Philippines Campaign FULL DOCUMENTARY - Pacific War Animated

The Japanese started the Pacific War with a bang, almost simultaneously launching a deadly surprise attack on Pearl Harbor that decimated the US Pacific Fleet and a series of naval landings on Thailand, Malaya, the Philippines, Borneo, Guam and Wake Island that completely caught the defenders with their guard down, consequently allowing the invaders to gain victory with little effort. The Invasion of the Philippines would be the first campaign of General Douglas MacArthur, one of the more well-k

nown figures of the Pacific War. This invasion would change the lives of the Filipino people, throwing them into a period of suffering and resistance characterized by an underground and guerrilla activity that increased over the years. It would also change the life of MacArthur, marking him as a hero of the Philippines and earning him a huge boost in popularity. His promise to return to the Philippines would later become the driving force behind his decisions for the remainder of the war; such w

as the impact of this important campaign. Thus, join us as we cover the Invasion of the Philippines in its full-depth, from the initial landings on Luzon Island to the Bataan Death March and the Fall of Corregidor. These long videos are very difficult to make, so we hope that you will give us your comment, like and share, and will consider joining our patreon or youtube membership - links in the description. And another way to support us, especially if you like military strategy, is to play this

video’s sponsor Call of War. It’s a free PVP strategy game, where you play a world war 2 simulation in real time over several weeks. You dip in and out to manage your economy, technology, diplomacy, and military strategy. Make real allies and enemies with up to one hundred other players, use loads of world war two units and secret weapons, and compose a grand strategy to conquer the world. Since it happens in real time over a long period, it’s very nice that you can access your empire any time

on PC or mobile to see the current situation and tweak your plans accordingly. Don’t be taken by surprise! Get the game for free via our link in the description, and you’ll get an exclusive gift: thirteen thousand gold, and one month of premium subscription for free, but only for the next thirty days so don’t waste time. As we’ve already seen, the United States had neglected the defenses of its Pacific possessions for too many years since their victory in the Great War. And with the Japanese thr

eat approaching like dark clouds on the horizon, the effort to prepare for a new war was still minimal, leading to a considerable weakness for the American forces in the Pacific. In July of 1941, after the Japanese occupation of southern Indochina, the USAFFE was formed, including both American and Filipino forces in the region, with Lieutenant-General Douglas MacArthur as its commander-in-chief. The Philippine Army had thousands of troops, but it lacked modern weapons, adequate training and val

uable experience, something MacArthur set out to correct from the get go, even though he wouldn’t have the time to complete his task. The US Navy also had a small presence in the region with the old Asiatic Fleet of Admiral Thomas Hart, which is not to be confused with the Pacific Fleet based on Hawaii. This fleet depended on a few cruisers and WWI-era destroyers, although it counted with a considerable submarine squadron as well, albeit not big enough to successfully struggle against the Japane

se. The Asiatic Fleet was also responsible for the defense of Guam, while the defense of Wake Island was under the jurisdiction of Admiral Husband Kimmel’s Pacific Fleet. In the Philippines, MacArthur had around 150.000 personnel, including one fully-American regiment, three well-trained regiments of Philippine Scouts, two tank battalions, ten inexperienced Philippine divisions and considerable coastal and anti-aerial artillery. MacArthur also had at his disposal the Far East Air Force under the

command of Major-General Lewis Brereton, totaling some 218 modern aircraft, as well as the Philippine Air Corps’ six squadrons of obsolete aircraft; a very sizable air force to stem the Japanese offensive. As for the Japanese, limited by the war in China and the attacks against the British and Dutch colonies, they could only count with 2 divisions and a brigade for their offensives against the American possessions in the Pacific. The rest of the hard-work would have to be carried out by the IJN

and their Special Naval Landing Force, the Japanese equivalent to the US Marines. For the invasion of the Philippines in particular, Tokyo had planned to first neutralize the American air forces in the Philippines to have full control of the air. To do this, they would also need to execute several amphibious invasions against the main American northern airfields to extend Japanese aircraft capabilities. Once air superiority was assured, they would launch their main amphibious assault against Lu

zon and Mindanao, then advancing across the Philippines to occupy their vital strategic locations. The 14th Army of Lieutenant-General Homma Masaharu, consisting of the 16th and 48th Divisions, as well as the 65th Independent Mixed Brigade and two tanks regiments, was appointed to carry out this operation, and they would be supported by the 5th Army Air Force Division of Lieutenant-General Obata Hideyoshi, consisting of 183 short-range aircraft. The Japanese also appointed Vice-Admiral Takahashi

Ibo’s 3rd Fleet to support the invasion of the Philippines, primarily showcasing a variety of cruisers and destroyers, and providing some 358 valuable long-range aircraft in the form of the 11th Air Fleet. Takahashi’s role in the Philippines was to destroy the Asiatic Fleet, cover and support the naval landings, and then protect Japanese supply lines and reinforcements. As we’ve seen, on December 2, the order to “Climb Mount Niitaka” was given, setting up the final preparations for the Japanese

offensives to be launched on December 8. Three days later, Homma’s men departed Haha-jima en route to Guam, with the objective of landing at Tumon Bay, on the southwest coast near Merizo and on the eastern shore of Talofofo Bay. The other invasions, however, would have to wait first for the air attacks to be successful. Around 03:00 on December 8, the American commanders in the Philippines were informed of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although the US thought that the Philippines were a lost caus

e and only wanted to execute a limited resistance for reinforcements of the Pacific Fleet to arrive, MacArthur had planned to do a more active defense, trying to defeat the Japanese on the beaches before they could establish a foothold. Thus, he established three main defense forces, the North Luzon Force of Major-General Jonathan Wainwright; the South Luzon Force of Major-General George Parker Jr.; and the Visayan-Mindanao Force of Brigadier-General William Sharp. MacArthur also believed that t

he combined strength of the Asiatic Fleet and his air forces were capable of destroying any Japanese fleet; something Admiral Hart opposed, believing it would be best for his forces to retreat south and join a combined fleet with the British and the Dutch. General Brereton wanted to prepare a retaliatory B-17 bombing strike against Formosa in accordance with the Rainbow 5 war plan. At 05:30, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General George Marshall, ordered MacArthur to execute the existing war p

lan, Rainbow Five, but MacArthur did nothing. General Brereton proceeded three times to ask permission and was denied until he personally spoke to MacArthur at finally obtaining permission. This procrastination of a preemptive attack would cost them dearly. Around 07:00, Japanese aircraft took off from Formosa, heading towards the Philippines and then striking Tuguegarao and Baguio at 09:30. At this point, army bombers returned to Taiwan, leaving the Americans feeling like the attack was over, e

ven though it had just begun. 34 bombers had also taken off at dawn from Roi island towards Wake, while from Saipan, Japanese aircraft struck Guam, destroying one of their minelayers. Back in the Philippines, Japanese navy bombers caught the Americans unaware at 12:30, bombarding the Iba airfield and destroying a flight of P-40s and its radar station. They then headed to Clark Field, where they managed to destroy most of the American aircraft on the ground, leaving only 17 B-17s operational. By

afternoon, half of the Far East Air Force was shattered, assuring Japanese air superiority for the rest of the campaign. At the same time, Japanese bombers at Wake managed to slip through the American patrols, then bombarding the airfield and destroying the eight Wildcats on the ground. They also struck the American camps, defenses and seaplane facilities, causing considerable damage before returning back to the Marshall Islands. In a single day, the Japanese air forces had repeated their succes

s at Pearl Harbor, leaving the American presence in the Pacific severely weakened. Furthermore, some 490 SNLF marines had already landed in Batan Island, taking control of its small airfield to further execute air operations. This convinced Admiral Hart to order the bulk of the Asiatic Fleet to withdraw and join the British and the Dutch on the Borneo, just as he had planned. More aerial bombardments over the remaining American airfields would follow in the next few days, destroying most of the

remaining aircraft and leaving only a handful of P-40 and B-17 unscathed. Thus, MacArthur was left without naval or air forces, alone to defend the Philippines with his ground divisions. Wake and Guam were also hit again on December 9, although this time the American defenders were prepared to brace the Japanese attack, so they didn’t suffer much damage. More air attacks would follow on December 10, but this day would also see the first major fighting in the Pacific. At dawn, three Surprise Atta

ck Forces, carrying around 2000 Japanese soldiers each, started their operations, with the first one landing at Aparri. This was a very important target, as its airfield could allow army aircraft of the Japanese to conduct attacks all across the Philippines. Despite this, the Japanese landed unopposed and could capture Aparri, Gonzaga and the Camiguin Island in a matter of hours. At the same time, the second force disembarked at Vigan, but was met with an intense B-17 and P-40 attack that forced

some Japanese soldiers to retreat back to the transports. They would return the following day, landing four miles to the south and taking the town of Laoag, while the rest of the detachment had already secured Vigan and its airfield. MacArthur was livid when he heard about the naval landings, blaming Wainwright for his incompetence in MacArthur’s planned active defense, not even offering any resistance. The last Japanese surprise force, coming from the Palau Islands, also disembarked on Legazpi

unopposed on December 12, then taking the city and its airfield. At this point, Japanese forces had also taken the Tuguegarao airfield to the south of Aparri, threatening the last major American airfield at Del Monte. This prompted Brereton to ask permission for the remaining aircraft to be transferred to Darwin, Australia, and as MacArthur agreed, the remaining B-17s had escaped by December 19. Homma then ordered his forces in the northern Philippines to concentrate at Vigan to assist the main

offensive against the Lingayen Gulf. Meanwhile, on December 16, two detachments of the 56th Division completed preparations to conduct amphibious invasions on Davao and the Sulu Islands, intending to secure a southern airfield on the Philippines and to prepare further attacks on Borneo from Jolo. The detachments were under the general command of Major-General Sakaguchi Shizuo, and they would depart Palau en route to Davao later that day. There, the Sakaguchi and Miura Detachments finally landed

under the cover of night. The city defenders, consisting of a single regiment of the Philippine 101st Division, were completely taken by surprise, yet they offered as much resistance as they could. With the Miura Detachment suffering many casualties, General Sakaguchi was forced to order forward some of his forces reserved for the attack on the Sulu Islands. Together, these forces would storm and take the city by midday, and a final attack would be then carried out against the remaining Filipin

o defenders behind the Davao River, finally forcing them to retreat northwestwards. Upon reaching Davao, the Japanese soldiers would be cheered by the sizable Japanese population of the city, liberating them from the warehouses in which they had been detained at the start of the war. While the battered Miura Detachment stayed to garrison Davao and continued the liberation of Japanese inhabitants, the Sakaguchi Detachment would prepare to continue on towards Jolo on the Sulu Islands and then to T

arakan in Dutch Borneo. At the same time, General MacArthur prepared his forces for the imminent main Japanese offensive. The most probable invasion site was in the Lingayen Gulf, where MacArthur had placed the North Luzon Force under the command of General Wainwright, and due to the recent Japanese landings in the north, he shortened its operational area south of San Fernando on the coast. Thus, Wainwright sent the 11th Division and the 26th Cavalry Regiment to defend the Gulf north of Damortis

and also sent a regiment of the 71st Division to San Fernando to stop the advance of the enemy coming from Vigan, while the rest of his forces stood on the route to Manila. On the other side, General Homma planned to land at the Lingayen Gulf with his well-trained 48th Division , then driving south between the Zambales Mountains along a valley that led directly to Manila. He had also prepared elements of the 16th Division under the command of Lieutenant-General Morioka Susumu to land on Lamon B

ay, planning to immediately advance upon landing towards Laguna de Bay. On December 17, Morioka’s forces departed Amami Oshima heading towards their destination. On the same day, Homma’s first invasion force, consisting of the 9th Regiment, departed Keelung en route to the Lingayen Gulf. The following day, the second invasion force embarked from the Penghu Islands, while the third invasion force sailed from Takao heading to its objective. The three invasion forces would arrive together at the Li

