1943: Turning Point of WW2 in Europe (Documentary)

In 1942, after three years of war, German control in Europe reaches its greatest extent: from the Arctic circle to Africa and from the English Channel to the Volga. But all that has changed in 1943, a year sometimes called “das vergessene Kriegsjahr” or the forgotten year of war. As the new year begins, the Red Army tightens its grip on surrounded German forces in Stalingrad, who surrender in February. This marks the first time an entire German field army has laid down its arms, and it won’t be

the last. Stalingrad is a major turning point in the war, but 1943 has just begun, and the rest of the year will see more dramatic setbacks for the Axis in the European theatre. In fact, the very next major Allied blow against Germany will draw some direct comparisons to Stalingrad – Tunisgrad. By late 1942, Axis forces in North Africa are on the backfoot. After Rommel’s decisive defeat at the Battle of El Alamein in November, British General Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army chases the newly ren

amed German-Italian Panzer Army back across the Libyan desert. Shortly afterwards, Anglo-American troops under General Dwight D. Eisenhower land in Morocco and Algeria as part of Operation Torch. The goal for both the Axis and Allied armies is Tunisia – home to the last major Axis ports of Bizerte and Tunis. For Rommel, the shorter supply lines in Tunisia offer a chance to replenish his army and perhaps bring it closer to being an effective force. But 2,500 kilometres of non-stop retreat has uns

ettled the German high command. In Berlin, the general staff make arrangements for his replacement, and continually ask Rommel to make much needed sick leave. He refuses for the time being. The Allies are also making plans. In January Roosevelt and Churchill – Stalin refuses their invitation – meet at Casablanca to discuss political and military strategy. There are disagreements though. Some of the Americans push for an invasion of Western Europe as soon as possible, while the British are more c

autious and want to strike on the supposedly softer Mediterranean front. The debates are bitter, and the US generals are divided since some fear the US doesn’t yet have enough strength to sustain a full-on invasion. By the end of the conference, the Western Allies agree on their plan for 1943 and beyond: they would attack Sicily as soon as possible and delay the invasion of France until 1944; they would intensify and coordinate the bombing campaign against Germany; and they would double the prop

ortion of Allied forces in the Pacific. The Brits and Americans are frustrated with the compromises, but Stalin is angry, since he wanted an invasion of France within months. Roosevelt, perhaps out of frustration, announces the Allies will accept nothing less than unconditional surrender from Germany, Italy, and Japan. This statement will become controversial, and debates still rage as to whether it stiffens Axis resistance, or whether Roosevelt hopes to delay peace talks until the US is in a st

ronger position. In any case, before any of the Allied plans can happen, there is an immediate need to finish off the Axis presence in North Africa. Luckily for Rommel, Montgomery’s pursuit is slow. By prioritising fuel deliveries for the best German units, most panzer divisions are able to limp across the Tunisian border. Italian troops lacking vehicles are not so lucky, and the British take many prisoner. On January 23, 1943 the British capture Tripoli, while to the west, the British 1st Army,

including the US II Corps and French XIX Corps approach from the Tunisian-Algerian border. Meanwhile, the Italian navy and the Luftwaffe move reinforcement into Tunisia, some via the massive Messerschmidt 323 transport planes. There they join German General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim’s 5. Panzerarmee. Together with Rommel’s panzerarmee, the Axis have 104,000 German and 74,000 Italian troops in or around Tunisia by late January 1943. However, both panzer armies are underequipped and Rommel’s force ha

s lost two-t hirds of its tanks and halftracks and nearly all of its artillery in its retreat. However, around 800 Luftwaffe aircraft can provide local air superiority. Tunisia promises a different kind of North African combat than the open deserts of Libya. Here there are mountain ridges, narrow passes and vast salt marshes, making manoeuvre and rapid advance difficult. Although cornered, the Axis troops still pose a threat to the spread-out allies and prevent the rapid capture of the ports in

late 1942. So, allied troops set up positions along the East Dorsale Mountains. Eisenhower requests permission to drive a wedge between von Arnim and Rommel, but his British colleagues think the plan is too ambitious and want to wait for Montgomery’s arrival. British officers also have reservations about the inexperienced Americans. Many US officers have never seen combat, and major manoeuvres in 1941 showed deficiencies in senior leadership, tactics and infantry training. Although re-training c

orrected some issues, Eisenhower himself notes that some of his officers are complacent. Rommel has already dismissed US troop as "Britain's Italians". The Axis wants to strike the Allies in the West before Montgomery’s estimated arrival in the east in early March. Von Arnim’s forces already had some success against US and French troops and he is confident he can deliver a serious blow in southern Tunisia. Once Rommel arrive, the Germans adopt a two-part plan. Operation Frühlingswind (Spring Bre

eze) will see Arnim’s 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions strike against vulnerable US positions around Sidi Bou Zid – a major supply base and headquarters of the US 1st Armored Combat Command A. Once von Arnim has pinned US forces there, Rommel’s Panzerarmee will launch Operation Morgenluft (Morning Air), a rapid strike from Gabès to Gafsa and through US positions around Kasserine. But things are tense at German headquarters. Rommel and von Arnim don’t like each other, and their animosity grows as t

hey work together – which means overall commander Albert Kesselring has to intervene to smooth things over. The dual operations also have no definitive end, instead German commanders will quickly draw up extended plans based on results. On February 14, Von Arnim launches Frühlingswind, with two armoured columns breaking out of Faïd. Supported by artillery and Stuka dive bombers, the panzers take green US troops around Sidi Bou Zid by surprise. Isolated on two hill tops, the US infantry is unable

to move or support each other. With communications unreliable, Colonel Thomas Drake of the 168th Infantry Regiment sends a desperate report written on toilet paper: “Enemy surrounds 2nd Battalion (located on Mt. Lessouda)… Shelled, dive bombed and tank attack... Germans have absolute superiority, ground and air... Am attempting to hold my CP position. Unless help from air and armor comes immediately, infantry will lose immeasurably.” (Kelly 194) But US forces are scattered around the region, an

d his commander Lt Gen Lloyd Fredendall is over 100 kilometers away in Tébessa. On February 15, Shermans and Stuarts of the 1st Armoured Combat Command A attempt to counterattack the experienced German panzers, but the result is a slaughter. Airburst artillery forces the US tank commanders into their turrets, reducing their visibility and speed. Lt Kurt Wolff recalls the results: “...scarcely had the first shells left our guns than the first three enemy tanks were on fire... [Soon] there were at

least 15 burning tanks ahead of us [and] the remaining enemy tanks had retreated... [The battalion commander] laughing like a boy, went from company to company asking us and himself too: ‘Did you ever see anything like [that]?’” (Kelly 206) The panicked withdrawal turns into a rout, with US troops fleeing their positions. Meanwhile, Rommel’s troops launch Operation Morgenluft but find their main target of Gafsa already abandoned. But instead of ruthlessly pursuing the fleeing Americans, the Axi

s units advance cautiously, giving US troops time to take up new positions on the Western Dorsales. Rommel, who was still overseeing the final elements of the Libyan evacuation, quickly relocates to take command of the next stage. The success of Frühlingswind and Morgenluft reinvigorates Rommel. He now develops an ambitious plan to surround allied forces in western Tunisia. Rommel thinks if he gets command of all of von Arnim’s armour, including heavy Tiger tanks, he can punch through Kasserine

Pass and capture the US supply depot and headquarters at Tébessa. Once resupplied with captured fuel, he could then strike 225 kilometers to Bône on the Algerian coast, encircling the entire allied force. He eagerly sends the plan to Kesselring and the Italian Commando Supremo. But von Arnim is against the idea. Instead, he wants to keep his panzers for a conservative operation towards the British depot at Le Kef. Although unlikely to completely defeat the allies in the west, this will cripple t

hem for the foreseeable future, allowing a stronger defence against Montgomery when he arrives. The result is a compromise. Rommel gets von Arnim’s panzers but must use them to strike towards Le Kef. Rommel’s Operation Sturmflut is set for February 19. Two main columns would strike towards mountain passes at Kasserine and the Sbiba Gap, and Rommel would reinforce which ever thrust produced the most results. But Rommel wasn’t happy with this compromise, as he later revealed in his memoirs: “At ot

her times, our higher authorities were so wildly overoptimistic that they hardly knew what to demand of us next; now, however, when a little boldness really was required, they lacked the guts to give a wholehearted decision.” (Kelly 229) Guarding Kasserine is a weak US force under Colonel Alexander Stark. His cryptic orders from Fredendall reference a stubborn and costly last stand from the US Civil War: “Go to Kasserine right away and pull a Stonewall Jackson.” (Citino 94)- But Stark’s men are

mostly construction troops and who have never seen action. They struggle to build a hasty defensive line – they do plant 3000 mines, but simply lay many of these on the road. The Americans do have help from a horse-drawn French battery of 75mm guns, but powerful Allied armour reserves stay at the rear to avoid a repeat of the Sidi Bou Zid disaster. At first, Rommel tries to force the pass with a decisive strike through the valley. But French artillery and US machine guns push back the attackers.

German commanders order Panzergrenadiers to scale the heights either side of the pass and clear out US infantry. Both attacks start with some success, but a lack of air support and artillery means the Germans soon retire. Still, although the defence largely holds, Axis troops are slowly advancing. Fredendall even prepares to abandon his HQ at Tébessa. Meanwhile, the German strike against Sbiba is doing poorly. British and US anti-tank guns repel the attack and Rommel decides to focus on Kasseri

ne, including the newly arrived Nebelwerfer rocket artillery. Late on February 20, US troops abandon their positions, leaving their armour unsupported. The French artillerymen, having fired all their ammunition, spike their guns and fall back. There is now nothing to stop Rommel’s panzers, which breach the pass and destroy a small British armoured force sent to block them. Now flushed with victory, Rommel splits his force in three and attacks towards Tébessa, Thala and Sbiba simultaneously. But

the Axis offensive is losing steam while fresh allied troops, with armour and artillery, rush to the front. By splitting up his forces, Rommel has weakened their offensive punch. Although the Germans briefly reach Thala, Allied material superiority is turning the tide. By February 23, with clear skies bringing allied air attacks, it's clear Le Kef is unreachable and Rommel calls off the attack. The Battle of Kasserine Pass can be seen as both a US and German defeat. Although German troops force

the pass, the overall German plan failed quickly. US commanders are disappointed at their performance. Some accuse Fredendall of hunkering down in his bunker instead of issuing clear and decisive orders. Following Kasserine, he is replaced by General George Patton. Historian Robert Citino concludes: “Although ‘blaming the general’ is the most simplistic form of military history, it is occasionally hard to avoid. The evidence against [Fredendall] is overwhelming.” (Citino 97) Others have been mor

e forgiving, suggesting Fredendall’s failure is indicative of wider issues concerning rapidly turning a small peacetime army into a larger warfighting force, such as untested officers and tactics. Furthermore, considering their lack of experience, US troops performed relatively well against German veterans, even according to Rommel: “Die Amerikaner hatten sich vorzüglich geschlagen.” - “The Americans performed excellently.” (Citino 97) Rommel has also been criticised, especially his decision to

split his force following Kasserine and expect rapid drives in mountainous terrain. Some historians suggest it is surprising, given his experience in the Alps in WWI, that Rommel did not clear the heights before his armoured push. But Rommel likely felt he did not have the luxury of time, given Montgomery’s Eighth Army was closing in. Rommel’s relationship with von Arnim impacted the operation too. Rommel was outraged to find out von Arnim only sent half of the 10th Panzer Division, and kept all

the Tigers for himself. Von Arnim instead uses them in his owned failed offensive on February 26, losing 15 of his 19 Tigers. These are losses the Germans cannot afford – by March, they only receive 29,000 tons of the required 140,000 tons of supplies. Meanwhile, the US alone bring in 400,000 tons. What is left of the Axis army in Africa will now be needed to face off against Montgomery in the east, and Rommel rapidly relocates to the Mareth Line to face his old opponent. Rommel doesn’t like th

e new position, which consists of a series of pre-war French forts. But his superiors demand that he stops Eighth Army outside of Tunisia. Hitler promises he’ll send new weapons and reinforcements, but by now, Rommel only has 160 tanks, mostly Italian, against 800 tanks in Eighth Army. Meanwhile, losses and fuel shortages mean the Luftwaffe has almost disappeared from the Tunisian sky. Rommel knows Montgomery is getting stronger, so he orders a spoiling attack to disrupt British preparations for

