washington. At its inception, policymakers in D.C. had  hoped this new operation would have similar success to international counter-piracy efforts in  Somalia, but that hasn’t been the case. Probably because there are some clear differences in  the Houthi threat, perhaps the most notable be

ing the highly political nature behind the  Houthis’ motivation. The Houthis have made it perfectly clear that Israel's invasion of  Gaza, and the West’s increased meddling, is their primary driver for these attacks.  And as the administration Biden continues to offer its support to Tel Aviv, many  nations remain very hesitant to appear as though they’re taking a definitive side  in the conflict. This is particularly true of Middle Eastern and North African states that  have previously expressed

support for Palestine, as well as European countries with a  mostly pro-Palestinian voting population. A realistic long-term strategy is also a  concern for Washington. Many are already asking, How long can the U.S. maintain an impactful  presence in the region? And if the U.S. were to leave, wouldn’t that just open the  opportunity for future Houthi attacks? With new crises emerging regularly, the  U.S.’s resources are getting stretched further and further. Which means that without  a reliable

, long-term international parentship, the U.S. cannot guarantee freedom of navigation  and safe transit of the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. A recent estimate by U.S. officials  claimed that over 2,000 ships have been forced to change course to avoid the Houthi  threat plaguing the Red Sea. In the past, the Houthis have used anti-ship cruise  missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, explosive surface drones, and aerial drones to  intimidate or attack both civilian and military vessels. But recently t

hey’ve decided to try  out another approach — an underwater attack. According to a recent report from CENTCOM,  the Navy carried out a series of “self-defense strikes” in Houthi-controlled waters  around Yemen against what they described as an “unmanned underwater vessel” — or UUV — as  well as another uncrewed surface vessels (USV), and three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles.  This marked the first instance of U.S. forces encountering an underwater threat since  the escalation of Houthi attacks

began. Just a few days before the UUV incident,  CENTCOM issued a press release regarding the U.S. Coast Guard’s capture of an Iranian  weapons shipment intended for Houthi forces in Yemen. CENTCOM hadn’t yet released  specific details about the Houthi UUV destroyed by the Navy, but the photographs  taken by the Coast Guard showed a propeller or screw section that’s consistent  with UUVs used by Iran — revealing a clear point of connection between Iran  and the newly emerging Houthi UUV threat.

Iran has a long tradition of  unconventional naval warfare, one that’s continued to evolve and now  includes unmanned boats, aerial drones, and underwater drones. The UUVs commonly used by  Iran are similar to a torpedo or one-way attack underwater drone (OWA-AUV). These generally have  a greater range than a torpedo, but are slower, which makes them more effective against static  targets such as ships in port or at anchor. The UUVs typically used by Iran can  also be fitted with a short mast,

so it can be observed as it makes its way toward  its intended target. It’s also possible that Iran’s UUVs can be remotely operated by  a wire, similar to wire-guided torpedoes, which would allow them to engage a  moving target. Iran is believed to have used similar devices against tankers off  the coast of the United Arab Emirates. Hamas, too, has attempted to use similar vehicles  against Israel’s offshore energy infrastructure. The Houthi’s new-found interest in the use of  UUVs could become

a huge problem for the Navy and its allies — for Underwater weapons are  inherently harder to detect and counter than surface vessels. A UUV is more likely to remain  undetected until it actually impacts the target, and because the point of impact  is typically below the waterline, there’s a significantly increased  risk of the vessel being sunk. A warship hoping to counter an underwater  attack must also rely on a very different set of tactics. One technique is using  an explosive-laden surface

drone, or USV, like the ones Ukrainian forces have been using  against similar Russian threats. So far, though, the Navy has been highly successful in thwarting  both the Houthis’ surface and underwater attacks. But there’s no telling how they will adapt or what  other capabilities Iran might supply them with. For this will likely not be the last shipment  of Iranian weapons that gets intercepted on its way to the Houthis. Nor was it the  first. Since April 2015, in fact, the U.S. military has

intercepted at least five other  shipments. Among other weapons and munitions, these shipments included thousands of AK-47s,  anti-tank missiles, and even a few sniper rifles. But how do we know they came from Iran? By analyzing the recorded GPS data for each  of the vessels, and from information gathered from interrogating the crews, the Navy was able to  determine the ships originated from Iran, likely the Bandar Abbas Port, located on the southern  coast along the Persian Gulf. This news didn