ngayen Gulf on the night of December 21, and thus, Homma prepared to start his main offensive. Earlier that day though, submarines from the Asiatic Fleet had discovered and engaged the Japanese convoys, only managing to destroy one of the troop transports. December 22 would finally see the start of Homma’s main offensive as his forces started to land in the Lingayen Gulf early in the morning. They disembarked largely unopposed at three positions , then overrunning units of the 11th Division sout

h of Agoo. At the same time, Japanese forces at Vigan started their drive south, while the 9th Regiment at Bauang supported them with an attack to the north on San Fernando and also advanced on Baguio to prevent a possible encirclement. Acting with haste, the Japanese would manage to reunite around San Fernando, leaving the regiment of the 71st in a difficult position and forcing them to retreat back to Baguio. Alarmed about the landings, MacArthur would have asked for reinforcements to contain

the situation, but with the US more focused in Europe, his Filipino forces would have to suffice. Wainwright would thus order the 26th Cavalry Regiment to establish a defensive line at the town of Damortis, but they too would be hit hard by Homma’s forces and ended up forced to retreat. Desperate, Wainwright then sent an M3 tank platoon to Rosario, which managed to advance up to Agoo but ended up destroyed under Japanese fire. By night, Homma had secured Rosario and the immediate area of the Lin

gayen Gulf, with only the battered 26th Cavalry still resisting to the south . Thus, MacArthur’s planned active defense operations to stop the Japanese on the beaches had completely failed. The next day would see the continuation of the Japanese offensive, which managed to expel the retreating American defenders from Sison and Pozorrubio. Later that day, the 26th Cavalry would be surrounded at Binalonan, but would successfully retreat after four hours of heavy fighting. Beaten, MacArthur now kne

w that his best chance was to establish a series of defensive lines , with the first one behind the Agno River, meant to delay the Japanese advance while his forces at Manila moved to Bataan to prepare for a contracted defense. This plan was WPO-3, which had been devised by the American high command prior to the start of the war and was considered to be too defeatist by MacArthur. He implemented WPO-3 far too late and did not properly prepare for its implementation. The early hours of December 2

4 would see the 16th Division landing at Lamon Bay to the surprise of the Philippine defenders. Morioka’s forces disembarked at three different locations, quickly engaging the defenders of the South Luzon Force. General Parker had placed the 1st and 51st Divisions there, but defenses were highly disorganized, as the 51st was moving to Legaspi to counter the previous invasion. To add to the confusion, MacArthur had placed Parker under the command of the Bataan defenses, then assigning the South L

uzon Force to Brigadier-General Albert Jones. Jones immediately planned to delay a possible Japanese advance through the mountains to Manila while at the same time fighting an aggressive withdrawal into Bataan. Back in Mauban, Morioka was facing fierce resistance by the dugged-in Filipino forces, but in the end the Japanese still managed to push back the defenders. Forces coming from Legaspi also met at Siain after moving through the Bichol Peninsula, while the main units of the 16th Division pr

essed west towards Mount Banahao and south towards Tayabas Bay with the objective of taking control of the route to Manila. Homma planned for them to then advance across the Tayabas Mountains to Cavite, from where they could capture Manila. For the Japanese, the Philippine capital was now within their grasp. Acting according to WPO-3 , MacArthur ordered Jones to efficiently coordinate with Wainwright for their retreat to Bataan, because if one of them retreated too fast, then the other would be

trapped and annihilated. Thus, Jones established his main defensive line on the town of Los Baños , with the 51st Division hastily retreating south of Mount Banahao under heavy Japanese pressure and the 1st Division retreating north of the mountains with little opposition. At this point, Wainwright had also started to withdraw to his second line, ranging from the Zambales Mountains to the town of San Jose. December 25 would see the invasion of Jolo in the Sulu Islands, with General Sakaguchi dep

arting Davao back on December 23. Upon arriving to his destination, one of his battalions landed at Jolo and captured the city and the airfield facing slight resistance from the local inhabitants. Now, Sakaguchi had his main base ready to conduct operations against Dutch Borneo. Meanwhile on December 26, MacArthur declared Manila an open city, knowing that its defense would probably cause the destruction of all his forces, yet the city would nonetheless be subjected to Japanese bombardments that

caused a fair amount of damage. At this point, Homma’s forces had already broken through the towns of Carmen and Tayug, but they failed to rout the fleeing American defenders. By December 27, the Japanese had gotten to the towns of San Manuel and San Quintin, while Wainwright had successfully reached his second line of defense. On December 28, the situation was desperate for the Americans under General MacArthur, forced to execute a difficult withdrawal into Bataan that required a great deal of

coordination between the North and South Luzon Forces. In the north, Japanese pressure had forced General Wainwright’s forces to abandon their second line and to retreat to a new defensive line between the towns of San Miguel and Cabanatuan; and in the south, the Japanese 16th Division had reached the Los Baños line, facing staunch American resistance to continue their drive on Manila. The following day, the Japanese had already gotten to the towns of Tarlac and Bongabon, so they were now apply

ing heavy pressure on Wainwright’s new line with their tanks and superior firepower. At this point, General Homma also realized the extent of MacArthur’s plan, so he sent the 7th Tank Regiment as a vanguard to move fast and capture any bridges and road junctions that would allow them to entrap the retreating defenders. Among the 7th’s targets were the vital road junction of Plaridel and the steel bridges of Calumpit, where the South Luzon Force needed to pass to get to Bataan. On December 30, Ho

mma’s forces finally managed to break through Wainwright’s third line when they took the town of San Miguel. The American defenders would then be forced to retreat to their last line, ranging from Fort Stotsenburg to the Sibul Springs. Concurrently, the 7th Tank Regiment was also traveling towards Gapan a short distance away from the last American line. By December 31, the 7th had broken through this last line, getting itself in the vicinity of Baliuag, a town that stood in the way to Plaridel.

Homma’s other forces were also rapidly pushing the American defenders to the town of San Fernando, where Wainwright knew that he needed to make a final stand. On January 1, the 7th Tank Regiment finally took the town of Baliuag and then advanced to engage M3 Stuart light tanks at Plaridel. In this tank battle, the M3s, supported by artillery of the 71st Division, managed to push the Ha-Gos back. Concurrently, the South Luzon Force of General Jones had reached the Calumpit steel bridges. While hi

s troops crossed it, Jones also sent two tank platoons to engage the Japanese tanks at Baliuag and thus create enough time for the Americans to pull out. The American armor would engage the 7th in the afternoon, disrupting the Japanese force and successfully delaying their advance. By the end of the day, the last of the South Luzon Force moved past Calumpit, blowing up the twin bridges behind them so the 16th Division couldn’t follow them. The next day, units of the 16th occupied Manila, with Ho

mma moving his headquarters to the Philippine's capital. Other units of the 16th were also already crossing the Pampanga River at Calumpit, while the 48th Division was concentrating around San Fernando, where the 11th and 21st Divisions made a last stand in front of the entrance to Bataan. Homma launched costly attack after attack against the battered divisions, but the Filipino forces would hold their ground until January 4, then starting to withdraw towards Layac, where they formed a new defen

sive line. Previous to this withdrawal, however, the defenders had established a line running from the town of Porac to Guagua on January 2. There, the 11th and 21st Divisions, along with the 26th Cavalry Regiment, had resisted against swarms of enemy forces for two days while giving time for General MacArthur’s forces to establish solid defensive positions on the Bataan Peninsula. In turn, the Japanese had suffered enormous casualties against American and Filipino firepower, with an entire deta

chment getting completely decimated at Guagua. Since January 4 though, the defenders would begin to withdraw to a last line at Layac. By January 6, most of their forces had retreated behind the Culo River, blowing up the Layac bridge behind them and causing a minor delay for the Japanese advance. At dawn that same morning, the defenders were greeted with orders and portions officially placing them on half-ration ; it was a long resistance that MacArthur was planning on the Bataan Peninsula. A co

uple hours later, General Homma’s forces started their attack against the Layac line. Initially, American artillery managed to inflict several losses on the invaders, but as time went on, the Japanese started to get the upper hand. Pummeled by Japanese artillery and air bombardment, General Wainwright ordered his forces to abandon the line at nightfall, retreating to the new Abucay and Mauban lines and ending their long withdrawal into Bataan. This officially marks the start of the Battle of Bat

aan, as all American and Filipino forces had now assembled on the Peninsula. MacArthur then formed two operational areas for his forces on Bataan: the 1st Corps, consisting of four divisions and a regiment of Philippine Scouts under the command of General Wainwright, defending a line that stretched from Mauban on the coast to the ranges of Mount Silanganan; and the 2nd Corps of General Parker, also consisting of four divisions and a regiment of Philippine Scouts, covering a line that extended fr

om Mount Natib’s foothills to Mabatang on Manila Bay just in front of Abucay. MacArthur’s strategy was to conduct a defense in depth, taking advantage of the rugged terrain and establishing entrenched defensive positions at the jungles and mountain ranges. Yet in the center of the American line, there was a huge gap at Mount Natib, which was thought impassable by the American commanders. This was a mistake as it formed a gap in the defense line and the two corps were not in direct contact with a

nother; something that the Japanese would use to their advantage in the future. MacArthur had also formed a rear battle position that stretched from Bagac to Orion across the Peninsula; this was to be their last line of defense in Bataan. So far in the campaign, the Americans had lost around 13000 men since the start of the war, while Homma had only lost 2000 soldiers; yet the Japanese general would unexpectedly see his most elite division, the 48th, redirected to participate on the Dutch East I

ndies campaign, so he could now only rely on the 16th Division and the 65th Independent Mixed Brigade for the remainder of the battle. An unsettling peace followed until dawn on January 9, when the Japanese forces started their first attacks against Abucay and Mauban. Fighting started in the Abucay Line back on January 9, when General Homma sent the 65th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 7th Tank Regiment to push south on the East Road and break through the 2nd Corps’ positions. Facing the Japan

ese attack were General Parker’s 41st and 51st Divisions, as well as the elite 57th Regiment of Philippine Scouts. These defenders quickly rushed to rain heavy artillery fire over the Japanese advance, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. At the same time, the Japanese 122nd Regiment moved west towards the 1st Corps’ area and captured the town of Olangopo. The following day, the main attack began against the Abucay Line, as the Japanese forces advanced upon the western sector of the line. T

o bolster the morale of his troops, General MacArthur himself decided to visit the frontlines, although this would be his only trip to Bataan during the battle . Despite the progress of the Japanese advance, the heavy bombardment carried out by the American defenders forced Lieutenant-General Nara Akira of the 65th Independent Mixed Brigade to push his forces further west. On the night of January 11, the first Japanese units started to cross the Calaguiman River against the positions of the 57th

Regiment. The Philippine Scouts resisted attack after attack of Nara’s forces, executing well-planned counterattacks that always managed to regain most of the lost territory. Parker also saw the difficult situation in which his troops were and so, he decided to reinforce them with his reserves. Elsewhere in the center of the line though, the Japanese had successfully pushed back the 41st Division; and in the far western sector, the battered 51st Division was being attacked repeatedly, which lef

t it very close to completely crumbling. Furthermore, on January 15, Nara found a seam between the 41st and 51st Divisions and quickly set out to exploit his newfound opportunity. Parker ordered a counterattack early on January 16, which managed to push back the Japanese a little bit, yet Nara saw this coming and planned to envelop the Filipino troops once they had advanced. This left the 51st completely exposed and rapidly collapsing. That same day, the 122nd Regiment moved south towards Morong