March 6. However, his subordinates attack in the south after disagreeing with his recommendations to attack along the coast. In any case, Montgomery’s dug in tanks and anti-tanks guns, including powerful 17-pounders, are waiting for them: “The silly buggers came right at us, didn’t they? Some of us who were in the early desert fighting expected a Rommel flank attack, something clever. It never happened. They kept coming straight across the plain.” (Watson 109) Montgomery put it more succinctly:

“The Marshal has made a balls of it.” (Citino 100) Although only 94 Axis troops are killed, Rommel loses up to 56 tanks in what is his last action as a commander in North Africa. On March 9, the Desert Fox finally agrees to take sick leave in Germany. Montgomery now launches his attack on March 16. It will be frontal charge supported by a wider flank, largely made up of New Zealand, Indian and French Senegalese soldiers. The frontal assault initially has some success, establishing a bridgehead

across the Wadi Zigaou – but Allied troops soon lose the position with heavy casualties. Frustrated, Montgomery prioritises the flanking manoeuvre. Indian troops use their mountain experience to move through rough terrain and attack from behind the Mareth Line, while the New Zealand Corps rush further to the Axis rear, breaking through Axis defences on March 26. Rommel’s replacement, General Giovanni Messe, falls back to the narrow Wadi Akarit position, but Allied forces overrun his lines by com

bined artillery bombardment, frontal charges, and mountain infiltration. The situation is now dire for the Axis troops. Hitler hopes Tunis and Bizerte can become meatgrinders to deplete allied forces and delay a European invasion, but morale and equipment is lacking. By April, von Arnim’s Fifth Panzerarmee has 150,000 men and 150 tanks against 210,000 Allied troops and 1,200 tanks. Patton also regains US positions at Gafsa and Sened Station, eventually linking up with the Eighth Army on April 7.

Now Eighth Army clashes against the new Axis positions at Enfidaville. Again the first assaults fail, but mountain troops, including Gurkhas, backed up by accurate concentrated artillery fire break the position open. For every Axis artillery shell fired, the British fire up to 30. The US II Corps, now redeployed in the north under General Omar Bradley, also batter their way towards Bizerte with renewed confidence. Von Arnim sends Major Hans von Luck to Berlin to plead for an evacuation, but Hit

ler refuses to see him. When Hitler finally allows an evacuation in late April, it is of little use since the Axis lack aircover and shipping. On May 7, 1943, the Allies capture Bizerte and Tunis. On May 13, Axis forces surrender along with tens of thousands of their troops. Many are Italian non-combat and colonial troops, but many are also German veteran units like the German veteran 15th and 21st Panzer and 90th Light Divisions which surrender to a man. A contingent of the elite Hermann Göring

division that fought in Tunisia is also captured, though a few escape to Sicily. Almost immediately, Allied troops refer to the Tunisia campaign as Tunisgrad – a reference to the recent Soviet victory at Stalingrad. This is due not only to the tough nature of the fighting, but also the seemingly decisive nature of the victory and the number of prisoners taken. Tunisia was not an easy victory for the allies, and the disasters at Sidi Bou Zid and Kasserine Pass tainted British perceptions of the

Americans for some time. In total, the allies suffered 70,000 casualties in Tunisia, with the US losing 2,715 dead, 9,000 wounded and 6,500 missing or captured in its first major theater. Of course, these numbers are not close to Soviet losses at Stalingrad, but they are a large portion of the roughly 240,000 allied casualties for the whole North African theatre since 1941. Axis losses in Tunisia are up to 62,200 with 12,200 killed – also far less than Stalingrad. Similar to Stalingrad though, t

he capture of Tunisia trapped and destroyed a large Axis force of over 250,000 thousand men. Army Group Africa may not have been as central to Axis war plans as Sixth Army at Stalingrad, but it was still a significant Axis investment in manpower and resources. Its defeat also eliminated tens of thousands of experienced troops as well material that Germany desperately needed elsewhere. In fact, the Germans redirected transport planes earmarked for Stalingrad to Tunisia, meaning they couldn’t supp

ly either location properly. The Luftwaffe struggled to recover from the losses it suffered over Tunisia and the Mediterranean theatre, which amounted to 41% of the entire air force. The victory was also total, since the Axis would never be able to return to Africa or even plan to. They would instead from now on move into a defensive posture concerned with the defence of their key territories. Meanwhile, allied – especially British – confidence grew after the disasters of 1939-41. Despite the Ka

sserine defeat, Allied forces were starting to perfect an operational doctrine that combined high levels of mechanisation with sophisticated logistics and thorough battle plans. This allowed them to effectively translate their advantage in industrial capacity onto the battlefield. Meanwhile, the victory showed the German way of war was faltering. German principles of Auftragstaktik, or mission command, which emphasised autonomy and flexibility at lower levels of command, were coming unstuck agai

nst Allied material superiority and firepower. Such methods worked well in the early war against inexperienced and unprepared enemies, but the Allied method left little room for mistakes the Axis could exploit. As historian Paddy Griffith concluded: “German tactical analysts might growl resentfully that US tactics were ‘inflexible, plodding and all about material superiority’ (exactly like Montgomery’s, in effect); but the fact remained that the Germans could not win such a battle.” (Griffith 55

) The rest of the fateful year of 1943 would only make this trend even clearer. But the Allied method still has weaknesses. Much of the material needs to be brought across the Atlantic, and although Germany is retreating on land, they’re still on the attack at sea – which the Allies need to stop if they hope to invade Europe anytime soon. From 1939, German U-boats threaten Allied shipping. Although German surface raiders do play a role, Admiral Karl Dönitz hopes his submarines can wage a so-call

ed ‘tonnage war’ against British merchant vessels. This means sinking enough merchant shipping to either massively degrade British military capabilities, or better yet – force London to surrender. At first, the Germans have some success. Dönitz calls summer 1940, “the happy time”, in which U-boats easily target mostly isolated merchantmen, sinking 471. When the US joins the war in 1942, this increases to 1,160. The U-boat crews' term this the “second happy time” or even “American Shooting Season

”. For British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the Atlantic is the critical theatre on which all others depend, and by late 1942 it is one of the few areas in which Germany remains decisively on the offensive. In November 1942, U-boats alone sink 768,000 gross tons of Allied shipping, their peak for the entire war. As a result, Churchill asks his allies for more assistance. He also lays down new guidelines for referring to the German submarine threat: “Enemy submarines are to be called U-boats

. The term “submarine” is to be reserved for Allied underwater vessels. U-boats are those dastardly villains who sink our ships, while submarines are those gallant and noble craft which sink theirs.” (Gannon) At the Allied Casablanca conference in January 1943, US leaders agree to prioritise the Atlantic and delay the invasion of France and Germany until 1944. Although some commanders accept reluctantly, others understand it is impossible to use the United Kingdom as a base for invasion with a l

ingering U-boat threat. But even with promises of more US support, issues remain. Across the allied effort there is significant demand and internal competition for scant resources. Meanwhile, Dönitz has more U-boats than ever. In 1939, Dönitz had just 39 subs, but by early 1943 he has around 300 and more are being build. Then, when Grand Admiral Erich Raeder’s resigns as Navy Commander-in-Chief in January 1943, Hitler promotes Dönitz to the top naval position. Hitler tells Dönitz to maintain the

pressure in the Atlantic, although the admiral remains realistic about the challenge in a radio broadcast: “The harsh realities of the submarine war [means that] even more difficult times lie ahead of us.” (Van der Vat 289) With a submariner in command of the entire German navy, the Allies also expect the U-boat menace to grow. One area of concern is the Mid-Atlantic Air Gap, a favoured U-boat hunting ground known to allied seamen as “Torpedo Junction”. By 1943, partly thanks the massive expans

ion of the Royal Canadian Navy, Allied warships can provide end-to-end escort, but they’re still too few and remain vulnerable without air support. Airbases in the UK, Iceland, US and Canada have been improving coverage, but there’s still a gap of up to 1,000-km gap off the Cape of Farewell. Allied commanders try to close it with escort carriers – including retrofitted civilian vessels – or Very Long-Range bombers like the B-24 Liberator, but until January 1943, British Coastal Command only has

6 VLR Liberators. The majority go to the bomber offensive against Germany or the Pacific. Meanwhile, in December 1941, the German navy’s Beobachtungsdienst intelligence service cracked the British Naval Cipher No. 3. By intercepting British communications, they organise group attacks on convoys. U-boats locate about 70% of convoys thanks to codebreaking. Allied resources are also drained by the 1942 Operation Torch landings in North Africa, and the Battle for Tunisia in early 1943. The Royal Nav

y diverts 125 destroyers and other escort ships to Torch, while fuel demands for African operations mean North Atlantic convoys have less fuel to out-manoeuvre U-boats. The result is an increase in sinkings in early 1943. In March alone, German U-boats and surface ships sink 120 Allied ships globally, totalling 704,000 tons – 484,000 of which sinks in the Atlantic. This rapid increase in tonnage sunk – 74% over the previous month – is often seen as a major crisis. A March 1943 British memorandum

claimed: “...[T]here is insufficient shipping to allow us to develop the offensives against the enemy, which have been decided on. Every ship sunk makes the situation worse... We can no longer rely on evading the U-boat packs and, hence, we shall have to fight the convoys through them.” (Haslop 210) A December 1943 Allied report even goes so far to suggest victory in the Atlantic – and therefore the entire war - was threatened. More recent research though, has questioned the crisis idea. The su

pposed March crisis mostly focuses on two convoys, which suffer disproportionate losses – 22 of 90 merchant vessels sunk. Overall, however, only 31% of March convoys are attacked, much lower than the 52% attacked in November 1942. In fact, in the first quarter of 1943, sinkings are lower than any 1942 quarter. The allies are also building more ships than they are losing, with a net gain of 2 million gross tons by March 1943. Perhaps most significantly, there is nothing in German sources which po

rtrays March as a moment of imminent victory. In fact, within two months, the U-boats withdraw from the Atlantic in defeat. Just as the March convoy battles are raging, the Allies meet in the Atlantic Convoy Conference to better pool resources and standardise procedures. The top priority is closing the mid-Atlantic Air Gap and taking the fight to the U-boats. The Commander-in-Chief of the Western Approaches is optimistic: “I really have hopes now that we can turn from the defensive to another an

d better role – killing them.” (Redford 74) Early 1943 also sees several tactical, technological and military developments all coming to fruition around the same time. Ultra intelligence, from the cracked German Enigma is the most well-known tool available to the Allies, but it was by no means the only one – or even the most important. Ultra can provide a general location of most U-boats, which are tracked by the men and women in London’s Submarine Tracking Room. Convoys reroute around them – an

effective tactic. But Ultra intelligence is slow, and sometimes it takes up to 72 hours to de-crypt German communications. There are also periodic blackouts when Germans alter their settings – including almost all of 1942. And, as the number of U-boats at sea increases, the likelihood of evading them decreases. Ultra is vital as a wider strategic tool but cannot pinpoint U-boats preparing to attack. That’s where other technology comes in. By early 1943, more allied escorts are equipped with bet

ter sonar and radar equipment. Underwater ASDIC sonar can listen for submerged U-boats, gauging range and bearing. Not only does this reveal approaching U-boats, but allows for more accurate use of anti-submarine weapons, like the Hedgehog and depth charges. Meanwhile, ships and aircraft equipped with the new 10-centimetre radar can detect U-boats on the surface. None of these tools are perfect, but when combined with others, they create a near impenetrable network of defences: “The first indica