’t come as a surprise to officials from Saudi Arabia,  who have long insisted that the Houthis were being supported by Iran. The intercepted shipments did,  however, add credibility to those claims. But that didn’t deter the Iranian Foreign Ministry from  insisting that these claims were completely false. Along with the Coast Guard, the USS Gravely  has also been staying busy — recently shooting down another anti-ship cruise  missile launched from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen. This attem

pted attack  followed one that’d targeted the USS Carney, another Navy destroyer patrolling near the Gulf  of Aden. In both cases the ships destroyed the Houthi missiles fired at them and were able  to avoid any damage or injuries to the crew. The Houthis have been eager to take responsibility  for these recent attacks. In some cases, perhaps too eager. According to U.S.  defense officials, the Houthis have even gone so far as to take credit for  attacks that never happened. For example, they re

cently claimed to have targeted  a Navy expeditionary mobile base — the USS Louis B. Puller — located in the Gulf of  Aden. But the Navy says there was no attack. Alongside Hamas and Hezbollah, the Houthis  have declared themselves to be part of the Iranian-led so-called “Axis of Resistance” —  or the unofficial league of extremist groups who’ve aligned themselves against Israel,  the U.S., and the West more generally. According to experts, though, the Houthis true  motivations and political ide

ologies remain somewhat vague and contradictory. Originally,  Houthi insurgents set out to imitate Hezbollah: they wanted to have power over the region without  actually ruling. But the Houthis have always been on the outside — a militia group that’s now only  started to dabble in politics. And as a result, their Hezbollah-like denunciation of both  the U.S. and Israel often appears to be mostly for show. Despite their jihadist  rhetoric, it’s possible that they’re simply another extremist facti

on looking  to capitalize on the spoils of corruption. Originally known as the Ansar Allah  — or “Partisans of God” — the Houthis later adopted the name of the movement’s late  founder, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi. Emerging in northern Yemen in the 1990s, largely as  a reaction to the rising Saudi influence in the region, the Houthis are a Shia Muslim,  political-religious faction that, at the moment, controls a large portion of northern Yemen,  including much of the Red Sea coastline, where the

y run a de facto government that  collects taxes and prints its own money. Since 2004, they have been actively fighting  against Yemen’s Sunni-majority government. And it’s no coincidence that, around this same time,  Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh began calling for the arrest of hundreds of Houthis, and even  offered a reward for the capture of the group’s founder. Tensions exploded a few months  later when the older al-Houthi was killed, and his younger brother, Abdul-Malik  al-Houthi, st

epped up to take command. Sporadic clashes between the Houthis and  government forces continued for the next few years, leaving hundreds dead on both sides, until  a brief ceasefire was agreed upon in March 2006. Saleh even granted amnesty to some 600 previously  captured Houthi fighters. But by early 2007, they again found themselves at war. The fighting  would continue for another five months, until they could reach yet another ceasefire agreement.  Things remained relatively cool for nearly a

year, until the fighting erupted again. And  after a few months, around July 2008, Saleh would be forced to relinquish the  Houthi-dominated Saada Governorate to the rebels. Just over a year later, however, the Yemeni  military would strike back with force — launching “Operation Scorched Earth” with the intention  of stamping out the Houthi rebellion in Saada. Around this same time, the Houthis crossed  over the border into Saudi Arabia and began engaging with Saudi forces in a series of  cross