, where its advance was finally stopped by the 26th Cavalry Regiment. Despite their successful horse-mounted charge, which would be the last US cavalry regiment to engage in horse-mounted warfare, General Wainwright had no other choice but to withdraw on January 17 . Due to lack of food, they would end up butchering their mounts to survive and convert into two squadrons, one motorized rifle squadron and a mechanized squadron. Back on the Abucay Line, MacArthur sent the Philippine Division and hi

s last reserves to plug the gap left by the 51st Division. If this position fell, then his entire main battle position might disintegrate in the blink of an eye. In turn, General Nara of the 65th Independent Mixed Brigade decided to slice through the Abucay Line along the Abo Abo River valley, and although the Philippine Scouts offered much resistance, they could hardly stop the advance of the Japanese 9th Regiment. Eventually, however, General Parker’s efforts managed to pay off, as the America

n forces began to hold off their enemy in a series of attacks and counterattacks that lacked decisive action. Meanwhile, General Homma demanded more progress on the western sector, so he reinforced the 122nd Regiment there with the main force of the 16th Division, under the command of Major-General Kimura Naoki. With Kimura now in charge of the western offensive, the Japanese forces started to push the 1st Division out of the Mauban Line by January 18, while the main strength of the 16th Divisio

n broke through the apparently-not-impassable Mount Natib area and started to drive southwest of the Silanganan ridge with the objective of cutting off the Filipino defenders. By January 21, the Mauban Line had been completely pierced, with Japanese soldiers enveloping the 1st Division and pushing towards the coast. Under much pressure, General Wainwright finally ordered the abandonment of the Mauban Line and a general retreat southwards. The following day, Nara started a massive assault against

the Abucay Line after a heavy bombardment of the American positions, forcing the defenders to slowly commence to retreat. In the end, the deteriorating situation at the Mauban Line also forced MacArthur to pull all remaining units from the Abucay Line. On January 23, the gradual retreat towards the new Bagac-Orion Line thus commenced. By January 26, the Filipino forces under Generals Wainwright and Parker had completed their withdrawal, dividing their new defensive line into several sectors . I

n hot pursuit, the Japanese started to hammer the American defensive positions straight away, with General Nara and his 65th Independent Mixed Brigade advancing on the east and with General Kimura’s forces moving towards the west . But General Homma had an ace up his sleeve: a planned naval invasion to bypass the American defenses and thus capture the naval base of Mariveles with the objective of cutting off the retreat of the defenders. Two battalions from the 20th Regiment were thus appointed

to land in small and isolated inlets and then fight their way over sharp cliffs and points rising from the sea. Back on the evening of January 22, the landing craft set out from the town of Morong, heading towards Caibobo Point south of Bagac. Unfortunately for the Japanese, the landings went awry, facing rough seas, poor weather and the threat of American PT boats. This caused them to misidentify the landing zone, coming ashore at Quinauan Point and Longoskawayan Point, which were further down

the coast from where they expected to land, something that left them very isolated but also very close to their target . Thus, the Battle of the Points had begun. On the morning of January 23, American naval lookouts saw some 300 Japanese soldiers moving inland from Longoskawayan Point. A combination of sailors, marines and soldiers then rushed to dislodge the Japanese invaders, but thick jungle impeded their advance. They eventually managed to push back the Japanese, yet they could not defeat t

hem. The Americans then exerted an intense artillery and mortar bombardment over the Japanese positions, but this could only contain their advance for long enough, so General MacArthur decided to send his trained reserves to save the situation . Meanwhile, at Quinauan Point, 600 Japanese soldiers managed to consolidate their position in the face of staunch opposition by American airmen and Filipino constabulary forces. For several days, the situation would remain the same, with both the defender

s and the invaders trying to reinforce their positions as much as they could. On the night of January 26, Kimura committed his reserve battalion and sent it from Olongapo to reinforce the Japanese at Quinauan Point. But this battalion would also be subjected to bad weather, landing instead north of Quinauan Point at Anyasan Point. In response, Wainwright sent two battalions of Philippine Scouts and some M3 tanks to reinforce the American defenders; while the remnants of the American air force ca

rried out a successful raid over the fields at Nielson and Nichols. While the Battle of the Points played out, Homma decided to appoint Lieutenant-General Morioka Susumu to command the offensive against Wainwright’s western area, reinforcing him with two battalions and some support units. Using night attacks all along the Orion-Bagac Line, the Japanese would also manage to make some limited incursions during these days. But on January 28, after two days of heavy fighting and a successful night a

ssault, Nara would finally manage to breach the defensive line in two places at Sector C . Despite these successes, the Japanese would fail to exploit their gains, so their advance would become bogged down. The next day, reinforced by Philippine Scouts and tanks, the American defenders would also manage to destroy the Japanese forces at Longoskawayan Point, thus removing the closest threat to Mariveles. Still, two more points were in Japanese hands, and they would continue to menace MacArthur’s

plans until they were removed. Concurrently, in the Philippines, intense fighting continued across the Orion-Bagac Line; but especially at the Quinauan and Anyasan Point, Japanese and Filipino forces were in a bloody struggle for control of the coastal points. Even despite their numerical superiority, the Philippine Scouts and Constabulary forces were simply not strong enough to push the invaders back, and on February 1, they would face a serious threat. Trying to secure control of the Quinauan

Point, General Homma sent his last reinforcements during the night, but they would fail to land at their objective due to the strong aerial assault of the four remaining P-40s, an intense artillery barrage and the deadly attack of American PT boats that sunk half the Japanese force and forced them to go ashore at the Canas Point. Now completely alone, the 600 Japanese soldiers at Quinauan began to slowly concede territory at a high cost for the defenders. And back to the Orion-Bagac Line, the fi

erce American resistance had taken a heavy toll on the Japanese soldiers . After nearly a month of continuous fighting, the battered 16th Division and 65th Independent Mixed Brigade were discouraged and battle weary. Despite this, General Nara persisted with great tenacity in his efforts to break through the eastern sector of the line. Alas, his efforts would be in vain, with each attack being repulsed by the Allied defenders. On the west though, General Morioka fared much better, breaking throu

gh the 1st Division’s jungle positions but having his force split into two pockets behind enemy lines. In response, General Wainwright launched attack after attack against the Big Pocket, in which the Japanese could block north-south traffic and hinder the movement of troops westwards, but they were continually repulsed, with the invaders even expanding towards the west; only by cutting their supply route behind them could the Americans really threaten the Big Pocket. Meanwhile, by February 5, t

he Filipino forces at Quinauan had been reinforced with a tank platoon and 70 men from the 21st Pursuit Squadron, under Captain William “Ed” Dyess, successfully cornering the Japanese to a small area at the edge of the point. The airmen, led by Dyess, would embark from Mariveles in two armored whaleboats and gunboats on February 8, then landing on the Agloloma Bay and decimating the remaining Japanese soldiers that had gone into hiding in some caves. With opposition at Quinauan Point terminated

at last , the Allied defenders then concentrated on the remaining points that were still under the control of the invaders, finally overtaking these positions and bringing an end to two entire Japanese battalions by February 13 . On February 6, Morioka prepared to launch a general offensive to reestablish a supply route with the Big Pocket by employing a recently arrived battalion of the 33rd Regiment. Initially, the Japanese assault went really well, breaking the main line of the defenders and

getting perilously close to the Big Pocket; yet the efforts of Wainwright’s men eventually paid off and the invaders’ advance was stopped. This allowed the Americans to concentrate on reducing these pockets, which came at a great cost for the defenders. Even despite the employment of tanks and the establishment of a cordon around the pockets, the ferocious Japanese could not be subdued. By January 9 though, the Little Pocket had been abandoned and the men fell into a trap to the west, where they

were completely annihilated. With his offensive bogged down on both fronts and the Battle of the Points lost, General Homma had no other choice but to order the withdrawal of all his engaged forces all along the Orion-Bagac Line to some more secure positions . The soldiers under Nara then began to disengage and move north, while Morioka tried to support the evacuation of the men at the Big Pocket with another attack of the 33rd Regiment. By February 11, the Japanese managed to successfully esca

pe from the Big Pocket under heavy American pressure. The almost 400 soldiers would arrive back to friendly soil on the morning of February 15 after a march of four days under enemy lines and through thick jungle. By February 20, the invaders had completed their withdrawal and Homma was ashamed to request reinforcements to Tokyo. The transfer of the 4th Division was then approved, but it would take time to get it to the Philippines from Shanghai. In the meantime, the 16th Division and the 65th I

ndependent Mixed Brigade would have time to reorganize, rest and refit, while a tight blockade would be enforced upon the Bataan Peninsula so the defenders could not escape, successfully capturing the island of Mindoro on February 26. Nonetheless, this was a tremendous victory for the Battling Bastards of Bataan. Over an entire month would then pass after this victory, which saw little fighting at all in the Philippines. Discouraged and battle weary, the invaders’ advance had been stopped by the

resilient American defenders at the Orion-Bagac Line. Diseases like malaria and dysentery, alongside starvation, weakened both sides in the Philippines, but they took a heavy toll on the Japanese in particular. But not everyone died from disease: by the end of February, some units had been surrounded in pockets, others had been held by the tenacious defenders and two entire battalions had been destroyed at the Battle of the Points, which finally forced General Homma to order the withdrawal of a

ll his engaged forces all along the Orion-Bagac Line. This defeat had left Homma humiliated by commanders in Tokyo and he was forced to ask for reinforcements, being the only Japanese commander to have been defeated up until now. And yet, they would still allow him to prove his worth in the end, with the reinforcement of a completely fresh division and some much needed siege artillery. The transfer of the 4th Division from Shanghai to the Philippines would take some time though, and with the foc

us of the Empire on the Dutch East Indies, it would finally arrive by March 15. Now, with his other forces strengthened and well-rested and with the additional reinforcement of the Nagano Detachment , the Japanese general was ready for a final assault. Meanwhile, the American defenders had their spirits up after the successful defense of the Orion-Bagac Line, but the lack of food and medicine due to the strong Japanese blockade would eventually leave them weaker with each passing day, as food ra

tions would be cut by 50% in the last two weeks of fighting. The 26th cavalry's horses were slaughtered for meat. Efforts were made to break Homma’s blockade, but it was fruitless, the Americans simply didn’t have the naval resources needed to do so. President Roosevelt and Chief of Staff George Marshall thus continued their efforts to supply General MacArthur, but it was too little for the commander of the USAFFE, who felt abandoned by Washington. At this point, MacArthur had also become a war

hero for the American population, bolstered by his personal media coverage team, thus his safety was paramount, losing him to the Japanese would be disastrous for morale. On February 22, with the situation getting ever more difficult on the Bataan Peninsula, Roosevelt finally ordered MacArthur to leave the Philippines and take command of forces in Australia and the Southwest Pacfiic Area. The general chose to remain in the Peninsula as much as he could to ensure that his forces wouldn’t get comp

letely demoralized, but he eventually had to leave on March 12, traveling first to Mindanao and then flying to Australia. Before he left, MacArthur assigned the Visayan Force to Brigadier-General Bradford Chynoweth as to allow General Sharp to fully focus on the defense of Mindanao, from where the Americans still hoped to launch a counteroffensive; and also ordered Major-General George Moore to prepare supplies and defenses on Corregidor Island for a final stand in case Bataan fell. Despite MacA

rthur’s intentions to retain command from Australia, General Wainwright would be left in command of American forces in the Philippines , with the final order to fight for as long as his troops had the ability to resist. When MacArthur arrived at Adelaide on March 17, he promised to return to the Philippines with his famous words “I Shall Return” , which would become a rallying cry for the Americans in the future. But at this point, the morale of the Filipinos was already starting to decline due

to their bad situation, and the general’s departure only hurted their confidence even more. With the assumption of Wainwright, 1st Corps was then assigned to General Jones, who had commanded the South Luzon Force in its retreat to Bataan, and the overall command of the peninsula was assigned to Major-General Edward King, who had been the commander of the artillery during the campaign. By the end of March, defenses across the Orion-Bagac Line had been improved and the half-starved and poorly equi

pped Filipino soldiers had further enhanced their training in jungle warfare. On the other side, Homma planned to make a coordinated three-pronged assault along a narrow front located around the key Mount Samat. After breaking through Samat, the Japanese would then push to Mount Limay and from there to Mariveles. This plan was based on the incorrect assumption that the defenders were executing a defense in depth along three lines , so Homma expected the assault to take over a month. The assault