tion of a U-boat attack would be from the ASDIC people who would pick up a contact... you could hear these pings... and the difference between the ping and the pong is the distance how far the submarine is away. When they think they’re right over the top of the submarine, the order is ‘Fire’. That means the depth-charges go... A colossal volume of water would come up... it was almost like lightning going across the water. In daytime it’s a fantastic thing to see.” (Bailey 67/68) German submarine

r Anton Staller aboard U-188 is on the receiving end of a depth charge attack in March 1943: “Alarm bells shrilled loudly... “Destroyer on the starboard bow... Range about 5,000 meters!”... A quick glance at the manometer showed me that we were at 100 meters, at the same instant for the first time I heard ahead of us the roar of exploding depth charges. Now I discovered how appalling loud these sounded under water. Though fearful I concentrated on my hydrophone wondering if I would ever hear any

thing again in my life... ” (Willman 49) Another important Allied development is High Frequency/Direction Finding, known as HF/DF or “Huff Duff”. This can detect German U-boat radio communications out to 25 kilometres, close enough to pursue and attack. It greatly outranges surface radar and helps allow escorts to be more proactive. The technology existed since 1942, but in 1943 it’s much more available, with at least 2 HF/DF equipped ships per convoy. With this comes more powerful anti-submarin

e weapons and better organisation. Previously 6 escorts were considered adequate to protect 24 merchantmen, but civilian experts led by Professor P. M. S. Blackett, find that eight escorts can protect 48 merchant ships just as effectively. This combines smaller convoys into larger ones and frees up escorts which can become mobile support groups assisting specific convoys under attack. The convoys and their escorts also adopt new tactics based on the in-depth analysis of previous convoys. From Fe

bruary 1942, Britain’s Western Approaches Tactical Unit conduct wargames based on recent attacks to estimate and predict U-boat group tactics. Much of this analysis is carried out by staff of the Women’s Royal Naval Service, better known as the Wrens, who work as plotters, mathematicians and players in the war games. The result is new evasion, search and convoy patterns which are taught to officers in special training courses. By 1945, 5,000 Royal Navy officers have received Tactical Unit traini

ng. And finally, there are more Very Long-Range bombers and escort carriers. By May, Coastal Command has 49 VLR bombers, up from 17 in February. Although dwarfed by the hundreds of bombers attacking German industry, this number is enough to close the air gap. Aircraft like B-24 Liberators, Whitley bombers and Sunderland and Catalina Flying boats, become vital submarine killers, quickly accounting for around half of U-boat losses. The combination of new tools and tactics is devasting to the U-boa

t fleet. In April, the battle balances out, as the Allies lose 39 merchantmen but sink 15 U-boats. May 1943 is the decisive month, especially the voyage of convoy SC-130. Heading to Liverpool from Halifax, Nova Scotia, the convoy has 37 merchantmen and 8 escorts, several equipped with High Frequency Direction Finding and new 10-cm radar. German naval intelligence identifies the convoy and gathers up to 25 U-boats in three wolfpacks to attack to attack. Donau 1 and 2 approach from the south-east,

while Wolfpack Iller is already in the area. The plan is to attack the convoy in the airgap, but British Ultra intelligence is aware of this. However, a system failure means the information is not passed to the escort commander. Even so, when the attack opens on May 18, the escorts proactive sweep for the U-boats and spoil their attacks, while the convoy also makes evasive turns. Soon the battle moves within the range of approaching Allied aircraft which hound the U-Boats and force them to subm

erge. By May 21st, U-boat command abandons the attack. The Allies sink three U-boats and damage another with no losses. On board one of the sunken U-boats - U-954 – is Admiral Dönitz youngest son, Paul, who dies with the rest of his crew. The SC-130 battle is the pinnacle of a terrible month for the Kriegsmarine, in which they lose a total of 41 U-boats – almost 25% those operational. Kapitänleutnant Peter-Erich Cremer at U-Boat Staff Headquarters later recalled: “This May situation was quite ou

t of hand: as I was soon to learn, the number of boats that failed to return from patrol reached... more than one a day, and there was talk of “Black May”.” (Gannon) On May 24, Dönitz orders his U-boats to withdraw from the Atlantic until better equipment and countermeasures are available. So why did things go so wrong, so fast for the U-boats? Allied developments are one factor, but there were also German weaknesses. Firstly, the Germans had poor intelligence on Allied capabilities, especially

High Frequency Direction Finding, radar, and Enigma decryption. As a result, submariners didn’t know how to avoid or compensate for them. Secondly, Dönitz’s top-down approach required constant radio reports, especially before an attack. This gave British Ultra and HF/DF detection more chances of locating them. During the SC-130 battle, there were 104 HF/DF reports, allowing the Allies to pinpoint the U-boats. Thirdly, the Kriegsmarine lacked reliable air cover. Dönitz demanded more from Hermann

Göring’s Luftwaffe, but Göring resisted diverting resources away from his own interests. The increase in U-boat numbers also didn’t mean a proportionate increase in sinkings, although the sheer number of active U-boats still worried the Allies: “By April 1943 the average kill per U-boat at sea had sunk to 2,000 tons. This might be interesting as a sort of sporting score, but the number of U-boats operating had so greatly increased that it was of little significance in solving the problem. When D

aniel Boone, who shot fifty bears a year, was replaced by fifty hunters who averaged one each, the bears saw no occasion to celebrate the decline in human marksmanship.” (Van der Vat 316) But individual U-boat performance and crew experience, were dropping quickly. In 1940, U-boat commanders had on average two years' experience. In 1943 this was only 8 months. Most U-boat captains killed in May 1943 had only one or two patrols to their name. In 1940, 2% of U-boat captains were responsible for 30

% of sinkings. All these so-called “aces” had entered the Kriegsmarine before 1935, but by 1943, the veterans of the early war were gone. Roughly 850 U-boats – about 75% of the total built and crewed during the war – would never damage an Allied merchantman. In November 1940, the average tonnage sunk per U-Boat per day was 430 tonnes. In January 1943, it was 65. From 1939 to early ‘43, the Atlantic is the only theatre in which Germany successfully maintained the offensive. But now even there, th

ey are in retreat. Dönitz’s withdrawal is not meant to be permanent though. He fast-tracks new U-boat developments and shifts back to a smaller group tactics, but the U-boat wolfpacks never make a meaningful return. Instead, the Atlantic becomes the logistical highway for the Allied invasion of Europe. But as Allied leaders had decided at Casablanca, Northern Europe would have to wait. The next push would be in the “soft underbelly of Europe”, although it will prove to be harder than anticipated

. In early 1943, Anglo-American troops decisively defeat Italo-German forces in Tunisa and take 250,000 prisoners. In spring, and after much debate, the Combined Chiefs of Staff confirm Sicily as the next steppingstone towards the invasion of Italy and so-called “soft underbelly of Europe”. They hope taking Sicily will provide freedom of movement for Allied forces across the Mediterranean and allow bomber fleets to reach further into occupied Europe. It may also appease Stalin by opening up an a

dditional front in Europe just as German forces launch their summer offensive at Kursk. Sicily’s invasion could even force Italy to withdraw from the war – although this is more of a hope than an expectation. Allied intelligence successfully casts doubt among the Axis where the invasion will take place: During Operation Mincemeat, Allied operatives plant fake invasion plans for Greece on the corpse of a supposed Royal Marines officer, which is then dropped off the Spanish coast. Through the fals

e information, the Germans move several divisions to Greece. Allied air raids also target Sardinia to further muddy the waters about the actual invasion target. British Field Marshal Harold Alexander oversees the invasion, named Operation Husky, using the specifically created 15th Army Group, which included the British Eighth and US Seventh Army. The initial invasion forces consists of around 160,000 men, 600 tanks and 1,800 guns. They`re supported by around 4,000 allied aircraft of Mediterranea

n Air Command operating from North Africa and Malta. The Allied airmen’s goal is to seize air superiority, interdict the island and provide close air support. This force will face off against General Alfredo Guzzoni’s Sixth Italian Army. He has 10 divisions, although six of these are mostly static coastal defence divisions. Overall, he has around 200,000 combat troops and 260 tanks and armoured cars. They are supported by up to 30,000 German troops and personnel of the 15th Panzergrenadier Divis

ion and Panzer-Division Hermann Göring. Considered elite, these German divisions are underequipped and filled out with replacement soldiers after costly battles on the Eastern Front. But they can still field around 100 Panzer IIIs and IVs and 17 Tiger tanks. In the air, the Axis have up to 1,600 available aircraft from multiple bases on Sicily, Sardinia, and Italy. But the Italians struggle with poor equipment. The Livorno and Napoli Divisions are arguably the best in the Italian army but are la

rgely equipped with obsolete early war tanks, or captured French vehicles. Available Axis vehicles are grouped into mobile units, the most powerful of which is Battlegroup Schmalz. Its job will be to counter invading forces near Syracuse, Augusta and Catania. Officially, German troops are under Italian command, but in practice, German commanders are largely independent. Both allied ground commanders, Bernard Montgomery and George Patton, have been highly critical of the invasion plan during its

conception. They request to u¬¬¬se their veteran troops from North Africa, but Alexander encourages them to use fresh troops so these can gain experience. Enemy air power is also a major concern for the landing force, so Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder suggests capturing and using the well built-up enemy airfields in the southeast of Sicily. This will allow fighter units to take off directly from Sicily instead of Malta. Patton and Montgomery also request more close air support during the landin

g, but Tedder argues gaining air superiority through bombing enemy airfields is a better use of Allied air power. From early June Allied planners prepare for the invasion. On June 11, the allied navy and air force bombard the nearby fortress islands of Pantelleria and Lampedusa into submission. Then on July 2 – D-Day minus 7 – Sicily and targets in Southern Italy come under heavy aerial and naval bombardment to disrupt and destroy supply lines, airfields and defences. As a result, the Axis reloc

ate the vast majority of their aircraft to mainland Italy, leaving only around 125 in Sicily. By this time the Mediterranean Air Command has achieved air superiority over the region, although German Luftflotte 2 still has bomber and fighter reserves available to potentially disrupt the landing in Sicily. Meanwhile, British and American paratroopers are getting ready for their drops. British and American planners developed the airborne component of Husky at short notice, and some commanders are c

oncerned about the drop planned for the night of July 9. US 82nd Airborne commander, Major General Matthew Ridgway is worried about friendly fire and a lack of night-flying experience among American pilots. All-in-all 5300 airborne troops are supposed to land in Sicily. US troops will mostly jump from C-47s, while British paratroopers will arrive on gliders. But there is a lack of trained glider pilots and US C-47 pilots have little experience in towing gliders. Once on the ground, the paratroop

ers will secure important crossroads and bridges to slow or stop axis counterattacks against the landing beaches. The 82nd Airborne will seize high ground around the junction at Piano Lupo, while the British 1st Airlanding Brigade will capture the important Ponte Grande Bridge near Syracuse. As the first Allied planes head for Sicily things quickly go wrong. The planes towing gliders rapidly fall out of formation and lose their bearings. Things get even worse when they come under anti-aircraft f

ire. The tug pilots dip and weave, and some prematurely release their gliders. Of the 144 gliders dispatched, only 54 land in Sicily, and only 6 on target. Up to 69 may have crashed into the sea, likely drowning around 300 paratroopers. This meant only around 100 men are immediately available to attack their targets. The US drop fares little better. Pilots again lose their way in the dark, while strong winds batter the landing zones. Most paratroopers land in small groups, and less than 200 are

immediately available to capture the Piano Lupo junction. In many cases, troopers simply land and make their way towards the noise of battle. But despite the low numbers, Anglo-American troops attack many of their first objectives. A single glider team captures the Ponte Grande Bridge, and US paratroopers battle against defenders at Piano Lupo. US paratrooper Bob Fielder recalls approaching the nearby Biazza Ridge: “Suddenly there was an unmistakable loud, ripping burst from a rapid-fire German