-border clashes, as well. The Saudis responded by launching airstrikes against the  rebels and engaging in regular ground skirmishes. Negotiations between Saleh and the Houthis  went back and forth with little progress until February 2010, when Saleh’s government  again agreed to a ceasefire. But this may have been intended more as a form of  misdirection — because early in 2010 the Yemeni military also launched “Operation  Blow to the Head” — a crackdown on both Houthis forces and combatants fr

om al-Qaeda  in the Arabian Peninsula, or the AQAP. But the tide really began to turn in the  Houthis favor in the wake of the Arab Spring, after Saleh was ultimately ousted from  the presidency. By the fall of 2014, the Houthis had taken control of  most of Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, and the Red Sea port city of Hodeida. And by  early 2015, the Houthis had taken control of the Yemeni government — a move that was  swiftly denounced by the United Nations. Saleh’s successor, President Abdrabbuh Manso

ur  Hadi, conceded to the Houthi leadership and was placed on house arrest — but soon fled  the presidential palace in Sanaa, narrowly escaping to Aden. But once out of harm’s way, he  rescinded his resignation and declared himself the legitimate president of Yemen. He also declared  the Houthi takeover a blatant coup d'état. By 2016, the Houthis would dominate  most of northern Yemen. By 2018, they were getting increasingly bold  in their choice of targets — with missile attacks on Saudi Arabia

becoming  increasingly common and, not to mention, a July 2018 attack that damaged a Saudi oil  tanker. Also in mid 2018, Yemen’s now-exiled president met with United Arab Emirates Crown  Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nayhan and together they launched an offensive to reclaim the port  city of Hodeida that was ultimately unsuccessful. Savage fighting and horrendous human-rights  violations have torn the country apart — creating what the United Nations has called the “world’s  worst humanitarian c

risis.” More than 23 million people — 80 percent of Yemen’s population — would  end up desperately needing humanitarian aid and protection. And as conditions worsened,  and the violence continued to escalate, U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition  in Yemen began to waver. Several former Obama Administration officials signed an  open letter expressing regret for their support of the war and encouraging  both sides to lay down their arms. Then, in December 2018, the U.S. Senate passed  a resolu

tion invoking the War Powers Resolution, effectively bringing an end to  U.S. military support for the Saudi-led coalition that’d been conducting  airstrikes and other military operations in Yemen since 2015. The resolution  to halt all logistical support and arms sales to the coalition passed  the Senate with bipartisan support, marking the first time in history the Senate  had voted to invoke the War Powers Resolution. Just a few months later, in February 2019, former Secretary of Defense Jame

s  Mattis’ resignation took effect, bringing an end to the Trump Administration’s  commitment to finding peace in Yemen. In April, despite bipartisan support in Congress,  President Donald Trump would veto the War Powers Resolution, arguing that it was both dangerous and  an attempt to weaken his constitutional authority. Soon, the Trump administration would also put  a freeze on $73 million in humanitarian aid for Yemen. A decision that drew heavy criticism  from humanitarian organizations and

lawmakers, who argued that cutting aid would only  worsen a situation that was already terrible. And after the U.S. took a big step back, it didn’t  take long for the UAE to follow — announcing in July 2019 that it’d completed its troop drawdown  in Yemen. Recognizing an opportunity to advance their own interests, however, another Yemeni  political-military organization known as the Southern Transitional Council (or STC) quickly  moved to assume control of some highly important cities in the sou

th, including Aden, Abyan,  and Shabwa. Since its inception in 2017, the STC has strongly advocated for the secession  of southern Yemen and its restoration as an independent state, as it was before South  Yemen and North Yemen were unified in 1990. Prior to the merger, North and South  Yemen existed as two separate entities; and when they were joined, the intention  was to create a single, sovereign state known as the Republic of Yemen with Aden as its  capital. But conflicts between the two re