on Mount Samat would be carried out by the 4th Division of Lieutenant-General Kitano Kenzo, closely supported by General Nara’s 65th Independent Mixed Brigade. Nara was to advance west up the Pantingan River and then continue towards the Mariveles Mountains, while the 4th Division divided in two, with the Right Wing getting across the Tiawir River and then heading down along the Catmon Valley towards Samat, and with the Left Wing advancing on the east directly towards the mount. Kitano believed

that once Samat was taken, only a pursuit of the Americans would be required, so his estimate was far more optimistic than that of Homma’s. In the meantime, General Morioka’s 16th Division would make a feint attack to pin down the 1st Corps and the Nagano Detachment would cover the right flank of the invaders with feint landings across the eastern coast of Bataan. By the end of March, American forces started to be subjected to heavy air and artillery attacks, and on March 28, Homma ordered the f

inal preparations to be carried out, so the Japanese units began to move forward to their expected battle positions. Two days later, the 16th Division would start its feint attacks against the 1st Sector; and by April 2, the preparations for the final assault against Bataan were finally ready. At dawn on April 3, the Japanese commenced a final 6-hours long air and artillery barrage over the Mount Samat area before the start of the offensive. This was undoubtedly one of the most devastating bomba

rdments of the war, with more than 60 tons of bombs dropped over the defenders, destroying many of the defenses recently constructed and weakening three entire regiments . By afternoon, the heavy barrage had achieved its main objective, so the invaders began their advance . Nara was confronted by the bulk of the 41st Division, while Kitano would face the 21st Division of Brigadier-General Mateo Capinpin. Some elements of the 65th Brigade would also engage the 2nd Philippine Constabulary to preve

nt them from coming to the aid of 2nd Corps, but Nara’s main effort was directed against the center of the 41st Division, where they got to quickly push down against the 42nd Regiment. The Japanese general expected heavy opposition but found none , so he decided to continue southwards. Meanwhile, the Right Wing had crossed the Tiawir and immediately engaged the 21st Regiment, rapidly scattering them and continuing its advance southwards. By nightfall, both forces had surprisingly advanced up to

1000 yards without facing strong resistance due to the success of the bombardment earlier that day, which had devastated the morale and organization of the defenders. When news of the disintegration of the corps’ left flank reached General Parker, he sent forward the 33rd Regiment to stop the Japanese advance on an area between Samat and the Catmon River. The following day would start with a renewed air and artillery bombardment. The remnants of the 42nd and 43rd Regiments would yet again flee t

o the south in a stampede, leaving only three regiments to stem the Japanese offensive. Yet despite their courageous resistance, they were no match against the superior Japanese firepower, so they had to retreat further south to prevent any more losses. At the same time, the Left Wing finally went into action, attacking the 22nd and 23rd Regiments and forcing them to retreat. American artillery at this point was hitting friendly and enemy units alike, but could not stop the advance of the invade

rs. By the end of the day, the Japanese were in possession of the entire main line of resistance and the Right Wing had gotten to the northern foothills of Samat. Facing a looming disaster, General King sent the 31st Regiment to further reinforce the American defenders, while also placing the 45th and 57th Regiments on positions of readiness nearby. On Easter Sunday, the 4th Division reorganized its forces for Kitano to start his attack against Mount Samat. The Right Wing would seize the heights

of the mountain and then continue south to the Tala River while the Left Wing executed the main attack against Samat. After the customary bombardment of the defenders’ positions, Kitano started his assault but found strong resistance coming from Capinpin’s men . Nonetheless, the Right Wing would advance unopposed towards the northwest slopes of Samat, forcing the American artillery to retreat. Deprived of artillery support, the defenders began to concede terrain and were eventually pushed back

by the Left Wing. Furthermore, the Right Wing also advanced on the southern slopes of Samat and captured many soldiers of the 21st Division, including General Capinpin. By nightfall, Mount Samat was under Japanese control and the Right Wing had advanced to the west, fully routing the 21st Division headquarters. Nara also continued to drive south towards Mariveles and the 16th Division and the Nagano Detachment were preparing to join in the attack against Mount Limay. But now, with the arrival of

the new reinforcements , King was planning to launch a four-pronged counterattack aimed to regain the main line. Yet Homma was also planning to launch an attack eastwards against the 51st Division and the 32nd Regiment, with the intention of pushing southeast to get to the Limay River. At dawn on April 6, both sides put their plans in motion. Within a day, the American counterattack rapidly ended up in complete disaster. Since the 21st Division had already been routed , the 31st Regiment would

have to attack Samat alone. Despite the 31st’s tenacity and resilience, the bulk of the Left Wing fell upon them, forcing the Americans to go on the defensive . In the center, the 33rd Regiment also saw its rear disappear against the savage Japanese forces, so it ended up completely encircled by the 65th Brigade. And to the west, the 41st Regiment initially fared much better , but Nara counterattacked and forced them back to the Pantingan River. The 45th Regiment was the most successful out of t

he four, overcoming the Japanese resistance and continuing its advance north towards the 41st Regiment, but already it was clear that the American counterattack was a failure. On the other hand, Nara had managed to cut off the 2nd Sector from the 1st and had advanced so far that forward elements of the 65th Brigade were engaging the 57th Regiment. Furthermore, Kitano sent the 37th Regiment with tanks to attack against the 51st Division, quickly overrunning the defenders’ positions and forcing th

em to retreat behind the San Vicente River. The 31st Regiment would also have to follow suit, and to the west, the 45th Regiment would have to withdraw as well to avoid an encirclement. By the end of the day, the Americans truly had a disastrous situation on their hands, with the loss of two divisions and with the complete breakdown of the main line of defense; and on April 7, the situation would only get much worse. After a failed counterattack to reestablish a connection with 1st Corps, which

was carried out by the 45th and 57th Regiments, Homma decided to quickly capitalize on his gains. Seeing a gap between the southern extremity of the San Vicente line and the 57th Regiment, Kitano thus sent the 61st Regiment to endanger the flanks of the Americans. This attack was highly successful, finally forcing the 57th to retreat eastwards. Meanwhile, despite their strong and fierce resistance, the isolated 33rd Regiment was routed at last and only few men would manage to escape to safety th

rough the jungles. But the main assault would be carried out by the 4th Division and the Nagano Detachment, directly striking at the demoralized defenders on the San Vicente River. Under a relentless bombardment, the Filipinos on the right would break, soon starting an unorganized retreat . The Americans to the left fared a little better, but the assault of the 8th Regiment would finally send them packing as well. To cover the withdrawal towards the Mamala River, General King would send the 26th

Cavalry Regiment, which recently got to arrive from 1st Corps, to hold off the invaders . The cavalrymen tenaciously resisted Kitano’s assault, but the 8th Regiment would finally encircle them, so they would have to retreat behind the river. By afternoon, a new line had been formed on the Mamala River, but the invaders immediately continued to hammer down the defenders, so the Americans would have to continue their retreat south towards the Alangan River. In his desperation, Wainwright ordered

the 11th Division to attack eastwards and save the 2nd Corps, but the task was impossible and it was already too late. Instead, General Jones would be forced to withdraw towards the Binuangan River to relink with Parker’s line. At this point, the situation was completely chaotic for the defenders. With Homma continuing his drive against Mariveles and Cabcaben on April 8, the decimated Filipino forces would continually be on the retreat due to the strong bombardment and the heavy pressure of Kita

no’s men. It was clear now that the 2nd Corps had fully disintegrated and that the end was nigh for the Battling Bastards of Bataan. Amidst the chaos, an order from MacArthur to launch an attack against Olongapo was received, but King quickly dismissed it since it was impossible to execute, instead ordering the demolition of equipment and facilities. The general knew that he held the heavy responsibility for the fate of the 78000 men on Bataan, but he had already made up his mind: surrender was

the only option, even if Wainwright or MacArthur ordered otherwise. Very few units would escape the fate of the peninsula, as most were too far away from Mariveles, but when Homma heard news of a possible evacuation, he sent forward his tank vanguard in an effort to rush to Mariveles. By noon on April 9, the Japanese tanks reached the American headquarters, where they were received with white flags. Soon after, King surrendered and, after several months, Bataan had fallen . Upon surrendering he

asked Major General Kameichiro Nagano's assurance that his men would be treated as prisoners of war. Nagano's response was "The Imperial Japanese Army are not barbarians. Another army had vanished against the might of the Japanese Empire; and their defeat would be followed by horrors and atrocities, as the Americans and Filipinos would be denied food and water, robbed of their possessions and equipment, maimed, beaten and bayoneted in a forced march under the hot sun from Mariveles to San Fernan

do. In result, the Bataan Death March would take the lives of 2300 Americans and almost 10000 Filipinos, and it would only be the start of the three years of mistreatment for those who survived it. But this would not be the end of the campaign, however, as the Americans were still in control of the southern Philippines and Corregidor, their island fortress. During the first four months of the war, General Homma knew that he lacked the sufficient resources to conduct simultaneous operations on bo

th the northern and southern Philippines. In this time, he could only seize Jolo and secure a foothold on Mindanao with the capture of Davao and a landing on Zamboanga back on March 2. But now, with the fall of Bataan, the Japanese general was ready to launch operations southwards. For this, he was further reinforced with two battle-hardened detachments: the Kawaguchi Detachment coming from Borneo and the Kawamura Detachment , which fought in Malaya. Confident in the strength of these forces, Ho

mma planned to land the Kawaguchi Detachment in Cebu while the Kawamura Detachment seized Panay. With the fall of the two most important islands on the Visayas, he would then have free rein to invade Mindanao . In contrast, General Sharp had three poorly-equipped and inadequately-trained Filipino divisions , almost without artillery pieces but with an additional division being recently organized at Cagayan . Sharp’s mission was the defense of Mindanao and the important airfield at Del Monte, but

if organized resistance was no longer practicable in the southern Philippines, he was to establish guerrilla groups in the interior of each island. On the Visayas, General Chynoweth counted with some 20000 men in five separate garrisons , with around 6500 soldiers in Cebu and some 7000 men in Panay. In the last month, Chynoweth had overseen the construction of elaborate defenses on Panay and Cebu , as well as the preparations for the employment of guerrilla warfare if these defenses fell. Back

on April 5, Kawaguchi had reached the Lingayen Gulf, from where he was immediately sent towards Cebu. On the afternoon of April 9, Chynoweth heard the first reports of the incoming Japanese invasions, so he put all troops on high alert. During the night, Kawaguchi divided his forces in two convoys, with one heading east towards Cebu City and the other advancing directly towards Toledo. The following morning, both forces landed on their objectives, facing light resistance from the Filipino defend

ers and slowly pushing them back. Within a day, Cebu City had fallen to the Japanese, but the defenders had gained enough time to carry out demolitions and retreat into the interior of the island . And at Toledo, the Filipinos were sent packing towards Cantabaco, a key position with a cross-island highway. In an unfortunate turn of events, the Japanese overran the defenders there and quickly seized this position, then driving towards Talisay and Naga. With his defenses compromised by April 12, C

hynoweth was finally forced to retreat into the mountains with his remaining forces to start guerrilla warfare. With Chynoweth hiding in Cebu, General Wainwright put Sharp back in command of the remaining Visayan forces on April 16, though in reality, the garrison commanders of each island would lead the islands’ defenses, such as Colonel Albert Christie at Panay. On that same morning, the bulk of the Kawamura Detachment landed at Iloilo on the southeast of the island, while a smaller force came

ashore at Capiz to the north and another force landed at San Jose to the south two days later. These landings were unopposed by the defenders, so Major-General Kawamura Saburo advanced with haste and rapidly seized all the strategic points of the island by April 20. This was because Christie had decided not to confront the enemy head on, instead withdrawing towards the well-stocked mountains to wage guerrilla warfare . Thus would begin a long campaign of hit-and-run raids and ambushes from the

mountains of Cebu and Panay. But most importantly, Homma had secured a foothold on the Visayas from where to launch his critical invasion of Mindanao. Now, the last obstacle that he had to overcome was the American island fortress of Corregidor. There, General Wainwright maintained control over the Manila Bay with a garrison of some 13000 men, including the 4th Marines Regiment of Colonel Samuel Howard. Known to the Americans as the Gibraltar of the East, Corregidor had been heavily fortified ac

ross its history, yet its defenses had not been improved since World War One. It nonetheless boasted a formidable armament of some 56 coastal guns and mortars, 48 machine guns , 28 3-inches guns and 10 Sperry searchlights . This constituted the Harbor Defenses , which was led by General Moore in an effort to protect the beaches and execute inshore patrols. Furthermore, his responsibility not only included Corregidor, but also the three other fortified islands that protected Manila Bay. Moore had

also tried to update thd’s fortifications prior to the war, but he had had little time and thus wasn’t able to correct the most important weaknesses of the harbor defenses: their vulnerability against air attacks and on their landward flanks. In result, Corregidor had been regularly bombarded from December 28 to January 6 by the strong air forces commanded by Lieutenant-General Obata Hideyoshi, suffering heavy damage and a morale drop, but luckily keeping the armament of the island unscathed. T

he defenders were also suffering from food shortage and living on 30 ounces of food per day. When bombardments killed horses of the cavalry, the men would drag the carcasses down to the mess hall for consumption. Additionally, Japanese artillery from Cavite intermittently shelled the defenders’ positions during the month of February, although failing to cause severe damage. By March 15, new reinforcements arrived to start a heavier bombardment from Pico de Loro, which caused much damage to Forts