machine gun... Never having heard the sound of 1200 rounds per minute I wondered what in the world is that?” (Fielder 31) At Ponte Grande, Italian troops with mortars and armoured cars attack the British paratroopers, whittling their numbers down to 70. The paratroopers now await relief by seaborne forces. Despite the high casualties, the mis-drops do have one benefit. The widely dispersed landings make the invasion seem larger than it is, and Axis forces are occupied dealing with guerilla-style

attacks. Although Guzzoni announces an invasion, Axis command makes no serious effort to counter it on the beaches. Coinciding with the nighttime airdrops are coastal commando raids by No. 3 Commando and SAS teams. Their job was to clear coastal guns and obstacles. At around 3am on July 10, the first seaborne units land. At the Pachino Peninsula, the Royal Marines, 1st Canadian and 51st Highland Divisions come ashore in the darkness to find most Italian positions abandoned. In many cases the co

astal defenders have simply fled their posts. The British 50th and 5th Divisions land south of Syracuse to equally light resistance. By 5am, the Brits and Canadians have secured the beaches and heavier landing craft deliver tanks and trucks. Allied troops take Pachino airfield, which they then ready for Allied aircraft. The British 50th Division runs into British paratroopers who’ve just retreated from Ponte Grande and together, they rapidly retake the bridge. The US landings also largely go to

plan, despite rough seas. Major General Lucian Truscott’s 3rd Division lands first, and sweeps towards Licata to cover the landing beaches’ left flank. As they advance, they knock out coastal defences and railway guns to clear the way for other divisions. In the east, the 45th Division capture the Comiso airfield and secure the landing beaches’ right flank. The 1st Infantry Division lands at Gela including a contingent of French Moroccan troops, and although resistance is stiffer, they take the

town by 8am. By now the first serious axis counterattacks arrive, as Guzzoni orders the Livorno and Hermann Göring Divisions against the US beaches. However, bombing and paratrooper activity has cut communications, meaning these first counterattacks are poorly coordinated. To the east, Italian blackshirt militia attack the Canadians, who easily push them back. British troops now approach Syracuse, a major port and key to continuous naval supply for the British landing forces. Guzzoni hopes its f

ormidable defences will protect it, however allied troops enter in the afternoon to a reportedly “riotous” welcome by the locals. Italian units do counterattack towards the city, including with captured French R-35 tanks. But by now, British troops have brought up anti-tank guns and other defences. Italian tank commander Adamo Profico recalls the attack: “We left, my tank in the lead… After a few hundred meters, my driver turned to me and shouted “mines!” […] The tracks of our tank had already g

one over the first mines, which duly went off… The second tank arrived at full speed, and as it took the curve a gun hit its right tracks; this disabled its steering, and it careened off, rolling down the escarpment. Right on its heels, the third tank arrived, also going at full speed. As soon as it had made the curve, its front was hit.” (Anfora 167) By the end of D-Day, allied commanders likely feel things are going well. Their troops are ashore, beachheads are expanding, several captured airf

ields are already in use by Allied fighters, and Syracuse has fallen. But there are mounting issues. Of the 5,300 airborne troops dispatched, only 2,000 are fit for duty the next day. Army commanders on the ground also complain about a lack of air cover. With allied aircraft occupied with fighter and fleet escort missions, no close air support is available on D-Day and D+1. This lack of continuous air cover allows a German Luftwaffe attack against the Gela transport area to get through and sink

the ammunition ship SS Robert Rowan. The Axis forces are also recovering from the initial shock. Now that they’ve identified the landing beaches and allied forces, Guzzoni orders more organised counterattacks. Battlegroup Schmalz blocks Allied progress towards Augusta, while the Livorno and Hermann Göring Divisions make a stronger move against the Gela beachhead. On July 11, three Italo-German columns attempt to break through to Gela. In the west and centre, the Americans repel the Livorno Divis

ion with heavy losses, however the Hermann Göring Division’s panzers make better progress against the light anti-tank weapons of US screening forces. German tanks break open the line and head for Gela and the beaches. With allied tactical support aircraft busy elsewhere, the 1st Division rushes anti-tank guns and armour ashore. Eventually, a handful of vulnerable catapult launched navy spotter planes are able to direct naval gunfire and stop the German attack. Axis commanders realise the offshor

e armada would destroy any further attempts to reach the shore, so their forces withdraw and take up blocking positions around Caltagirone. But despite the failure of Italo-German counterattack, they do slow the progress of the American 1st and 45th Divisions. The Luftwaffe is less successful and are only able to offer sporadic resistance from the remaining Sicilian airfields. Johannes Steinhoff from Jagdgeschwader 77 later recounts the desperation in his memoirs: “With what we could scrape toge

ther of the remnants of the group, we would fly along the north coast over Etna’s crater towards the Straits of Messina where we would fling ourselves at the [B-17] Flying Fortresses in a series of uncoordinated attacks. Our numbers were so few that we would do little damage, and even that little depended upon our breaking through to the bombers.” To reinforce the US troops, further paratrooper drops are planned for late July 11, but the drop is another disaster. Recent German bomber attacks hav

e the allied anti-aircraft units on high alert. When the navy and army gunners spot the friendly C-47s are spotted, they mistake them for Axis craft and open fire on them. 23 of the 144 transport planes are lost to friendly fire, with an estimated 90 aircrew and 229 paratrooper casualties. A report by the 82nd Airborne Division blamed a lack of communication and preparation among the ground forces. Meanwhile, fleet commander Admiral Andrew Cunningham blamed the pilots for flying outside of agree

d air corridors. As the US advance bogs down, the British Eighth Army makes better progress along the coast. The Brits take Augusta on captured on July 12, but resistance from dug-in enemy units is stiffening. Montgomery now develops a plan to open new routes of advance for British troops. While continuing to push towards Catania along the coast, he orders the XXX Corps to swing around Mount Etna from the west, with the aim of cutting the island in two. However, this requires British troops to t

ake over US objectives around Caltagirone and give them exclusive use of Highway 124. Patton is outraged that his force is now relegated to supporting the British manoeuvre. So, in response, Alexander allows the US 3rd Division to advance towards Agrigento. As Montgomery takes increasing control of the offensive, German commanders are also taking control of the defence. General der Panzertruppe Hans-Valentin Hube of the XIV Corps takes over de facto command of the island, while incoming German f

ormations are preparing to reinforce him. The elite 1. Fallschirmjäger-Division is on the way, as is the freshly reformed 29th Panzergrenadier Division. BLOCK 5: PRIMOSOLE BRIDGE On July 13, Montgomery opens his major push towards Catania. First, nighttime airborne and seaborne commandos raids will capture two bridges, the Ponte dei Malati and Ponte dei Primosole. The 50th Division will then breakthrough axis defences around 30 kilometers to the south, link up with the commandos and strike for C

atania. Once again, the air drops go poorly. Both friendly and enemy anti-aircraft fire forces nearly 30 percent of the gliders to return to base, and only 200 men and 3 anti-tanks guns drop near to their target. To make matters worse, they’ve dropped directly on top of the newly arrived 1. Fallschirmjäger-Division. The British do capture Primosole Bridge, but come under immediate German attack. The Brits use captured anti-tank guns and mines to repel the assaults, but casualties are mounting an

d ammunition is running out. Eventually, they decide to relocate to a hill to the south of the bridge, and cover it from there until 50th Division arrives. However, the 50th Division expected to fight against Italian units, not hardened German paratroopers and their progress is slow. Fighting is particularly tough in dense vineyards and orange groves. A soldier of the 5th East Yorkshire Regiment recalls: “[…]it wasn’t possible to see more than 20 yards [in the orange groves]... Some [unidentifie

d] troops were moving alongside a small wall, […] As we were debating who they might be, the question was solved by the rapid burr of a Spandau [machinegun] not very far away.” (Clay, 186) On July 14, the 50th Division reaches the bridge, but finds the northern bank under solid German control. British troops wade across on July 15, but German machineguns and artillery soon pin them down. Only a small Allied bridgehead is formed. On July 17, after tough fighting around the bridgehead, the Brits m

ake another attempt towards Catania under a heavy creeping barrage. Sergeant Georg Schmitz of the 1. Fallschirmjäger-Division is on the receiving end: “We survived the 1 ½ hour barrage well under the cover of the tank trench. […] We had orders not to open fire until Oberstleutnant Walther... gave the order... Thus, without a shot being fired from our side, the attacking enemy came unhindered into the range of fire of our infantry weapons. But then he was met by our furious defensive fire. The at

tacker had very heavy losses and the attack was beaten off.” (Klein 29) The British attack again on July 18, but they’re unable to breakthrough to Catania, or the nearby aerodrome. The next day, Montgomery abandons the plan and shifts the focus to his planned swing around Mount Etna. But what was envisioned as a speedy thrust is also an arduous slog. On July 17th, the Canadians push along Highway 124 but are stopped short of Enna by tenacious resistance. The Axis forces have already shifted thei

r positions to counter the move. Hube decides to abandon the west of Sicily and fall back to a series of defensive lines around Etna. His plan is now to defend Sicily as long as possible before withdrawing forces across the Messina Straits into Italy. However, the withdrawal is not a retreat. German and Italian rearguard units continue to contest town after town. Demolitions and booby traps further slow the allied advance. With Montgomery bogged down, Patton senses an opportunity. He demands US

forces be given a more significant objective, arguing there is a political necessity for the American public to see their troops at work. Alexander concedes and allows Patton to capture Palermo, a major port and the largest city on the island. US forces, especially the 2nd Armored Division, now race forward against isolated pockets of mostly Italian troops - who often surrender after token resistance. Colonel James Gavin of the 82nd Airborne recalls: “It was unlike anything else I had encountere

d during the war. Suddenly a machine gun or anti-tank weapon would open up, and then the white flags would appear. A shot had been fired for ‘honour,’ but it was just as likely to cause casualties as a shot fired in anger.” (Ford) The US troops have another advantage in their drive across Sicily. Large number of the American troops are Italian-Americans, some with Sicilian heritage. They occasionally receive a warm reception from locals and can use their connections to gain important intelligenc

e. US intelligence also makes use of criminal connections among New York mafia families with ties to Sicily. Local Sicilian mafia opposed to Mussolini helps gather intelligence and guide allied troops through mountain passes. Meanwhile, German troops report a hostile attitude towards their continued presence. German paratrooper Joseph Klein recalls the response to his unit's demolitions work: "In Trecastagni, […] some [civilians] emerged as spokesmen, waving old hunting rifles around and assumin

g a threatening posture... The kerfuffle did not end until our platoon sergeant had a machine gun group with an MG 42 set up on the market square...” (Klein 29) On at least one occasion, tensions spill over into murder. The Hermann Göring Division shoots 16 Italian men in Castiglione di Sicilia, likely as retaliation for supposed thefts. By July 22, the Americans have taken Palermo, and the Allies have practically cut the island in two at Termini Imerese. US troops take 50,000 Italian prisoners

with only 272 casualties. Patton now directs his troops along northern Sicily to participate in the attack towards Messina. Indeed, for him it has now become a race about whether the American or British will get there first. Meanwhile, in Rome, the war takes an unexpected and dramatic turn. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini is voted out of the Fascist Grand Council and arrested – his time as Il Duce now over. King Victor Emmanuel assumes full constitutional powers. Mussolini had faced a growing

conspiracy from within his own general staff, and the Sicilian invasion paired with Allied bombing of mainland Italy act as a final nail in the coffin. But with Hitler watching closely, Italy vows to continue the war – for the time being. Mussolini’s removal also ends any pretence of Italian command in Sicily. General Hube now oversees the entire withdrawal and evacuation. His troops continue to fight rearguard actions towards the Etna Line based around the formidable Centuripe position. Meanwhi

le, US troops advance towards Troina, another prepared defensive point. Carefully positioned German anti-tank guns, machine guns and tanks take their toll. In many cases, small groups of axis troops delay entire Allied divisions in the narrow mountain roads. Progress is also hampered by a lack of close air support coordination by the Allies. The process of requesting air strikes is slow and convoluted, and in any case, fragile radio equipment breaks down or cannot get through the mountainous ter

rain. Confused boundaries between US and British units add to the problem. As the British XXX Corps assault Centuripe, fighter-bombers of the US XII Air Support command attack them by mistake. XXX Corps commander General Oliver Leese phones General Omar Bradley to complain: “What have we done that your chaps would want to bomb us? [They’ve hit]… right on top of my headquarters! They have really plastered the town.” (Ford) Exhausted and inexperienced allied units are now near breaking point. Majo

r Derek de Stacpoole, of the 7th Royal Marines – an entirely green formation – recalls an attack on Dittaino: “My God! When I think of the things that went wrong – the unpreparedness and the rush and hurry of the whole blasted amateurish mess up!... Poor old 7th R.M. Never have so many been buggered about by so few.” (Ford) Only the release of experienced units from North Africa breaks the deadlock. Aided by the arrival of the British 78th Battle Axe Division, the British and Canadians capture C

enturipe and its dominating heights on August 1. On August 6, the US 1st Division finally captures Troina, but only after the Axis counterattack no less than 24 times. With these two positions lost, Hube knows the battle is now over. He speeds up preparations for evacuation but continues his punishing rear guard actions. The British 3rd Division advancing along the coast is especially held up at Monte Fratello. To assist it, Patton orders amphibious landings behind the enemy lines on August 8, 1