gions, fueled by political, economic, and social  differences, immediately broke out — eventually erupting into a civil war in 1994 when  the South rallied and tried to secede. And when the STC made its move, around  the end of August, the UAE jumped back into the mix — this time launching  a series of air raids against Yemeni government forces who were enroute to Aden,  hoping to take control back from the STC. But wait, you’re probably thinking.  Wasn’t the UAE just fighting with the governmen

t against the Houthis to reclaim Hodeida? They were — but it appears the UAE lost  faith in President Hadi and Yemen’s weakened central government. The dynamics and power  struggles within Yemen are highly complex, but, for the most part, they are based  on the desire for control and national security amidst a series of violent  conflicts. The UAE’s support for the STC has probably been rooted in a combination  of strategic, security, and geopolitical goals, with the overall aim of advancing its

interests  in Yemen and the broader Middle East region. And in terms of the Houthis, it’s  probably safe to say that the UAE thinks the STC will do a better  job of countering that threat. Despite the drawdown of foreign troops  and continually shifting alliances, the Houthis continue their campaign — launching  “Operation Victory from God” against Saudi-led forces in the region. They also escalate  their attacks on Saudi oil installations, including the use of drones to bomb oil  processing fa

cilities in Abqaiq and Khurais in eastern Saudi Arabia. As a result of these  attacks, Saudi Arabia loses nearly half of its oil output capacity. But while the Houthis  are happy to take credit for the aggression, the international community blames Iran  — because they’re the ones who must’ve provided the technical expertise  needed to carry out such attacks. At the start of 2021, the Trump Administration  designated the Houthis a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). But as soon as President Bi

den  took over in February 2022, he revoked the FTO designation. Biden also officially put a stop to  Washington’s support of the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive operations in Yemen; but he would  continue to support the UN-led peace process, and also offered his assurances to Saudi  Arabia regarding the defense of its territory. The fighting continues — with regular Houthi  missile and drone attacks against Saudi oil facilities, airports, and airbases. While the  Saudis retaliate with airstrike

s of their own. The U.S. continues to condemn Houthi  actions — but opts to remove its most advanced missile defense systems from Saudi  Arabia. Then the UN announces that nearly 20 million people — or two-thirds of Yemen's  population — are dependent on humanitarian aid for daily needs. Five million of whom  are on the brink of death due to famine or related disease. But due to dwindling  international funding, the World Food Program cuts food aid to Yemen, which leads  to a dramatic increase i

n the cost of food. But as bad as things are now, the situation  in Yemen was incredibly dire long before the Houthis stepped up to support Hamas at  the start of Israel’s invasion of Gaza. Almost immediately after the war started, the  Houthis began attacking Israel with missiles and drone strikes, but the majority of  these were intercepted. As we’ve seen, the Houthis have mostly been making an impact out  on the Red Sea — as they’ve increasingly targeted ships which are Israeli-owned, flagged

, or  operated, or are heading to Israeli ports. Shortly after these first attacks,  the UN Security Council issued a stern warning to Houthis on behalf of 44 countries  around the world. In this joint statement, the UN demanded the Houthis stop attacking  civilian ships and immediately release any detained vessels or crews — or else. They did  not comply. And despite the ongoing efforts of the Navy — as well as many other nation’s  militaries — this does not seem to be enough to deter the incre

asingly bold, almost  daily attacks occurring in the Red Sea. Yemeni officials continue to insist that  Iran, as well as its proxy Hezbollah, have provided arms, training, and financial  support to the Houthis. But both Iranian and Hezbollah officials have denied or downplayed  these claims. And so, the back and forth continues. With Iran claiming their support of  the Houthis is solely political, while the U.S. continues to accuse Tehran of enabling them to  terrorize civilian operations in the