Frank and Drum. With the fall of Bataan, however, General Homma could now place his heavy artillery on the slopes of the Mariveles Mountains, from where he could now start inflicting some real damage over the American defenses. Meanwhile, to the south, General Sharp was also working tirelessly to make all defenses ready on Mindanao. There, he had three poorly-trained and inadequately-equipped Filipino divisions , with few artillery pieces but with an additional division being recently organized

at Cagayan. Sharp divided the defense of Mindanao into five sectors , with the most important being the Cotabato-Davao Sector, where the Japanese had already landed back in December, 1941. Whereas Corregidor’s importance lay with its ability to control Manila Bay, MacArthur desired to use Mindanao as a base for his reconquest of the Philippines, so keeping American control of the island was also of the utmost importance. As for the Japanese, they kept a small presence over Davao with the battal

ion-strong Miura Detachment , under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Miura Toshio. Since his arrival to the island, Miura had tried to extend his control into the interior, but even despite the air and artillery support, he hadn’t been successful in this endeavour. With the fall of Panay and Cebu, however, Homma prepared to finally seize the island with a coordinated attack from three directions, so Miura was ordered to move to the town of Digos, from where he would strike towards the Sayre Hig

hway. At the same time, the Kawaguchi Detachment was to land at Cotabato on the west coast, where a small force would advance east to link with Miura’s troops while the bulk of the detachment pushed north towards Cagayan. Finally, the Kawamura Detachment was to land at the head of the Macajalar Bay, with a small force striking west to meet Kawaguchi’s men while the rest of the detachment marched south along the Sayre Highway. Thus, Homma planned to encircle and neutralize the American defenders

across three fronts. On April 26, the operation was set in motion with the departure from Cebu of the Kawaguchi Detachment, followed by Kawamura from Panay five days later. At dawn on April 29, the day of Hirohito's birthday, Kawaguchi’s men began to land at Cotabato and Parang. Whereas they could come ashore unharmed at Cotabato, Kawaguchi saw much more opposition at Parang. There, the 1st Regiment of Colonel Calixto Duque had established solid defensive positions at the beaches, which enabled

him to hold the town for more than six hours. Despite initially landing without problem at Cotabato, Kawaguchi also saw heavy resistance when entering the city, only managing to push the Filipinos back with the aid of Japanese aircraft. Soon, both Calixto’s men and the 101st Division found themselves encircled and had to withdraw inland . In the meantime, Miura had moved against Digos in strength, engaging the Filipino forces there and starting his advance west towards the Sayre Highway. The def

enders, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Reed Graves, opposed the Japanese advance stubbornly and got to effectively slow them down with mortar fire. On April 30, though, Kawaguchi began his advance eastwards towards Miura’s position, both moving overland and sailing up the river . This was very dangerous, as the Japanese could rapidly set up roadblocks in front of the retreating men of the 101st Division. And this is exactly what the invaders would do, capturing Pikit and forcing the Filipinos to move

north and away from the roads. From there, Kawaguchi then wanted to advance on Kabacan, where he would completely cut off Graves’ men. A race would thus start for the heart of the sector. Meanwhile, the Japanese would also start to advance from Parang towards Malabang, which was held by the 61st Regiment of Colonel Eugene Mitchell. There, the defenders immediately withdrew to some better defensive positions behind the Mataling River. When Kawaguchi landed at the city, action immediately opened

along the Mataling line. The Filipinos held on for a few hours, but, having suffered heavy casualties, they started to give way against the incessant hammering of Kawaguchi’s men. Desperately, Mitchell launched a counterattack against his weakened rear, but the arrival of Japanese artillery and the reluctance of some of the Filipino soldiers to attack ended up forcing his men to retreat . The following day, the 61st was engaged again by Kawaguchi’s men, suffering heavy casualties and having to c

ontinue its withdrawal northwards. Although they were later reinforced by elements of the 84th Regiment, a third Japanese assault finally overran and routed the defenders. Making his way to the rear, Mitchell reorganized the remainder of his forces with a detachment of the 81st Regiment, but hot on their heels, the Japanese struck and finally annihilated the Filipino force, capturing Mitchell in the process . Now, Kawaguchi aimed his detachment against the town of Ganassi, where the 73rd Regimen

t Led by Lt. Col Robert Vesey stood as his last obstacle on the way to Cagayan. On May 2, Kawaguchi’s vanguard started a preliminary assault, which rapidly forced the defenders to withdraw towards Bacolod, though the Japanese would not keep their pressure. In the meantime, after carrying out successful delaying actions against the Miura Detachment, Graves was ordered to withdraw immediately or else get annihilated by the enemy. By a hair’s breadth, the Filipinos would get to escape through Kabac

an just as the town was starting to be attacked by the Japanese. They would then set up defensive positions along the Sayre Highway, successfully holding their ground against the invaders until the end of the campaign. Early on May 3, Kawaguchi resumed his advance towards Cagayan, but was abruptly stopped by the successful delaying actions of the 73rd. One IJA tank attempted to cross a stream (and was knocked out by a 2.95" mountain gun while the 73rd shot out the IJA halting them. Yet despite t

hem, the Japanese would manage to start a renewed assault, as they received artillery support and that sent the defenders packing. With this victory, Kawaguchi had consolidated his control over southern and western Mindanao, only leaving the Filipinos on the north standing. There, however, the Kawamura Detachment had landed at two points during the early hours of May 3. Supported by Japanese destroyers and aircraft, Kawamura’s forces quickly came ashore and successfully pushed back the defenders

. Only a strong counterattack by the 103rd Regiment almost managed to drive back the invaders into the sea, but the retreat of the other elements of the 102nd Division ended up forcing the regiment to withdraw as well. At this point, General Sharp sent forward his reserves to halt the Japanese advance along the Sayre Highway. By nightfall, new defensive positions were thus established parallel to the Mangima Canyon, with three regiments holding the town of Dalirig and two regiments defending Pun

tian. Luckily for them, Kawamura decided not to continue his advance, so the defenders could dig in at their new positions. But before we can conclude the invasion of Mindanao, we have to look back to Corregidor. With his heavy artillery now in place on the slopes of the Mariveles Mountains and along the shores of Cabcaben, Homma was preparing his final assault against Corregidor. The 4th Division of General Kitano was selected to carry out two consecutive amphibious attacks , reinforced with th

e 7th Tank Regiment and one battalion of mountain artillery , while at the same time, the 16th Division would launch a feint attack from Cavite against Forts Frank and Drum. For the assault, the Japanese artillery had the most important task, starting their incessant barrage of the island on April 10. This force, led by Major-General Kitajima Kineo, included 18 batteries with some 116 field pieces and had to neutralize the enemy’s guns, destroy Corregidor’s installations, sink vessels in the bay

and allow Japanese aircraft to get close to the island with the destruction of all anti-aircraft guns and short-range batteries. It would also drown out the noise of the transports’ engines as they entered Manila Bay through the North Channel, successfully allowing the invaders to assemble some 60 transports at the bay by April 22. During the 27 days of siege, Kitajima’s artillery unleashed hell upon the defenders with great effectiveness, raining such a heavy amount of fire over them that most

of the beach defenses ended up demolished, the anti-aircraft guns destroyed and the land cratered. The shelling never really stopped , making it impossible to repair or replace any of the defenses. The devastation caused by the Japanese was also accompanied by several aerial bombardments, which were carried out by the 22nd Air Brigade. Emboldened by the success of the artillery, the pilots came in at lower altitudes and bombed much more accurately, thus increasing the damage to the American def

enses . By the start of May, large sections of Corregidor lay shrouded under a dense cloud of smoke and dust; and now, the even heavier pre-assault bombardment was commencing. With such barrage, the only place safe for the Americans was on the Malinta Tunnels , but they could not fight back from there. Concentrated fire over the narrow tail of the island hinted where the assault was going to take place, but the harshness of the attacks left this area really vulnerable. With each passing day, the

intensity of the bombardment increased to the disbelief of the demoralized defenders; and by May 5, the defenses of Corregidor had truly been destroyed, with dust laying so heavy over the island that the men could not see beyond their position. That night, Kitano’s assault was commencing and the fall of Corregidor was coming close to fruition. Surprisingly, the defenders valiantly employed the few remaining batteries they had against the invaders, managing to sink a number of boats and inflicti

ng hundreds of casualties. Then, after running to the island in the dark, the 61st Regiment came ashore further east than expected, immediately starting to push west towards Malinta Hill and south against Monkey Point. By the early hours of May 6, the Japanese had taken the position of Battery Denver, swiftly defeating the little opposition of the US marines and threatening the Malinta Tunnels. While Moore tried to reinforce the entrance to the tunnels under heavy artillery fire, the Japanese fe

nded off three consecutive counterattacks against their position. Desperately, Colonel Howards sent forward his last reserves, a provisional battalion of 500 marines, sailors and soldiers, which started a last counterattack by 06:00. To the surprise of the Japanese, the obstinate and bold attack of the Americans managed to make gains, but it was eventually stalled and the defenders had to retreat. At this point, however, the situation was very bad for the invaders as well. Several ammunition cra

tes never made the landings and as a result several Japanese attacks and counterattacks were made using Bayonets The retaliation of the American batteries had destroyed some 31 vessels, preventing Kitano from launching the second wave of landings by the 37th Regiment unless Malinta Hill was first taken. Despite this, the 61st had now assembled with its tanks and artillery and was starting a coordinated assault that managed to rapidly route the marine defenders. By 10:00, the situation was hopele

ss for the Americans. Knowing that a wholesale slaughter would occur if the Japanese got to the tunnels, General Wainwright had no other choice but to surrender the four fortified islands in Manila Bay . While he traveled to Bataan, the Japanese actually got to seize the Malinta Tunnels, leaving the men there to their mercy. Despite Wainwright’s initial reluctance to surrender the rest of the Philippines, General Homma finally forced him to order the Visayan-Mindanao forces to surrender as well

or else the 11000 men in Corregidor could be brutally executed. At Mindanao, May 6 had actually seen Kawamura resume his offensive with an attack against Dalirig, yet he made little progress against the defenders. Only on May 9 could the town be taken as the 62nd Regiment retreated in disarray, but this effectively breached the Mangima line and left northern Mindanao in the hands of the invaders. General Sharp was in a difficult position, if he ignored the surrender order from Wainwright, the ho

stages on Corregidor could be massacred. Yet his men were still capable of mounting guerilla warfare and several smaller groups were released from his command while the remaining defenders retreated to their mountain-hideouts. Between May 10 and 15, Wainwright’s orders for surrender began to arrive to the commanders of the scattered Filipino forces. Generals Sharp and Chynoweth, among many others , decided to surrender to avoid the slaughter of the Corregidor garrison, but many officers refused