1 and 16. Although risky, these so-called “end runs” do ease the advance. The British also conduct their own landing on August 16 to cut off retreating elements of the Hermann Göring Division but are unable to catch them. Both Allied forces now converge on Messina, and during the night of August 16, the vanguard of the US 3rd Division enters the outskirts. Hube’s well-organised evacuation comes to an end. The narrow straits, coastal guns and large anti-aircraft forces means the evacuation Allied

forces mostly don’t disrupt it, and on August 17, Hube’s command is one of the last units to leave Sicily. Of the eventual 460,000 Allied troops in Sicily, around 5,000 are killed and up to 16,000 wounded in Operation Husky. An additional 3,500 are missing. Of those killed, 1,400 are paratroopers. German losses are 4,500 killed, 13,500 wounded and around 10,000 missing or captured. Italian losses are especially high. 4,650 Italian troops are killed, 5,000 wounded and up to 152,000 missing or ca

ptured. The loss of Sicily also decimates axis air units. In July 1943 alone 711 German aircraft were lost in the Mediterranean theatre, and the Italian Regia Aeronautica is in the process of dissolution after Husky – a high cost for the limited damage they were able to inflict. But despite these results, there are Allied complaints with the first major joint operation. There was poor coordination, especially between different branches as well as animosity and a lack of communication between com

manders. Although tactical air superiority improved as the invasion went on, army commanders consistently claimed they rarely saw friendly air cover. Air commanders replied they were attacking targets further to the rear, a more important contribution. Better communication regarding objectives and methods may have smoothed over these tensions. Alexander is also accused of giving Montgomery too much control and undervaluing US troops’ potential, while Patton too is criticised by both superiors an

d subordinates. General Omar Bradley, who served under Patton, accuses him of recklessness with the lives of his men, especially in his race to beat Montgomery to Messina – a race some historians suggest Montgomery was not even aware of. News emerges of two incidents in which Patton slapped enlisted men and at Biscari on July 14, US troops massacre 73 Axis prisoners. The perpetrators claim Patton ordered for no prisoners to be taken, something Patton denied. There were also missed Allied opportu

nities, as Hube’s phased withdrawal preserved his fighting strength. In the first 17 days of August, the Axis evacuate 100,000 troops, 10,000 vehicles, 200 artillery guns and 47 tanks to Italy where they would continue the struggle. However, the Allies also learn lessons from their mistakes. For example, almost all aircraft will display clear invasion stripes to prevent friendly fire during the Normandy invasions, while airborne operations will enjoy longer planning periods and wider use of path

finder units to guide in paratroopers. They also make tactical improvements, including improved rugged radios and clearer channels for requesting air support. Arguably the biggest outcome of Husky is also a mostly unintended one. The removal of Mussolini opens the question of Italy’s role in the war. But while the Allied demand of unconditional surrender remains, Italy seems reluctant to surrender, and the battle for Italy will continue. In fact, many of the units – on both sides – who had fough

t in Sicily will soon meet again on new battlefields. The next step for the Allies is the invasion of the Italian peninsula, which begins on September 3, an event that causes the collapse of Mussolini’s regime and a new Italian government to join the Allies. It’s a political success for the Allies, but militarily things quickly bog down into grinding positional warfare. American, British and Canadian forces are able to gain a foothold, but the Germans quickly disarm the Italian army, take contro

l of the country, and rush troops to the landing zones. Allied troubles in command and coordination, plus Italy’s mountainous terrain, and skillful German defence all mean that by the end of the year, larger Allied forces are stuck up against the German position south of Rome known as the Gustav Line – with its strongpoint at Monte Cassino. In fact, the truly decisive breakthrough was going on at the same time as Operation Husky, but far to the East. There, the Wehrmacht and the Red Army wage th

e biggest battle of all time at Kursk – and although the Germans inflict more losses than they suffer, the Red Army emerges victorious. In spring 1943, Nazi Germany’s leaders are facing a strategic dilemma: the Soviets stopped their 1942 offensive at Stalingrad, Allied bombers are pounding German cities, Axis forces in North Africa surrendered to the British and Americans, and Allied ships are winning the war against the U-Boats. But Adolf Hitler and his generals know they cannot defeat the Sovi

et Union while fighting a two multi-front war, so he is cautious: “This year we cannot undertake any large operation [in the East]. We must avoid all risks. I think we can only make limited strikes.” (Töppel 21) Hitler believes that once the Anglo-Americans try and fail to open a second front in France, he’ll be able to strike a decisive blow against the USSR. The immediate priority for him is to draw the Red Army into a battle of attrition to weaken it so badly that the Soviets won’t be able to

launch a major offensive of their own in 1943. This is especially important since in spring 1943, the Red Army outnumbers the Wehrmacht in the east 2.1 to 1 in men, 4.6 to 1 in tanks, and 3.1 to 1 in guns. And despite the catastrophic losses in men and equipment suffered by the Soviet Union in 1941 and 42, Red Army commanders are indeed planning sweeping offensives: they plan to smash the Germans around Oryol which would open the way to Bryansk, Minsk, Poland, and East Prussia, while a simultan

eous offensive through Kharkiv would let them recapture of Poltava and Kyiv, and threaten the German rear to the north or its Allies Hungary and Romania. If the Soviet plan works, the war might be over by 1944. So the Germans have a conservative plan for the Eastern Front in summer 1943, while the Soviets have high hopes for major breakthroughs. And both are focusing on the area around the town of Kursk. The Soviet General Staff, or Stavka, expects the Germans to attack the Red Army in exposed K

ursk salient, so they deploy two army groups in the area – the Central Front under Konstantin Rokossovsky, and the Voronezh Front under Nikolai Vatutin, they also create a reserve army group for a counterattack – the Steppe Military District under Ivan Konev. Red Army engineers also turn the salient into a fortress, to bleed out the attacking Germans. But some Soviet leaders begin to doubt the defensive plan given the long delays in building fortifications. Joseph Stalin and Vatutin both argue t

he Red Army should hit the Germans first, to spoil the expected enemy attack. Eventually, Marshals Vasilevsky and Zhukov convince Stalin to start on the defensive to weaken German armored formations before going over to the counterattack – especially because of the new Germany heavy Tiger tanks. The Red Army had captured a Tiger in January 1943, and the test results showed its armor is extremely strong. Regular soldiers are worried about the Tiger too: “But the Germans have gotten ahead of us wi

th their tanks again. […] The worst is that our guns and tanks aren’t equal to the Tiger.” (Popjel 157) Learning how to fight against Tigers is a key part of Soviet preparations – Red Army anti-tank crews learn to target vision ports or commanders’ hatches, which have a tendency to shear off after a hit. The Soviets build six defensive belts to protect the salient and prevent a German breakthrough. Together, the belts include 9200km of trenches, sometimes 4 lines deep, along with 1 million mines

. Most of the 300,000 civilian workers who work on the fortifications are women. The two first belts are the strongest, to allow the destruction of German tanks, and it’s here that the Soviets create anti-tank strongpoints. A typical strongpoint has a company of anti-tank riflemen, a squad of engineers with explosives, 4-10 anti-tank guns, and 2 or 3 tanks or self-propelled guns. Soviet troops also dig in their vehicles so that only the turrets are visible to the enemy. But German aircraft detec

t the Soviet strongpoints, and so the Wehrmacht command issues instructions on how to engage them: “The numerous anti-tank strongpoints visible in aerial photographs […] must be engaged as follows: a) Stuka [dive bomber] attack [immediately] followed by Grenadiers attacking with fire support from Tigers. b) […] strongpoints are to be suppressed by artillery fire and Tiger gunfire. [Then] the infantry attack. [followed by] a supporting attack by tanks.” (Stadler 27) Aside from fortifications, the

backbone of the Soviet defense is artillery – and they have lots of it, up to 70 guns per kilometer of front in some sectors. Soviet partisans behind German lines also contribute to the defense, and in June alone they launch 1100 attacks against German logistics and infrastructure, damaging 400 locomotives and 54 railway bridges. The Soviets are also planning for counteroffensives they will launch if they can stop the German attacks. In Operation Kutuzov, the West, Bryansk, and Central Fronts w

ould attack the German-controlled Oryol salient and continue west. Meanwhile the Voronezh, Steppe and Southwest Fronts would strike towards Kharkiv in Operation Commander Rumiantsev. So the Red Army is preparing for a German attack around Kursk and preparing a massive counteroffensive. And it is these preparations that help make up Hitler’s mind about where to strike. Hitler originally wants to attack in the Donbass region to secure control of its critical natural resources. It is his generals w

ho convince the Führer to attack at Kursk, to cripple Soviet offensive potential. And he is not the author of the attack plan, unlike what German generals will later say after the war. But the attack is delayed, and Hitler and his generals debate what to do. In April, 9th Army Commander General Walter Model tells Hitler that he thinks he can win at Kursk, but his army isn’t strong enough yet, so Hitler decides to wait until reinforcements arrive. Then in May, Axis forces in North African surrend

er, and Hitler fears Italy might soon leave the alliance, or the Allies might land in Italy or Greece. He decides to wait until the situation in the Mediterranean is clear before committing in the East. But in the second half of May, heavy rains turn the roads in the Soviet Union to mud and render any attack impossible. In June, everything is ready, but Hitler is still hesitant. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein and General Kurt Zeitzler have been telling him that the Red Army around Kursk is get

ting stronger, and the longer the Germans wait, the worse their chances. So Hitler decides he’ll wait for the Soviets to attack first instead. Then in late June, Army Group Centre Commander Günther von Kluge convinces Hitler he must attack as soon as possible. The offensive, Operation Citadel is set to begin on July 5, 1943. The German plan is to encircle the Soviets and crush them. Model’s 9th Army is to break through the strongest Soviet positions in just two days, and complete the northern ha

lf of the encirclement. The southern pincer consists of General Hermann Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army, and Army Detachment Kemp. Hoth’s tanks will lead the assault until they meet up with the 9th Army and trap the Red Army’s best forces in a pocket. Including their reserves, the Germans have about 900,000 men, 3900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1800 planes, and 8300 artillery pieces and mortars (Töppel 80). These figures though include the 2nd Army that would not participate in the attack. But the Ger

man plan has a fatal flaw – they badly underestimate Soviet strength. Including reserves, the Red Army has 2.6 million men, 8900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 5900 planes and 47,400 artillery pieces and mortars that it can throw into the battle. They’ve also introduced new heavy weapons systems, like the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns. So the Germans have finally decided to attack at Kursk, just what the Soviets have been preparing for. But when the battle starts, the Red Army is in for

a surprise. In the night of July 4-5, several German soldiers cross the lines to surrender, and tell the Soviets the attack is imminent. Soviet aircraft and artillery spring into action to catch the Germans in their jumping off positions. General Rokossovsky later records his assessment: “[Our artillery] fire plastered the enemy troops preparing to attack, caused heavy losses, especially in artillery, and disrupted command systems. Our strike surprised the fascists and made them think that we we

re about to attack. Their plans were disrupted and confusion spread amongst [German] soldiers. It took two hours […] before the enemy artillery started preparatory fire [which] was disorganized and weak.” (Rokossovsky 262) For decades, this is the picture accepted by Soviet and Western historians – but it’s not true. In reality, Soviet artillery strikes too soon and does little damage, and German fighters shoot down 300 Soviet planes on the first day alone. When the ground attack begins on July