Red Sea. In a recent analysis conducted by the U.S.  Defense Intelligence Agency, for example, it was confirmed that Houthi forces had  being using Iranian-made missiles and UAVs in their attacks. As far back as 2014, the  analysis revealed, Iran’s Quds Force — a branch of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that  specializes in unconventional warfare and military intelligence — had been providing the Houthis with  an arsenal of sophisticated weapons and training. With Iran’s support, the so-

called three H’s —  Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis — have been able to create a serious amount of chaos, and  there’s genuine concern among the international community that a full-scale war might break out  between some combination of the U.S., Yemen, Iran, and Israel. If Iran were to directly attack  Israel or some American asset in retaliation to the Navy’s continued attacks on the Houthis, or  if the U.S. were to ramp up their support of the Yemeni government, that might just be enough to 

spark the next major conflict in the Middle East. So far, the isolated attacks and skirmishes  we’ve seen haven’t been enough to warrant direct military action from Iran and Iran’s  leaders have been taking a more pragmatic approach. Even if they don’t approve of Israel’s  invasion into Gaza, it seems they’d rather avoid a war that would very likely involve the  U.S. — a war they would not likely win. Even before the arrival of the Houthis —  from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea to Mediterranea

n — tensions in this region had  been smoldering for decades. The conflict between Palestine and Israel has been one of  the world’s longest-running disputes. But it wasn’t until the emergence of Hamas — as well  as the other two H’s — that the stage would be set for nearly fifteen years of violent  conflicts on the scale we’re seeing today. Ever since the first major conflict  erupted between Israel and Hamas in 2008, the Gaza Strip has experienced  ongoing destruction and horrendous civilian c

asualties. But on October 7th,  a whole new chapter of this war opened up. Many experts believe Hamas’ sudden escalation  of violence was intended to derail the potential peace agreement that was being brokered by  the U.S. between Saudi Arabia and Israel. As part of this agreement, Saudi Arabia  intended to address Palestine’s concerns, in general, but the Palestinians  were not directly involved in the discussions. And this did not sit  well with Hamas or their supporters. After Hamas’ highly

coordinated and brutal attack  on the State of Israel — which included various other Palestinian militant groups, including the  Palestinian Islamic Jihad or PIJ — October 7, 2023, would be called the deadliest day  for Jews since the Holocaust. Around 1,400 people were killed, including IDF soldiers,  families that were attacked in their homes, and attendees of an outdoor music festival.  Most of the casualties were Israeli civilians, but a number of foreign nationals  were also murdered in the

attack, while an estimated 240 others were hauled  back to the Gaza Strip as hostages. The next day, Israel officially  declared itself to be at war with Hamas, prompting Prime Minister Netanyahu to  warn Gazan residents that they’d better get out as soon as possible. Another day  later, Israel began a full-on siege of the Gaza Strip — cutting off much of the region’s  supply of water, electricity, food, and fuel. Given the horrendous conditions  and mounting casualties in Gaza, it’s clear why

Hamas is going to fight  this one out to the bitter end. But why, you might be asking, are the Houthis risking their  hard-won gains in Yemen by getting involved in a conflict that (1) doesn’t directly involve  them and (2) is thousands of kilometers away? Simply put, it’s political. As members of  the Axis of Resistance — the alliance of proxy militant groups that Iran has assembled  throughout the region — the Houthis can boost their standing within the alliance by taking  an active approach.

For the Houthis this means treating any Israeli-affiliated vessel traveling  along the Yemeni coast as fair game for attack. Before returning to Yemen in the early  2000s, and becoming more politically active, several members of the Houthi leadership  received religious education in Iran. But to label the Houthis’ aggression toward Israel  and its allies as simply a favor to Iran, would be to overlook their own  wider geopolitical ambitions. The group’s enthusiastic support of Hamas  — and Pales

tine more broadly — might also gain them both domestic and regional  support for their efforts to control Yemen. But what do you think? Can the  Houthis advance their own cause by aligning themselves with Hamas and  Iran? As the Israel-Hamas war continues, will they become a more serious threat in the Red  Sea? Even with Iran’s support, will the Houthi threat ever be a match for U.S. Navy assets like  the MH-60 Seahawk? Let us know in the comments. Now go check out How F-18 Super Hornets  Devast

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