to carry out these orders and continued to fight as guerrilla groups, mostly made of Filipino soldiers. Most of these guerrillas would continue to fight until the liberation of the Philippines, proving to be pivotal for the operations that would take place there in the future. The last place to surrender would be the island of Negros, where the Filipino forces mutineed against their commander and held hostage some 200 Japanese internees. Eventually , most of the Filipinos surrendered on June 3,

but two of these battalions never surrendered at all, thus continuing the fight from the mountains. With this, however, the fall of the Philippines had been completed after six months of long resistance, and the archipelago was now in the hands of the Japanese. Homma had finally won the campaign, but Tokyo had expected this to happen by February - in 2 months, rather than 5 he has spent, so he was promptly and disgracefully relieved from his command. As for the Allies, the epic of Bataan and Cor

regidor would act as a beacon of hope for the future, proving that the Japanese were not really unstoppable. It is also important to note that the long American-Filipino resistance had managed to tie up a large amount of Japanese troops, aircraft and resources, which could not be employed elsewhere, particularly for a dangerous invasion of Australia. Thus, the Allied forces in the Philippines managed to gain enough time for the improvement of Australia and New Guinea’s defenses, the same defense

s that would later stop the Japanese advance on the South Pacific. The casualty reports of the US Army for the Philippines totalled 31615 men , from which 1092 were killed, 1720 were wounded, 15309 were missing, and 13494 were officially reported prisoners. To these must be added the casualties suffered by the Philippine Commonwealth Army, which approximately included an estimate of 16000 killed or missing, 19000 wounded and 70000 captured. Additionally, the 4th Marines suffered 315 killed, 15 m

issing, 357 wounded and 1388 captured. On the other hand, the Japanese reported 4130 killed, 287 missing and 6808 wounded; yet the Americans estimate that they actually lost 7000 battle casualties, with another 10000 to 12000 men dying of disease, between January 6 and February 8 alone. Thus, their approximate count could number over 10000 casualties and over 20000 sick. On the naval aspect, although most of Admiral Hart’s Asiatic Fleet managed to escape towards Australia, some vessels were lost

during the first few days of the invasion or were left behind and later destroyed to prevent their use by the enemy. These losses included one submarine, one submarine tender, five PT boats, four minesweepers, four Filipino tugboats, three river gunboats, three converted yachts, one district patrol vessel, one submarine rescue ship, and about 70 miscellaneous district craft. Against them, the Japanese only lost two minelayers during the Invasion of the Philippines. But the end of the campaign w

ould not be the end of the struggle for the almost 85000 men that were captured by the Japanese. The Bataan Death March saw some 75000 prisoners of war suffer a forcible transfer from their assembly point in Mariveles airfield to the prison camp at the former Camp O'Donnell in Capas, Tarlac. The first segment of the march, from Mariveles to San Fernando, would be all on foot and without food over a pitted and peppered-dusty road of some 94 km, with the prisoners accompanied sparsely by the Japan

ese soldiers-escorts. Many officers and men died on the way due to starvation, exhaustion or sickness. In an appalling sight, the ditches by the sides of the road were strewn with the weak, the sick and the dying. At San Fernando, the prisoners were made to board railroad freight trains of the airless type , as many as 115 packed in each car. The men could only stand, wedged in much like cigarettes in a pack. Throughout the distance of some 40 km, the boxcars remained closed in order to prevent

escapes along the way. Many men died of suffocation, each car with its quota of dead. The prisoners were then made to alight at the Capas railroad station where the survivors would begin their trek of the final eight miles or so to Camp O'Donnell. Sources report 5000 to 18000 Filipino deaths and 500 to 650 American deaths during the march. Conditions at the prison camps were not much better either. The Japanese military leadership was ill-prepared to handle the incarceration of such an amount of

prisoners of war, and did not have the logistics or facilities prepared at the camp to support such an influx of population. Accompanying the scarcity of food and water was the lack of cleaning materials, medicine and hospital equipment for the weakened men that managed to survive the death march. They were forced to eat meager amounts of spoiled and moldy rice and to drink contaminated water from a river about four inches deep, which was slimy mud into which the overflow of the pit latrines se

eped, with only a scum of water on top. By the end of April, men laid on the bare floors, sick and hungry, with hundreds dying every day. Major-General Rafael Jalandoni later said that 43000 Filipinos reached Camp O'Donnell alive but 29000 of them died there before he was released. It is estimated that around 5000 American prisoners also died during the first year. After the fall of Corregidor, the American prisoners were transferred to new camps near Cabanatuan, where the conditions were somewh

at better; and about 120 senior officers, including General Wainwright, were taken to a camp near Tarlac City. From September 1942 to January 1943, Japan paroled the remaining Filipino prisoners, forcing them to sign an oath not to become guerrillas in the future. Finally, the remaining American prisoners of war that were too weak to be sent abroad would be distributed all across the Philippines while the rest were sent off on "hell ships" to do forced hard labor in Japan, Manchuria, Korea and T

aiwan, among others, until the end of the war. Wainwright, for example, would be sent to Formosa and later to Manchuria, where he would become thin and malnourished and where he would also suffer the same Japanese mistreatments despite being the highest-ranking prisoner of war. But there is one man who managed to get off scot-free, who did not suffer the same fate as those men that were under his command and who even saw his reputation increase despite his many errors… Douglas MacArthur was one

of the US military’s most celebrated and controversial commanders. His military service career is one of the most extensive and impressive in history, but it did not go unblemished.By the end of the Philippines Campaign, he had risen to become a national hero both for the Philippines and for the United States. But it is important to note that he made many blunders throughout his illustrious –or notorious– career. One of them might be his unsuccessful defense of the Philippines, so we ask the que

stion: How did Douglas MacArthur Cause the Philippines’ Disaster? Douglas MacArthur was born January 26th, 1880 at Little Rock Barracks in Little Rock, Arkansas, to Arthur MacArthur Jr. and his wife Mary Pinkney Hardy MacArthur. They had three sons, Douglas being the youngest, after Arthur III, born in 1876, and Malcolm, born in 1878. The family lived on a succession of army posts in the American Old West where Douglas, according to himself, “learned to ride and shoot even before I could read or

write--indeed, almost before I could walk and talk” . Douglas MacArthur was the military brat son of Arthur MacArthur Jr., who held an impressive military career, serving in the Union Army during the American Civil War and becoming Governor General of the Philippines. The stage was set for Douglas MacArthur to distinguish himself with an extensive military career, taking part in the Philippine-American War, Mexican Revolution, WW1, WW2 and the Korean War. He received an incredible amount of mil

itary service awards and became the youngest US major general in 1925 at age 44. Yet many historians argue that his accomplishments were not based on merit alone. MacArthur’s “helicopter mom” , nicknamed Pinky, followed him to every military station he served and used her influence as the wife of Commanding General Arthur MacArthur to make sure that her son received the kinds of postings that would move him ahead. Indeed, MacArthur seemed to go from glory to glory, from Superintendent at West Po

int to Major General in the Philippines, bringing his mother along to Manila, where she would soon die in 1935. The same year, Douglas MacArthur was hired by his personal friend, Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippines, to supervise the creation of a Philippine Army. On December 31, 1937, MacArthur officially retired from the US Army, ceasing to represent the US, but continued as Quezon’s adviser in a civilian capacity. Douglas MacArthur’s legacy is marred by criticism of his tactical skills

and a diagnostic of extreme narcissistic personality disorder. MacArthur was incapable of accepting responsibility for his mistakes and was driven by his obsession with his public image. He went as far as to hire an entire public relations staff to promote his image with the American public. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who would later become US President, said that MacArthur “had an obsession that a high commander must protect his image at all costs and must never admit his wrongs” . MacArthur would

write in grandiose, self-glorifying prose, attributing much of the US Army’s success to himself, often emphasizing the many awards he received throughout his career. He would often write sitting at his desk, wearing a Japanese kimono, smoking cigarettes out of a jeweled holder and speaking of himself in third person with a fifteen-foot-high mirror behind his officer chair” On July 26th, 1941 President Roosevelt federalized the Philippine Army and recalled MacArthur to active duty as a two-star M

ajor General, naming him commander of the US Army Forces in the Far East . MacArthur had two war plans to follow to defend the Philippines. War Plan Orange dictated that the primary mission of the Philippine garrison was to hold the entrance to Manila Bay and deny its use to the Japanese. American troops were not to fight anywhere but in central Luzon. An Initial Protective Force would have the main task of preventing enemy landings, but if this proved unsuccessful, it was to engage in delaying

actions while withdrawing to the Bataan Peninsula, however not at the expense of the primary mission. The Philippine army could be utilized to defend Manila Bay, but troops would not defend the entire archipelago. The withdrawal would require moving all necessary war supplies capable of supporting defensive operations by a force of 43,000 men for a period of six months to Bataan. War Plan Orange was superseded by Rainbow Plan 5 , which came about as a result of Japan joining the Tripartite Pact

in September 1940. It stipulated that the US would maintain a defensive stance against Japan until Germany and Italy had been defeated. By this time it was now called WPO-3, and despite it being a sound defense plan, it meant that the Philippines was implicitly an acceptable loss. MacArthur regarded WPO-3 as defeatist and too defensive, preferring an aggressive plan to defeat any enemy that attempted the conquest of the Philippines. He outright rejected Rainbow 5 as it implicitly accepted the lo

ss of the Philippines. Almost from the date he was recalled on July 26, 1941 MacArthur began trying to replace WPO-3 with his own more aggressive plan. In July 1941, Major General Henry H. Arnold proposed reinforcing the Philippine Army air corps by sending four heavy bombardment groups and two pursuit squadrons. By the time the conflict began, 107 P-40 Tomahawk fighters and 35 B-17 bombers were in place in the Philippines. By October 1st 1941, MacArthur had persuaded the War Department to appro

ve some of his concepts for the defense of the Philippines. MacArthur reported to Washington confidently that he would soon have 200,000 armed men organized into eleven divisions with corresponding air force, corps and army troops ready for combat and that the arrival of the B-17s “has changed the whole picture in the Asiatic area”. He called for a change from WPO-3 to a much riskier strategy. He would stage an aggressive beach defense with his large Filipino force and use the Far East Air Force

and Navy submarines to destroy Japanese transports inbound for Luzon. MacArthur believed that the Japanese would not attack during the hot season and therefore he would have until april 1942 to train and prepare his defenses. By then, the Filipino force he promised would be ready. However, by December 8th, 1941, none of this was a reality. Washington was inspired by MacArthur’s optimism and slightly amended Rainbow 5 on November 19, 1941. The amendments were orders for the aircraft of the Far E

ast to attack any Japanese forces and installations within radius at the outbreak of war. Washington increased MacArthur’s force numbers and supplied him with tanks, artillery and aircraft. By December 1941, MacArthur had 31,095 US forces, 130,000 under trained and ill-equipped Filipino forces, 35 B-17s and 107 P-40s. The most crucial equipment shortfalls were in rifles and divisional light artillery. Most were equipped with WW1 M1917 Enfields and the divisions only had 20% of their artillery re

quirements. Admiral Hart had three cruisers, thirteen WW1-era destroyers, six patrol torpedo boats and twenty-nine submarines. Washington had no illusions about the Philippines being capable of holding back a Japanese invasion, and ordered Admiral Hart to withdraw his fleet if attacked. WPO-3 was still to be enacted at the offset of invasion and MacArthur's beach defense was not to hinder its implementation. MacArthur instead implemented his own plan, dispersing his forces widely and thinly acro

ss nine major Philippine islands, breaching WPO-3. This meant that the vital war equipment was scattered with these units, and it would therefore be difficult to move to the Bataan Peninsula. He did this because he believed that the Japanese would not attack prior to April 1942. He thus had no realistic plan to defend the islands if attacked earlier. On November 27, 1941, numerous war warnings had developed as well as a strong belief that war with Japan was imminent. An alert was radioed to all