5, the Germans break through the first defensive belt in the north and south. The next day, they pierce the second belt, shocking Soviet commanders who expected their months of preparation would provide better results. The Central and Voronezh Fronts both rush in their reserves, but a major counterattack in the north fails to drive the Germans back. Rokossovsky now orders that Soviet tanks should not be sent against German armour, as he writes later: “Given the superiority of the enemy, especial

ly in heavy tanks […] [our] tanks should only counterattack against infantry or light vehicles; and even then only when our fire had already disorganized enemy dispositions. This order was necessary given the situation. There were cases when our tankers rushed to attack Tigers, only to be pushed back behind the infantry with heavy losses.” (Rokossovksy 266) In the south, the Soviet counterattack turns into a giant tank battle, as Soviet units try to encircle the German armoured spearhead. As in

the north, German tanks dominate the battlefield here too. On July 8 alone, they knocked out 343 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns, against just 20 German. The Soviets have spent some of their reserves with no result, and the Germans in the south push farther. In the north, Model’s 9th Army struggles once it reaches the third Soviet defence belt. Soviet mines, including anti-tank mines upgraded with artillery shells, take out many German vehicles, and heavy Red Army artillery fire holds up Ge

rman infantry. The Germans notice that Red Army tactics against their heavy tanks are taking a toll as well: “Particularly noticeable was that the commanders hatch was often pierced or badly damaged […] Russian regulations for engaging Tigers were prepared surprisingly quickly and the enemy stubbornly followed them with all weapons.” (Töppel 65) Field Marshal von Kluge blames 9th Army’s failure squarely on Soviet firepower, but hopes to continue the offensive after regrouping. Another issue is c

oordination between German tanks and infantry, as in the case of the 33rd Panzergrenadier Regiment’s assault on a hill: “The tanks [of the 35th Panzer Regiment] should have, as discussed and agreed, immediately pushed to the top of the hill. […] Our attack ran into strong enemy fire, some of it flanking fire, but we advanced better than expected. On the crest however, there was extraordinarily hard hand to hand fighting. The Russians had literally to be dragged from every foxhole. Unfortunately,

[our] tanks stayed at the foot of the hill and didn’t move. While the top of the hill was being cleared, the Russians counterattacked with their tanks. The last of our rifle companies […] saw that our own tanks weren’t supporting us, and could not resist the counterattack.” (Töppel, größte Schlacht, 145) In the south, 4th Panzer Army has more success, and penetrates the third Soviet defensive belt on July 11. Manstein admits on July 13 that his forces are too weak to surround the Soviets on the

ir own, but he also wants the offensive to continue. Hitler wants to avoid further discussion with the headstrong general, so he tells Manstein that the general’s Army Group South would have to give up some of its forces to help counter the Allied landings in Sicily. But this is just an excuse and Hitler doesn’t send any units from the eastern front to Sicily for the next ten days. But Hitler’s ruse works and Manstein reluctantly accepts that Citadel has failed. Still, Hitler’s lie that he neede

d to send reinforcements to Sicily becomes one of the most persistent myths about the battle of Kursk, and still has many defenders today. The German offensive has failed thanks to a lack of forces and stiff Soviet resistance – and because the Soviet counteroffensive has begun. On July 12, the Red Army launches Operation Kutuzov. The Soviets break through the German positions facing Oryol, forcing the 9th German Army to send reinforcements to help plug the gaps, which seals Citadel’s fate beyond

a doubt. Red Army soldier Evgeny Bessonov later describes how the Luftwaffe tries to slow the Soviet advance: “That was my first experience of such a heavy air raid. It was pure hell; it is hard to find a comparison for it. You are just lying in your foxhole and waiting for death, bombs are exploding all around, the ground is shaking and you are shaking. I was frightened to death and wanted to run away from that hell, but I was a platoon commander and had to stay with my soldiers.” (Bessonov 39

) Further south, the Red Army attacks 4th Panzer Army’s vulnerable spearhead. The 5th Guards Tank Army, supported by the 5th Guards Army, will lead the charge after having sat in reserve so far. The Soviet tank army is to destroy German armour near the village of Prokhorovka, break through the German line, and drive ahead 30km. The Soviets use radio transmissions and fake troop movements to confuse the Germans to think there are two more Soviet armies west of the German spearheads, but this is j

ust a ruse. The attack is so critical to the Soviets that Stalin sends Marshal Vasilevsky himself to Prokhorovka. But when Vasilevsky realizes the Germans have advanced much farther than expected, he panics and orders a rushed start to the operation on the morning of July 12. But the Red Army isn’t yet ready, and when the 5th Guards Tank Army smashes into the II SS Panzerkorps, confusion reigns. German intelligence fails to anticipate the Soviet attack, so SS soldiers like Erhard Gührs are compl

etely surprised: “We were all sleeping, then they were on top of us, with planes, endless tanks with infantry on them. It was hell. They were around us, above us, and in the midst of us. We fought, man against man. We jumped out of our foxholes, jumped on our vehicles and took on all comers. It was hell!” (Guehrs) Despite the shock, the Germans recover and inflict a heavy defeat on the attacking 5th Guards Tank Army. The SS units not only hold their positions, but also knock out 382 Soviet tanks

and assault guns, of which 227 are destroyed. The Soviets are only able to knock out a dozen German tanks, and only 4 of those are not recoverable. These figures are in stark contrast to later Soviet portrayals of the battle as a Red Army success. For the Germans, Prokhorovka is limited to a local, tactical defensive success. The Soviets still have the upper hand, but have to delay their main counteroffensive for three weeks because of the heavy losses they’ve suffered so far. On August 3, they

’re finally ready to launch the final phase of the battle, Operation Commander Rumiantsev. 7 Soviet armies, 2 of them Tank Armies, storm the German lines in the southern part of the Kursk Salient. Three more Soviet armies join them in the next few days – a total of 1 million men, 2440 tanks and self-propelled guns. Trying to stop them are the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf, both of which have been weakened by sending units to other parts of the front. They’ve only got 210,000 men and

640 tanks and assault guns, of which just 270 are combat-ready. The Red Army immediately smashes the German line north of Kharkiv and advances towards the southwest. German units have to avoid being surrounded, so they beat a hasty retreat. On August 5, Soviet forces liberate Belgorod and Oryol – for the first time since the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army has beaten the Wehrmacht in a big summer battle. In Moscow, Red Army cannons fire a massive 124-gun salute at midnight to comm

emorate the double liberation. On the 7th, elements of General Katukov’s 1st Tank Army reach Bogodukhov, just 50km from Kharkiv and nearly behind the German forces fighting there. The German command rushes Panzer divisions from other parts of the front, and manages to stop the Soviet tank spearhead. In the following days, both sides send more and more reinforcements into the fighting, which develops into another major tank battle. The desperate Germans even weaken their forces defending Kharkiv

– which Hitler wants to hold at all costs – to stop this dangerous Soviet drive. The Soviets are trying to push farther southwest towards Poltava, the most important communications and logistics hub for Germany’s Army Group South. On August 11, the Red Army launches another attack, this time with the fresh 1st Guards Army of the Southwest Front. The goal is to encircle Kharkiv from the south. Army Detachment Kempf is now surrounded on three sides, and the defence of Kharkiv is becoming untenable

. The Germans are able to stop the Voronezh Front west of Kharkiv, but the Steppe and Southwest Fronts are getting closer and closer to the city. By the 18th, Hitler has to admit the situation in Kharkiv is hopeless for the Wehrmacht, and prolonging the city’s defence risks another Stalingrad-style disaster. He allows Manstein to give up the city if necessary. The same day, the Germans complete their retreat from the Oryol sector, bringing Operation Kutuzov to a close. The Soviet pincers close e

ver tighter around Kharkiv, and on the night of August 22-23, the Wehrmacht left the city to the Red Army. The Battle of Kursk, which has raged for 50 days, is over. The Battle of Kursk is the biggest battle of the Second World War, and one of the bloodiest in history. Historians still argue about Soviet losses today, and the exact figures will probably never be known. In all probability, at least 1.2 million Red Army soldiers are killed or wounded, 7000 tanks and assault guns destroyed, and 300

0 aircraft lost. The Germans lose about 203,000 dead, wounded and missing, 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 650 aircraft. (Töppel 154) Although Soviet losses are far heavier, and the Red Army fails to achieve its operational goals, Kursk is a serious defeat for the Germans. They hesitated before deciding to attack and to exploit the initial successes, they underestimated the enemy, had inaccurate intel -- and all this without any margin for error given their logistical and numerical disad

vantages. They don’t achieve any of the goals they had when they attacked in July either: they don’t destroy the Soviet forces in the Kursk salient; they don’t weaken the Red Army enough to prevent its offensive; they don’t shorten the front to free up reserves; and they don’t capture hundreds of thousands of Soviet prisoners they wanted to put to work as forced laborers in Germany. Hitler had hoped that a victory at Kursk would convince the world that the Wehrmacht was invincible. But the resul

t is the opposite: for the first time, the Red Army stopped a German summer offensive within a few days, and despite enormous losses, went over to the offensive all along the Eastern Front. By the end of summer 1943, German combat power in the east was exhausted, and they could no longer replace their losses. The defeat at Kursk also has repercussions at home: in spring 1943 most Germans still believed military victory over the USSR was possible, but after Kursk morale begins to fall. And the vi

ctory at Kursk was the start of more Axis setbacks in the east. From August to December, the Red Army throws the Germans back from Kharkiv to the Dnipro river. Soviet forces recapture Kyiv in November, but German forces fight hard and manage to keep a few bridgeheads on the eastern bank. At German headquarters, these minor successes and the stabilization of the line in December are optimistically interpreted as a sign they might have weathered the storm. Meanwhile another storm is brewing in the

skies above the Reich, as the British and American air forces launch their bombing campaign to strike and German industry and civilian morale. At the January 1943 Casablanca conference, Allied commanders call for a Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany. The goal is to hit key industries and military targets in preparation for an invasion in 1944. Allied command still prioritizes U-boat facilities at first, but by June 1943 the POINTBLANK directive shifts the focus to German aircraft and bal

l-bearing production. US Army Air Force chief Henry Arnold strongly supports strategic bombing and has expanded US air power since 1940. He especially believes the targeted daytime bombing of specific key industries, like oil or ball-bearings, can cripple German war production. British bomber command chief Arthur Harris, who is sceptical of such ‘bottleneck’ bombing, wants the US to join the RAF in nighttime area bombing, but Arnold maintains independence. The RAF and USAAF campaigns will build

on each other but are largely separate. From the US side, the Eighth Bomber Command will carry out most of the new mission for summer and fall 1943, flying from RAF airbases across East Anglia. By late summer, the US had almost 400 heavy B-17 bombers in 21 Bombardment Groups ready for operations in the skies over occupied Europe. The Eighth conducted small-scale raids, especially in occupied France, in 1942, but a lack of bombers limited operations against Germany. By 1943 though, new aircraft,

personnel and equipment are arriving, allowing for operations to be ramped up. In summer 1943, the Eighth launch a series of raids to coincide with the RAF’s bombing of Hamburg. Starting on July 24, 1943, US bombers hit targets across Norway and Germany over six days in a mini-campaign known as Blitz Week – with mixed results. A firestorm in Hamburg damages some U-boat production facilities and kills and wounds thousands of civilians, while the Norway bombing setbacks nitrate production by a few

months. But bomber losses mount and the available fighter escorts are inadequate. Overall, the USAAF lose about 100 B-17s across Blitz Week, with 90 casualties. Still, replacements are arriving from the US and commanders plan new, even more ambitious raids. Operation Double Strike targets the Regensburg aircraft factories and Schweinfurt ball-bearing plant in a coordinated raid – the deepest yet into Germany. Colonel Curtis LeMay’s 4th Bombardment Wing will attack the Messerschmidt factory at R

egensburg before flying onto land in North Africa. Planners hope these so-called “Shuttle Raids” confuse enemy air controllers and wrongfoot defending fighters. The 4th Wings unexpected flight to Algeria will hopefully divert Luftwaffe forces away from the 1st Bombardment Wing’s outward and return flight to Schweinfurt. This is even more vital as both raids will lack fighter escort for much of their route. Fuel limitations means many escorts will turn back near the Dutch border, while long range

additional fuel tanks are scarce. However, the raid on August 17 quickly goes wrong. Poor weather delays the departure of the Schweinfurt force, meaning it takes off four hours after the Regensburg force, instead of the planned 10 minutes. As the 146 Regensburg bombers pass into Luftwaffe operational areas, German fighters scramble and attack along a 260-kilometre-long aerial battlefield: “We came down on them from the front and slightly above. The huge airplanes were quickly distinguished as i

ndividual targets – we aimed at the fuselage and the right engines. We fired, then ripped through the entire bunch lightning-quick – a fantastic moment. Some of the monsters had caught fire. I dodged their huge, shark-like tails with their large black code letters.” (Caldwell) Over Regensburg, the fighters withdraw and the bombing is generally effective. One of its biggest impacts is unintended, as it destroys secret experimental Me 262 jet fighter fuselages. The diversion south also works and c

onfuses the Germans. However, it's of little use to the delayed Schweinfurt force flying along a similar route as the Regensburg bombers. German fighters have time to land, rearm, refuel and attack the second penetration even harder than the first. After a gruelling air battle, the bombers reach their target, but bombing is less accurate. The combined raids are costly for the Eighth. 60 B-17s are shot down, and 11 scrapped on their return, with 600 casualties – around 16 percent of the force. Ce

rtain groups, such as the 100th and 95th Bomber Groups lose almost 50 percent. US bomber aircrews claim to have shot down 288 enemy aircraft, but the real figure is closer to 47, with only 16 German pilots killed. Of this number, most were shot down by escorting fighters. The hugely exaggerated claims of shot down enemy fighters were sometimes viewed sceptically by commanders but accepted in the interest of morale. This was important as statistically; bomber crews face some of the worst odds for

all combatants. The B-17 Flying Fortress is designed to be robust and well-defended by a 10-man crew in mutually supporting defensive air formations. But, although Luftwaffe pilots attack from all directions, US aircrews become especially concerned about attack against the weaker front of the plane. Machineguns are later added to the plexiglass nose, but B-17 gunners lack training, and despite Allied claims, German losses to B-17 guns are low. One Eighth Air Force commander was critical: “I rea

lly felt that the gunners, in some cases, were more a hazard than they were a protection. I do not think we will ever know how many airplanes we shot down ourselves by this wild spraying of .50 caliber machine guns...” (Ross 150) US planners try to improve the B-17, such as the G model with a remote-controlled chin turret, but enemy fighters and flak are just two of many dangers. Accidents are a problem - made worse by lack of maintenance time – as are friendly fire, collisions in formation flyi

ng, frostbite and poor weather. Many pilots lack experience taking off and landing in fog, especially with overladen planes: “An overloaded B-17 stalling out under a thousand feet met its spectacular end in seconds... Three tons of bombs, twenty-seven hundred gallons of high-octane fuel, about six thousand rounds of fifty-caliber ammunition along with oxygen tanks, hydraulic and lubricating oil, all hitting the ground at over two hundred miles an hour, left nothing but a steaming black smear.” (

Ross 146/147) A whole crew bailing out is possible, but dangerous. Crew have to grab their parachutes in time, fight against the forces of a tumbling plane and avoid other planes or debris in the sky. Pilots often remain onboard to keep the plane flying level. The men also fear being shot while parachuting, and German civilians occasionally attack downed bomber crews. Stoked by Nazi propaganda regarding Anglo-American Luftgangsters, conservative estimates suggest lynch mobs kill around 350 downe

d airmen, especially from 1944 – although the actual figure may be higher. German troops generally do take prisoners though. Sergeant Ray Manley recalls his reception after bailing out: “Four German soldiers approached me and asked if I was armed. I said, “No,” and then one of them replied in perfect English, “For you, the war is over!” Then they walked me to a nearby village where a crowd of people had gathered... A little blonde girl, aged about five or six, stood and looked me over. She smile

d at me, the only friendly face there...” (Hawkins Munster 131) Successive missions with high casualties also result in psychological breakdowns. The USAAF reassigns sufferers to non-combat roles, but crews see psychological wounds with a social stigma attached. The men also know that the bombing kills more German civilians than soldiers, which adds additional stress for airmen like Colonel LeMay: “[Y]ou drop a load of bombs, and, if you’re cursed with any imagination at all, you have at least o

ne quick horrid glimpse of a child lying in bed with a whole ton of masonry tumbling down on top of him; or a three-year-old girl wailing for Mutter... Mutter... Then you have to turn away from the picture if you intend to retain your sanity.” (Hansen 167) For Eighth Bomber Command crews, the stats are grim. A 1943 study finds only 26% complete their 25 missions. 57% are killed, missing, or captured and 17% are wounded, killed in accidents, or discharged due to mental conditions. But numbers pai

nt an incomplete picture. Casualty rates among bombers vary greatly between different parts of the formation. Some may escape unscathed, while others might be almost wiped out. The 100th Bomber Group gains a grisly reputation for high losses, earning it the nickname the “Bloody Hundredth’. At Regensburg, the 100th loses nine of 21 attacking bombers– the highest of any group. 100th Bomber crewmen begin to suspect Luftwaffe fighters are deliberately targeting them, perhaps as revenge. A story spre

ads among US crewmen that on an earlier raid a damaged B-17 from the 100th dropped its landing gear to signal surrender to a German fighter. When the fighter flew closer to escort it to the ground, the B-17 gunners opened fire, shooting the fighter down. The story though is probably false. The reality is likely more mundane. At Regensburg, many 100th Group bombers flew in the most vulnerable positions of the wing – the high and low squadrons of the low combat box in the formation. These exposed

positions lack the supporting fire of the central ones and were often targeted first, earning the nickname “Purple Heart” or “Coffin Corner”. But the rumour sticks and in October, a new raid seems to confirm the Bloody Hundredth ‘curse’. On October 10, 1943, US planners target the city of Münster. 274 B-17s will attack the city center in the first explicit US raid to bomb civilian housing. The goal is to kill or render homeless workers of Münster’s factories and transport facilities, reducing bo

th manpower and morale. The aiming point is the Münster cathedral on a Sunday afternoon. The 100th is exhausted after another week of intense bombing, but the Americans expect the Münster raid to be relatively easy due to its proximity to the Dutch border and fighter escort. However, it soon turns into a disaster. Fog prevents some escorts joining the bombers and up to 350 Luftwaffe fighters scramble to intercept the raid, especially the 100th Bomb Group in “Coffin Corner”. Captain Frank Murphy

aboard a 100th Group B-17 nicknamed ‘Aw-R-Go' recalls: “The German aircraft came after the 100th in seemingly endless waves. As one element of fighters broke away, another was turning for a head-on attack far ahead of us... Fighter after fighter flew directly into our formation passing so close that we could distinctly see the German pilots in their cockpits... More than once I turned away from the attacking fighters fully expecting a certain head-on collision.” (Hawkins Munster 113) Within mome

nts, German Me 109s and Fw 190s shoot down three of the 100ths lead squadron. Damaged bombers, falling out of formation, found themselves especially vulnerable to heavy twin-engine German aircraft, like the Me 110, 410 and Ju-88. The bombers’ gunners attempted to drive off attacks, but weapons jam, crewmen are wounded, and ammunition runs out. The B-17s waist guns and turrets are often the most dangerous position to man. Within stricken B-17s, chaotic scenes play out: “...I heard loud yelling be

hind me. I turned and saw Sergeant Auger squatting beside the Navigator with blood streaming down his face. The Navigator, obviously in a state of complete shock, was screaming at him, ‘Get back on your guns or I’ll kill you!’ He started searching through his gear for his pistol.” (Hawkins Munster 147) The US loses 30 B-17s. Of the 100th group’s 13 bombers on the raid, 12 are shot down, with 32 killed and 88 captured. The lone surviving bomber, the Royal Flush, limps home on two engines, a non-f

unctioning oxygen system, and wounded crew. Its pilot, Robert Rosenthal, will go on to complete 52 missions – double the standard tour. Despite the losses, the lead bombers hit Münster, killing 700 civilians. For the bombers, the lesson of October’s so-called ‘Black Week’ is the need for better long-range fighter escort. New fighters like the P-51 Mustang and improved fuel drop tanks are coming, but Allied plans to cripple the German war industry mean bomber missions often outrange fighter escor

t. Four days after Münster, the 100th Bomb Group joins another ambitious mission deep into Germany. The target is once again Schweinfurt. Bomber command believes a raid on the ball-bearing plant can set back German fighter production by months. It will be the biggest US raid yet: 383 B-17s in two forces will penetrate into Germany without fighter escort. Within 100 kilometres of their route, around 1,100 Luftwaffe fighters are based. US veterans of the first Schweinfurt raid two months prior are

concerned: “When the briefing officer said, “Gentlemen, your target for today is Schweinfurt,” everyone groaned. The ball bearing plants would be heavily defended. We knew our third mission would be one hell of a fight.” (Bowman 16) Again, the raid starts poorly. Delays and weather confuse fighter escort rendezvous. By the time escorting P-47s near the German border, some have only 15 minutes of fuel for combat. Mechanical problems mean only 291 bombers continue onto the target. When the Allied

fighter escort turns back around Aachen, the Luftwaffe attack with everything they have, including a new weapon: “...the tail gunner, shouted that a Me 110 behind us out of range was firing something at us and it was leaving a black stream of smoke. We didn't know that it was at the time, but we discovered later that it was a rocket... The missile exploded right under our plane. It felt as if we were on an elevator; it lifted us up and did all kinds of damage.” (Bowman 57) The American bombers

arrange themselves into mutually supporting masses up to 100 strong, but Luftwaffe planes launch coordinated attacks. While twin-engine Zerstörer aircraft, like the Me 110, volley rockets into B-17 formations to cause disruption, single-engine fighters accelerate in front to open up with a grouped head on attack. Once out of formation or damaged, isolated bombers can be picked off from all directions. As the Americans approach Schweinfurt, flak guns, some crewed by teenagers, take over the defen

ce: “Our fire control equipment registered the formation immediately... Every three seconds the alarm bell range. That means: “volley fire from all guns!”... The enemy aircraft were densely surrounded by the air-bursts of anti-aircraft shells... Large dark, in some places blood-red, clouds of smoke and dust hung over the city. Often only afterwards were we stricken with fear. We 16-year-olds had to overcome it each in his own way.” (Bowman 44) 228 B-17s reach Schweinfurt to bomb it, with general

ly good accuracy. The Luftwaffe pursues them on the return flight. Only when the bombers reach the safety of escort fighters near the Channel do the equally exhausted Germans retire. Some Luftwaffe pilots have flown three individual sorties during the raid. US losses are 60 B-17s shot down, and 121 damaged, 17 beyond repair. 600 men are dead or missing. 13-year-old Ernst Reichert finds a crashed bomber: “With other boys I ran straight to the suspected emergency landing site. [...] On the left in

the burned-out cockpit was the completely charred and shrunken pilot. His hands still gripped the steering wheel tightly. The Flying Fortress had already burned down and was still smoking. Behind the pilot there was another crewman, also charred, tilted sideways.” (Historischer Verein Markt Werneck) Bomber crews claim they’ve shot down 186 Germans, but the actual figure is around 40. Allied commanders claim the attack destroys three ball-bearing factories and shuts down the entire works. Privat