commands by General Marshall, including one to MacArthur, stating that if hostilities occurred, he was to carry out Rainbow Plan 5. Rainbow 5 called for MacArthur to conduct air raids against enemy forces and installations within tactical operating radius as soon as Japan committed the first act of aggression. Despite this, MacArthur pursued his beach offensive plan based on the forces he expected to have by April 1942. Within minutes of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at 2:30 a.m. on Decemb

er 8th, 1941 (Manila time), the news was received by HQ in the Philippines and MacArthur was informed by 3:00 a.m. Brereton got the news at 4:00 a.m. from MacArthur’s Chief of Staff Lt. Col Richard Sutherland, and immediately placed the Air Force on war alert. At 5:00 a.m., Brereton asked MacArthur permission to bomb Formosa, but he was denied access to MacArthur by Sutherland. Sutherland responded by insisting on a preliminary photo reconnaissance mission to find out what they were going to bom

b at Formosa before doing so. At 5:30 a.m., MacArthur received a cable from Washington instructing him to execute the Rainbow Plan 5 at once. Yet, MacArthur seemingly did nothing. At 6:15 a.m., MacArthur was informed by Admiral Hart that Japanese carriers had bombed the American seaplane tender William B. Preston in Davao Bay on Mindanao. At 7:15, Brereton asked permission to bomb Formosa again and Sutherland responded “MacArthur said no, we must not make the first overt act, your role is defens

ive for the time being”. At 8:00, General Henry H. Arnold called Brereton from Washington, warning him not to let his planes be attacked on the ground. Brereton began ordering his aircraft to circle the arifields by 8:30 a.m. At 9:25 a.m., Brereton was informed that Japanese bombers had attacked Tuguegarao Field and USAFFEE summer HQ at Baguio. Brereton telephoned Sutherland, asking permission to bomb Formosa, and Sutherland refused yet again. At 9:40 a.m., Brereton received instructions to send

a photo reconnaissance flight over Formosa and, if they identified targets, a bombing raid would be approved in the afternoon. At 10:14 a.m., MacArthur finally approved a bombing attack on Formosa. At 10:30, aircraft began landing to be refueled and at 10:45 the B-17s were ordered to be armed with bombs in anticipation of a launch at 2:00 p.m. to attack Formosa At 12:35 p.m., 26 Nells and 27 Bettys bombed Clark Field, escorted by 34 Zero Fighters which strafed aircraft on the ground. Seven minu

tes later 53 Bettys bombed Iba Field and 51 Zero Fighters strafed aircraft on the ground. Most of Breretons aircraft at Clark Field Air Base were sitting on their airstrips when attacked. Of the 17 B-17s on the ground at Clark Field, 12 were destroyed and 4 damaged. 34 P-40s were destroyed on the ground or in aerial combat. Half the Far East Air Force was destroyed on the ground in the first 45-minute attack, and in the following week, continued Japanese air attacks reduced Breretons remaining a

ircraft to a handful of P-40s and B-17s. From December 17 to December 20, realizing that there were not enough fighters to protect the B-17s, MacArthur ordered the remaining 14 B-17s to retreat to Australia. There was no formal investigation of what took place in regards to the failure preceding the bombings of Clark and Iba air fields. Many historians argue that MacArthur’s personal forty-year friendship with president Quezon has a lot to do with what occurred. President Quezon had visited Toky

o in 1938, where Japanese officials told him that Japan had no aggressive intentions towards the Philippines and only wanted trade. The Philippines was approaching independent status and Quezon naively believed that Japan might not invade them. Indeed, without its consent, the Philippines had been included in Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, giving Quezon some reason to believe they would be spared. Quezon was trying to avoid thousands of Filipino deaths and untold destruction. Qu

ezon knew that If the US sent a bombing mission against Formosa, the chance of Japan leaving the Philippines alone was lost. Why else might MacArthur defer to Quezon? MacArthur commanded the US forces, yes, but did not necessarily command the 130,000 Filipino forces. His control over them relied on Quezon’s unequivocal support. On December 8th, 1941, the 14th Japanese Army, led by Lieutenant-General Homma Masaharu, began landing on Batan Island , off the North coast of Luzon. Two days later, lan

dings were made on Camiguin island, Vigan, Aparri and Gonzaga. On December 12th, the Japanese landed 2500 men of the 16th Division at Legazpi, in Southern Luzon. On December, 8th 1941, MacArthur should have implemented WPO-3 to begin the defensive withdrawal to the Bataan Peninsula, giving his forces ample time to move the necessary war equipment, food and medical supplies, but he did not. Instead, he followed his own plan. Overestimating the ability of his Philippine forces, MacArthur chose to

fight an offensive war on the beaches, despite losing his Air Force and relying solely on the Navy’s submarines to take down Japanese transports. The supplies earmarked for Bataan under WPO-3 were thus advanced to forces all over the archipelago. Meanwhile, Admiral Thomas C. Hart withdrew most of his fleet from the Philippine waters, leaving only submarines in accordance with Rainbow Plan 5. The submarines would prove not very effective at thwarting Japanese transports to the dismay of MacArthur

who asked Admiral Hart: “What in the world is the matter with your submarines?”. It turns out that the submarines were armed with the untested Mark 14 torpedo, a grossly malfunctioning weapon. They were thus unable to sink a single Japanese warship during the invasion. Instead of sending his crack troops, the Philippine Scouts, 4th Marines or 31st Infantry, MacArthur sent the Filipino Army to the beaches, stating that they were “to be held at all cost”. He kept one third of his combat-trained r

egiments out of harm's way on Corregidor island. As a result of this, only one battalion out of the three would actually engage against the Japanese before surrendering because of the layout of the island of Corregidor. MacArthur's confidence in the Filipino troops fell when the IJA rapidly advanced after landing at Lingayen Gulf on December 21st. By nightfall on December 23rd, they had marched ten miles into the interior. On December 24th, 7000 men of the 16th IJA Division hit the beaches at th

ree points on the shore of Lamon Bay where they found General Parker’s forces dispersed and without artillery. The IJA consolidated their position and drove North to Manila. General Wainwright’s poorly trained and ill-equipped 11th and 71st Philippine Divisions were unable to repel or pin down the enemy at the beaches. The 26th Philippine Scout Cavalry were better trained and equipped, advanced to fight the Japanese at Rosario, but were forced to withdraw after taking heavy casualties. It was on

December 24 that MacArthur finally invoked WPO-3. He withdrew the Philippines government and his HQ to the heavily fortified island of Corregidor and ordered a general retreat of his troops on Luzon to the Bataan Peninsula. Most of the troops on Luzon were able to retreat, but without most of their supplies, which had to be abandoned. The US and Philippine armies scattered across eight of the other large Philippine islands were abandoned along with their equipment. Despite losing his Air Force

after the Navy’s submarine failure and the dramatic loss of his beach warfare, MacArthur reverted to WPO-3 far too late to realistically implement it. When MacArthur finally enacted WPO-3 to withdraw to Bataan, he did not allow himself enough time to gather the necessary food, water and medical supplies. WPO-3 required supplies to sustain an anticipated forty-three thousand men for over six months. They only managed to stockpile enough supplies to survive a thirty-day siege. They would ultimatel

y succumb to disease and starvation, forcing a bitter surrender. Was Douglas MacArthur responsible for the loss of the Philippines? Not at all. Many variables were out of his control. However, for what was under his control during the initial invasion, he certainly bears much responsibility. Ultimately, it was his overconfidence in his own offensive plan, his inability to send a bombing raid on Formosa, and his blundering of WPO-3 that hampered the defense of the Philippines. But once the conque

st of the Philippines was consummated, the Filipino people entered a new age, a period of Japanese occupation. They had entered the war with the totality of a unified, aroused nation, under the leadership of President Manuel Quezon. Yet Quezon had to be evacuated to establish a government in exile; and in his stead, the Japanese established a military administration at Manila and immediately sought to form a collaboration government, expecting immediate Filipino compliance. By the end of January

, under the pressure that Philippine independence would be granted “so long as it cooperates” , the Filipino leaders in Manila decided to constitute themselves into a Provisional Philippine Council of State under Jorge Vargas, the Mayor of Manila. This was a huge political victory for the Japanese. A combination of a genuine sense of responsibility toward the civilian population, coupled with a mood of fear, disillusion, and abandonment, produced this cooperation. The Japanese, by threatening an

d cajoling these men to resume the reins of government for the interim period, managed to keep most of them in active governmental service until the war ended. But while the Japanese, with physical control of the Manila elite, had most of the trump cards in their hand, they lacked the ace of trumps. The Commonwealth government in exile which Quezon established in Washington was powerless in the immediate sense, and yet it was also omnipotent. Despite its isolation, it remained the government for

most Filipinos and continued to command allegiance. The failure of the Japanese to bend Filipino allegiance away from the Commonwealth government in exile was a defeat greater in importance than the military successes. But the Japanese brutality did not stop with the collaboration of the Filipino government. Throughout the Philippines, more than a thousand Filipinos, composed of mothers, girls, and gay men, some aged 10, were imprisoned, forcibly taken as "comfort women", and kept in sexual sla

very for Japanese military personnel during the occupation. Each of the Japanese military installations in the Philippines during the occupation had a location where the women were held, which they called a "comfort station" . The Filipinos that were forced to sexual slavery by the Japanese were kidnapped from the population and were routinely gang-raped, tortured, and humiliated. Many of them had their breasts cut off or received damaging wounds whenever they fought back against the soldier's s

exual advancements. Many were also murdered and disposed of like animals. The Japanese also sent "doctors" and "surgeons" to the Philippines, who performed human experimentation on native Filipinos. Some of these experiments included amputations, dissections, and suturing blood vessels of live humans. Soon, due to the Filipino discontent, resistance against the Japanese occupation began to erupt all across the country, with the formation of guerrilla groups and active underground movements. Befo

re the Japanese could even establish their Military Administration, independent civilian-led armed resistance groups began to hit it behind its lines in North Luzon and the Bicol region. These resistance groups were those founded in December 1941 by American miner Walter Cushing ; Ilocos Norte Governor Roque Ablan; Cagayan Governor Marcelo Adduru ; American mining engineer George Scholey ; and former Camarines Norte Governor Wenceslao Vinzons in the Bicols . Though most of these groups would be

later wiped out , their 1942 raids were a huge thorn in the side of the Japanese invaders that were still fighting on Bataan. Before the fall of Bataan, it is said that General MacArthur went on the air through the USAFFE's Voice of Freedom appealing to the Filipino people to organize resistance groups as they had done in North Luzon and the Bicol region in order to relieve enemy pressure on Bataan and Corregidor. In response, during the following months, Dr. Higinio Mendoza organized a guerrill

a movement in Palawan; Jose Banal founded a resistance unit in Minalin, Pampanga ; professional boxer Marcos Villa Agustín formed the Marking Guerrillas in Talbak, Antipolo; the First Provisional Guerrilla Regiment was formed in North Luzon ; and many guerrilla groups were formed in Bicol . Additionally, Lieutenant-Colonel Claude Thorpe was ordered in February to surreptitiously leave the Bataan Peninsula and proceed northward to establish a coordinated guerrilla force in the island of Luzon in

order to conduct a raid on the Japanese-held Clark Field . Despite an initial success at Zambales , his efforts would eventually prove fruitless, as he would fail to adequately organize the different Luzon guerrillas under his command. Nearby, at Mount Arayat, Pampanga, a group of intellectuals, disgruntled politicians, socialists and people of communist leanings got together and agreed to form a military phase of the United Front political party in March. This original intent is reflected in it

s name , which translates to "People's Army Against the Japanese". The Huk Military Committee was at the apex of Huk structure and was charged to direct the guerrilla campaign and to lead the revolution that would seize power after the war. Luis Taruc, a communist leader and peasant-organizer from a barrio in Pampanga, was elected as head of the committee and became the first Huk commander called "El Supremo". The Huks began their anti-Japanese campaign as five 100-man units and were later reinf