ely, though Eighth Bomber Command is concerned about the high losses. The second Schweinfurt raid ends USAAF deep, unescorted penetrations, while poor weather stops major bombing until February 1944. When commanders assess the year’s progress, they’re still not sure how much damage they’ve done. Assessing the damage is difficult due to inaccuracies in bomber surveys and debates about the German war economy. Post-war RAF and USAAF surveys tend to exaggerate the impact both economically and psycho

logically. In the USAAF’s case this was partly to encourage its reform as a separate, independent branch of the military. But even some analysts at the time accepted the results were disappointing. Firstly, allied intelligence worked under the assumption Germany was fully mobilised from the start of the war, limiting German war production growth. However, Germany consistently found surplus industrial capacity – although historians debate whether this was due to lack of early-war mobilisation or

fixing economic inefficiencies. In any case, general arms production continued to increase until peaking in 1944. Fighter and ball-bearing production was also not hugely disrupted by bombing in 1943. Until the final months of the war, the Germans built more aircraft and fighters and compensated for ball-bearing production damage with porcelain substitutes, rigid controls, imports from Sweden and unused stockpiles. Some historians, such as Alan Levine, suggest bombing may have reduced German arma

ments growth by as little as 5%. Others argue the 1943 Combined Bomber Offensive should be viewed as a German defensive victory. Although no bomber force was totally destroyed or forced to turn back, Allied bombers failed to cripple German war production. Armaments Minister Albert Speer later claimed follow-up raids on bombed facilities could have caused significant damage, but such raids often came too late, by which time equipment was salvaged and buildings repaired. But this potential German

defensive victory is highly conditional. The 1943 campaign did wear down the Luftwaffe. In all theatres, the Luftwaffe lost 30-40% of its entire force every month. For a while new production replaced aircraft losses, but the Luftwaffe lacked experienced pilots. New pilots received less training, and advanced skills like instrument flying and night flying became rare. Although there were advances like jet fighters, the Luftwaffe also adopted more desperate measures, like mobilising their own bomb

ers in the fight against Allied bombing. The Luftwaffe converted surplus bombers like the Dornier Do 17 into heavy fighters and even theorised concepts of air-to-air bombing – dropping time-fused bombs onto enemy formations. A huge amount of resources and manpower were also being locked down in German air defence. By the end of 1943, 9,000 88mm guns, 25,000 other anti-aircraft weapons and half the electronics industry was diverted to air defence. This means fewer weapons on the frontline and mor

e equipment in passive roles. On average 16,000 shells were fired per bomber shot down. Bombing in 1943 also set up the German war industry for future failures. German authorities brought more forced labourers into war production, impacting output and quality. Meanwhile, factories dispersed or moved underground were less efficient. Dispersal may have reduced fighter production by 25% compared to concentrated factories. Such isolated factories were also more vulnerable to transportation bombing,

which becomes a major allied target in 1944. Luftwaffe successes in 1943 may also have more to do with Allied limitations than German strategy. Weather, inexperience, and a lack of fighter escorts arguably played a bigger role. By the end of 1943, the Allies are working on solutions to these problems – like better radar and radio equipment, longer range fighters, and improved training. As soon as the weather clears in February 1944, the bomber offensive continues on an even bigger scale. The bom

bing campaign of 1943 kills tens of thousands of German civilians, and turns the heart of the Reich into a major front. Meanwhile, far from the front lines and momentous battles, the Nazi regime’s plan to murder Europe’s Jews, Roma, and other groups in the Holocaust continues. Berlin also targets remaining German Jews, including the arrest of thousands who were married to Christian German women. This leads to a rare example of open German opposition to government policy in February 1943. Hundred

s of wives and relatives gather in Berlin’s Rosenstrasse to demand the release of their loved ones being held their by the Gestapo. The police release some, but send others to their death in concentration camps. This protest though, is a small exception in the midst of the ongoing genocide. Aktion Reinhard is the name the Germans give to their operation to kill the more than 2 million Jews living in ghettos in Eastern Europe. In 1942, the SS experiment with methods for mass killings and settle o

n gas chambers, which they build at three main killing centers, or death camps: Bełżec, Sobibór, and Treblinka. The plan is to deport most of the Jews from the larger ghettos: Warsaw, Łódź, Bialystok, Vilnius, Minsk, Riga, and Kaunas – along with thousands of Roma people. Once the deportees arrive, German guards trick them into thinking they’re being sent to showers – but instead, they are gassed. Jewish worker Shimon Goldberg, describes the gassing of the Roma at Treblinka: “While I was there,

they killed about 2,000 Gypsies. The Gypsies went wild, screamed awfully and wanted to break down the chambers. They climbed up the walls toward the apertures at the top and even tried to break the barred window. The Germans climbed onto the roof, fired inside, sealed off the apertures and asphyxiated everyone.” (Arald, p. 152-153; Crowe p. 246) In this way, by September 1943 the Germans have killed 250,000 Jews at Sobibor, 600,000 at Belzec, and 874,000 (and several thousand Roma) at Treblinka.

Most of the Polish, Baltic, and Belarussian Jewish population is now dead. But the killing in 1943 doesn’t stop with Operation Reinhard. In November, the Germans kill more than 40,000 at the Majdanek, Trawniki, and Poniatowa camps in what they call Operation Harvest Festival. And in other parts of Europe, German and collaborationist authorities continue deporting and murdering other Jewish communities. Starting in February, SS officials deport nearly all of the historic, 50,000-strong Jewish co

mmunity in Salonica to Auschwitz, where the camp authorities immediately gas 2/3 of them. In Bulgarian-controlled Macedonia and Thrace, Bulgarian authorities deport 11,000 Jews whom the Germans then kill. Sofia then goes back on its agreement with Germany and refuses to deport the Jewish population living inside the pre-war Bulgarian borders. After Italy surrenders in September, German troops occupy the country and the Nazi government tries to kill the Italian Jews, which up until now the Mussol

ini regime refused to deport. In October, the SS and Italian police begin to round up Italy’s Jewish population for transport and murder in Auschwitz. In the end, they kill about 15% of Italian Jews. In occupied Denmark, Germany declares martial law after a series of strikes, and plans to deport and kill the 7500 Jews in the country. The Danish government contacts the Swedes, who agree to accept Jewish refugees escaping by boat, the majority of whom do. Most of the Jewish victims of Aktion Reinh

ard and the other mass murders had no chance to defend themselves, but in 1943, thousands of Jews rose in revolt against the Nazis. In August, at the Treblinka killing center, Jewish prisoners fight back against the SS guards and 200 escape, most of whom the Germans catch and killed. In October at Sobibor, Jewish Red Army prisoners of war lead an uprising that kills 13 SS men and other guards, including the center’s deputy commander. 300 prisoners escape, of whom 50 survive the war in hiding. Tw

o of these are Chaim Engel and Selma Wijnberg, who later marry. Selma, suffering from typhus, later recalls the terrifying escape from the camp as the guards machine-gunned the crowd: “Chaim took my hand and he said, 'Come, its no use we stay there.' And then everybody starts running […] to this gate, everybody was falling around next to us. You hear mines going and people dropping dead […] You just run. I remember I had a necklace full with Jewish emblems […] So that was the first thing what i

took off and threw away [outside the camp]. […] I was very nervous of course when you had to run, I get diarrhoea and I had to stop all the time. We heard shooting behind us and we heard screaming and we were running and running […]” (Interview) The biggest uprising of all takes place in the Warsaw Ghetto in April and May. Once Operation Reinhard begins and the Nazis plan becomes clear to its intended victims, so the Jewish underground resistance in the Warsaw ghetto prepared to resist. They for

m defence organizations, and receive weapons from the Polish Home Army, which was resisting Nazi rule throughout Poland. Many ghetto residents are former Polish army soldiers, and when the Germans start deportations in January 1943, these Jews fight back for several days. The Germans deport fewer Jews than planned, but begin a second deportation wave on April 19, when the main uprising begins. For 23 days, about 750 armed Jews hold off around 2000 German troops. They know they cannot win and mos

t will die, but resistance commanders like Mordecai Anielewicz are determined to fight: “Something has happened which is beyond our wildest dreams. The Germans have fled twice from the Ghetto.[...] I cannot describe the conditions under which the Jews are living. Very few will hold out. Sooner or later the rest will perish. The die is cast. In all the bunkers where our comrades are hiding, it is impossible to light a candle at night for lack of air […] The main thing is—the dream of my life has

come true. I have lived to see a Jewish defence force in the Ghetto in all its greatness and glory.” (State of Israel 1:91; Crowe 268) The Germans do reestablish control over the ghetto, claiming to kill about 7000 Jews and deport more than 40,000 others in the process – the vast majority of whom they kill soon afterwards along with survivors in the ghetto. And so the so-called forgotten year of 1943 sees the Allies push the Germans out of North Africa, Sicily, part of Italy, the Atlantic, and s

mash the Wehrmacht backwards from the Volga in Russia to the Dnipro in Ukraine. But even though the Germans are losing, they are making the Allies pay dearly and cling to their conquests: the Allied campaign in Italy is bogged down, the bombing campaign suffers heavy losses in men and planes, and the Red Army loses hundreds of thousands of men without achieving its ambitious strategic goals. The Germans are losing the war, and the odds are stacked against them, but they have stabilized the lines

in the east and in Italy, for now. As historian Robert Citino writes: “...the math couldn’t have been worse. But was it just possible that there were some in the German military – not just Hitler, but men among the staff and field commanders – who looked around at the end of this horrible year, took a deep breath, and began to hope that with a tweak here and there, a little more willpower, and perhaps a bit of luck, they might actually survive their ordeal?” (Citino 278) These thoughts are a de

parture from the rational approach to war the German officer corps long prided itself upon. Germany is out of options for holding on to its supposed 1000-year Reich, and yet still underestimates the willpower of its more powerful enemies. The Allies have definitively gained the upper hand, and 1944 will make that abundantly clear. Since you are watching this two plus hour documentary about the pivotal year 1943, I am guessing you might be keen to learn more about the Second World War and other o

verlooked campaigns that don’t often get the time they deserve in history documentaries. Well, we made two other epic World War 2 documentaries: the first one is 16 Days in Berlin; the most detailed documentary about the Battle of Berlin ever produced. A 4 ½ hour day-by-day breakdown of one of the biggest battles of the entire war when the Red Army advanced from the Oder River into the heart of Nazi Germany’s capital. Filmed on original location, featuring detailed maps and animation, expert int

erviews and much more. The second documentary is Rhineland 45 about the last set-piece battle on the Western Front in which the Allies under Bernhard Montgomery attacked from the Dutch Border and ultimately crossed the mighty Rhine river. This 3 ½ hour documentary was also filmed on original location, features detailed maps and animation, expert and veteran interviews and more. But you can’t watch 16 Days in Berlin and Rhineland 45 on YouTube because of our uncompromising portrayal of the war us

ing authentic combat footage. So, where can you watch these two massive documentaries with a combined runtime of over 8 hours? On Nebula, a streaming service we’re building together with other creators; where we don’t have to worry about YouTube’s advertising guidelines and the mighty algorithm. If you sign up at nebula.tv/realtimehistory you can watch all our content in 4K, ad-free and earlier than on YouTube. And not just in your browser, Nebula is also available on your Smartphone and devices

like Apple TV or Roku. And all that for just $30 a year. And it’s not just our documentaries you can watch on Nebula, there are a lot of other creators on there who also produced original content they couldn’t upload on YouTube. If you want even more Second World War content, check out the Battle of Britain series by Real Engineering or if you need a break from military history, check out Jet Lag by Wendover, a fun game show where contestants race around the world. Again, that’s nebula.tv/realt

imehistory for just $30 a year and supporting our channel and future history content directly. As usual you can find all the sources for this video in the video description below. If you are watching this video on Nebula or Patreon, thank you so much for the support. I’m Jesse Alexander and this is a production of Real Time History, the only history channel that won’t forget 1943.