orced by Jose Banal’s unit and the Communist Chinese Wha Chi unit, eventually growing in size and efficiency to develop into a well-trained, highly organized force with some 15000 armed fighters by war's end. After the fall of Bataan, many who evaded capture by the Japanese found their way to Central Luzon, where they joined Thorpe’s unsuccessful guerrilla group. Among them was Captain Bernard Anderson, who would later form a guerrilla battalion at Tayabas, while Lieutenants Robert Lapham and Ed

win Ramsay organized resistance in East Central Luzon . On the other side, the Zambales Resistance Movement continued to consolidate in the area , with the induction of Captain Ramon Magsaysay into its service. As the build-up was going on, the unit conducted limited sabotage over enemy installations and facilities and in the process, attended to Japanese-hired spies. Finally, in September, Thorpe was captured around Pampanga and later executed, thus leaving only the aforementioned two junior of

ficers to command the East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area. In the meantime, other survivors of Bataan under Colonels Martin Moses and Arthur Noble in one group and Major Russell Volckmann and Captain Donald Blackburn in another, slipped from Bataan in order to get to the Cordilleras of North Luzon. In July, Moses assumed command over all North Luzon guerrillas and prepared coordinated attacks and ambushes for October. Elsewhere, a group of undergraduates of the Reserve Officers Training Corps led

by Lieutenant Miguel Ver and 20-years old Eleuterio Adevoso formed the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas in Rizal . The group then moved to Zigzag, Banaba and finally Malabanca, Antipolo, where the Japanese ambushed them and killed Ver. Forced to take over, Adevoso would regroup his men and move to Bosoboso Valley to train the new recruits, aided by a group of the Markings . As a revenge for Ver’s death, the Hunters successfully ambushed a Japanese convoy at Pugad Lawin on August 31, which resulted in a b

oost in morale and an expansion into the Rizal, Laguna and Tayabas provinces. With the fall of Corregidor and the final surrender of General Wainwright’s forces, more guerrillas would be formed in the Southern Philippines. In Mindanao, Engineer Wendell Fertig went to the hills of Kolambugan, Lanao alongside Captain Luis Morgan and immediately started recruiting and organizing guerrillas in Lanao and Misamis Occidental; in the Cotabato Valley, the reign of terror of the Japanese incited the Musli

m Moro population to form guerrillas under Datu Salipada Pendatun; in the Sulu Archipelago, some guerrillas began to emerge; in Zamboanga, eight officers and almost a hundred men formed various guerrillas in the area; and in Davao, Captain Claro Laureta organized the civilian refugees of Davao along the Libuganon River and started forming guerrillas. Elsewhere in the Visayas, the defeated American-Filipino forces had already retreated into the interior to fight guerrilla warfare, yet Wainwright’

s order to surrender soon forced most of the commanding officers to turn themselves in. In Panay, after Colonel Christie surrendered, Colonel Macario Peralta Jr. organized and led the Free Panay Guerrilla Force with the support of Governor Tomas Confesor’s hidden civil government ; in Palawan, more guerrilla forces soon emerged , unified under the Panay central command; in Negros, Majors Salvador Abcede and Ernesto Mata refused to surrender and continued to conduct guerrilla warfare against the

invaders; in Cebu, after General Chynoweth’s surrender, most of the 81st Division would reorganize into a guerrilla unit under Engineer James Cushing; in Bohol, the guerrillas unified themselves under Lieutenant Ismael Ingeniero ; in Leyte, many guerrilla organizations erupted to fight against the Japanese garrison at Tacloban; in Samar, there were two main guerrillas organized, with Captain Pedro Merritt dominating the northern side of the island while Captain Manuel Valley formed a group in th

e south; in Masbate, Captain Manuel Donato unified the three main guerrillas there into a single battalion which had almost complete control over the island; and in Mindoro, the resistance movement was unproductive on account of strifes and friction among the different groups . 1942 was a busy year for these guerrilla groups, as they consolidated in their respective areas, fought to survive with the support of the local population and conducted raids against the Japanese garrisons in the country

, which included the infamous Kempeitai police. Salipada Pendatun, for example, attacked and wiped out the small enemy garrison in Pikit, Cotabato in August and soon seized and controlled that portion of the Sayre Highway from Kabacan to Digos. Due to this success, he would be reinforced by the Moro-Bolo Battalion of Datu Gumball Piang, composed of 20000 fighting men that were known visibly by their large bolos and kris. Pendatun would later help the Bukidnon guerrillas drive out the Japanese fr

om Kibawe, Maramag, Valencia and Mailag before year end. On August 24, Peralta also opened his offensive with a preliminary attack against the Japanese garrison at Calmay, killing 20 Japanese and stealing 1000 rounds of ammunition. Two days later, the resistance civil government likewise ambushed some Japanese in the San Nicolas mountain pass. The zeal and efficiency with which the guerrillas struck against the enemy loosened the foothold of the Japanese on Panay. By August 31, the Japanese had

left Kalibo; and five days later, the guerrillas liberated Dumangas, with six more towns falling into the hands of Peralta in September. When Pototan, Iloilo was freed on October 20, Panay, with its re-established and fully functioning civil government, was almost Japanese-free territory. Shortly after, Peralta initiated a call for the unification of all resistance groups in the Visayas under Panay leadership, with amenable responses from groups in Negros, Leyte, Samar, Cebu and Bohol. Thus, Per

alta created the 4th Philippines Corps with himself as Corps commander, although the actual coordination of these forces would prove to be difficult. Meanwhile, Moses’ October offensive ended in a complete failure , which prompted MacArthur to officially give a radio order to “lie low” in 1943; an order that was received by most guerrilla units, but that wasn’t obeyed in its entirety. Some groups were hunted by the tenacious Japanese and their puppet spies and constabularies; others continued to

resist the enemy incursions; and others kept raiding the invaders. In the meantime, Fertig tasked Morgan with the mission of uniting all the known guerrilla groups all over Mindanao. Departing Misamis with a party of 80 men on January 12, 1943, Morgan would move across northern Mindanao, Leyte and Negros, where he attempted to unify the different guerrilla units that existed; yet his efforts would be largely fruitless, only gaining the recognition of the Zamboanga and Bukidnon guerrillas. To co

nvince the other groups, Fertig used the theory of lineal seniority by assuming the rank of Brigadier-General; yet Pendatun did the same thing, thus refusing to follow Fertig’s orders. At the same time, Fertig had sent Captain Charles Smith to run the blockade and make contact with Australia; and on February 18, Smith would return aboard the submarine Trout accompanied by Lieutenant-Commander Charles Parsons and approximately seven tons of assorted supplies. On the promise of help from Southwest

Pacific Area, Parsons convinced Fertig to strip himself of the flag rank and from then on was made Temporary-Colonel and Commanding Officer of the pre-war 10th Military District , which embraced all of Mindanao. Both rank and designation were confirmed by MacArthur's headquarters, and this would soon convince the other guerrillas to join him, including Pendatun who was assigned the rank of Major. But Pendatun also extracted a concession: that he would operate in an area where Fertig was not phy

sically present; and so it was that Pendatun took Lanao, Cotabato and Bukidnon as jurisdiction and as Commanding Officer of the 117th Regiment. Additionally, Lieutenant-Colonel Alejandro Suarez also reorganized and unified the Sulu guerrillas to form the 125th Regiment , under Fertig’s command; and on Panay, MacArthur also reorganized Peralta’s 4th Philippines Corps into the 6th Military District, with Colonel Peralta as District Commander. Further north, the Markings saw the arrival of Yay Panl

ilio, an Irish-American-Filipino mestiza that would become Colonel and second-in-command, responsible for most of the organization's activities outside of the action in the field; the Hunters raided and burned the Kapatalan Sawmill in Laguna before dispersing for some time to avoid a Japanese retaliation; and on June 9, 1943, Colonels Moses and Noble were captured in Lubuagan, Kalinga, thus forcing Major Volckmann to assume command of the North Luzon guerrillas, with orders from MacArthur to “..

.limit hostilities and contact with the enemy to the minimum…” as his “present mission as intelligence units can be of utmost value”. As it can be seen, the success of the Filipino resistance not only forced the Japanese to keep troops in the Philippines instead of in the frontlines, but it was also wresting control over many Filipino provinces and gaining valuable intelligence for MacArthur in Australia. One of the main catalysts for the success of the Filipino guerrillas in 1943 was the handli

ng of the thousands of surviving Filipino prisoners, which posed a huge question for the Japanese. If they were treated as traditional prisoners of war, there was little hope of winning the sympathy of their families and friends. If they were sent home without detention, the trained nucleus of an enormous guerrilla movement was being turned free. Since the number of weapons scattered throughout the country was great, the risk created a serious problem. Inevitably, the Japanese were very hostile

to these Filipino soldiers at first. Having seen their comrades killed by Filipino troops during battle, many Japanese troops behaved brutally, forcing the Filipinos to endure hardships of a severity equal to that endured by American troops. The Filipino prisoners were herded into makeshift camps, where terrible atrocities were perpetrated. As the fighting ended and the Military Administration began arguing for pragmatic charity against the field command’s irrational brutality, the policy agains

t the prisoners of war was reversed. The Japanese political officers attempted to capitalize on this benevolence to gain a propaganda victory by arguing that with peace a new era of Filipino-Japanese relations had begun. A hastily constructed rehabilitation and indoctrination program was organized for the Filipino troops prior to their discharge; and having alienated these young Filipinos completely, the Japanese then proceeded to turn them loose into society. Within a short period, however, mos

t had joined a guerrilla movement either overtly or covertly. One such example is Captain Alejo Santos, who was captured in Bataan, herded into the Death March and later escaped from the prisoners' formation at Betis, Pampanga. In July 1942, he managed to surreptitiously bring together his fellow officers and formed the "Philippine Legion" at Bulacan. In December 1943, Captain Santos proceeded to consolidate all guerrilla groups in Bulacan; and on December 21, he mediated a conference between Li

eutenant Ramsey and Captain Anderson, confirming the latter as the new commander of the Luzon Guerrilla Forces. Another example is that of Lieutenant-Colonel Ruperto Kangleon, who, after escaping from the prisoner of war camp in Agusan, was offered to take unified command over the Leyte guerrillas. Convinced by Commander Parsons, Kangleon reluctantly assumed command on April 20, 1943. Kangleon immediately attempted to consolidate all the guerrilla units in the entire island province of Leyte , e

njoying ample success and later sending Lieutenant-Colonel Juan Causing to nearby Samar in an effort to unify the guerrillas in this area, although only the Valley Group was convinced . Retired and active Filipino senior officers also collaborated with the guerrillas, though many of them were approached to lead the Japanese-sponsored Bureau of Constabulary. Such is the case of Brigadier-General Vicente Lim. Upon his release, Lim went to live in Manila, where he was sent feelers to head the puppe

t Philippine Constabulary. Absolutely determined not to have anything to do with the Japanese-controlled government, he had himself confined at the Institute of Cancer building of the Philippine General Hospital. With the cooperation of his doctors, Lim was pronounced "sick", giving him a ready excuse to turn down the appointments offered to him. He supposedly told an enraged Filipino ranking official that he preferred death at the hands of the Japanese, rather than an assassin's bullet. In the

meantime, Lim continued to fight the Japanese by personally financing various guerrilla activities in the provinces. Directing all of these operations from the PGH, Lim had his operatives give regular weekly reports about Japanese troop movements, disposition, and military installations. This intelligence would later greatly contribute to the success of American and Filipino military operations to liberate the Philippines in 1944 and 1945. But this would also inevitably make him a target, and he

would be captured by the Kenpeitai while trying to escape to Negros Island in August, 1944. Imprisoned and tortured in Fort Santiago, the Filipino war hero was allegedly beheaded and then buried in an unknown grave. We’ll continue to talk more about the Filipino guerrillas in the future, particularly in 1944, when their role becomes more prominent. Thanks to Call of War for sponsoring this video. Click our link in the description to get an exclusive gift: thirteen thousand gold and one month of

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